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Thomas S. Kuhn writes of disciplinary paradigms, presuppositions 
tacitly setting v ,ie epistemological boundaries of a partlculat field or 
of the vision of a particular epoch. In the past decade, a paradigmatic 
revolution has deeply altered the western world's sense of reality. A 
new postmodern paradigm has emerged and evidenced Itself in such 
critical approaches to art as semiotics, phenomenology, 
poststructuralism, and hermeneutics. The aim of the present study is to 
identify the central theoretical perspective offered by the new 
paradigm, to examine and define the central critico-historical 
principles stemming from such a perspective, and to relate these 
principles to the work of the theatre historian. In order to do so, the 
study has limited its focus to a single significant and representative 
body of work, the first thirteen volumes of the journal, New Literary 
History (NLH).
The significance of NLH in the realm of American aesthetic theory 
and history rests on several foundations. The first journal to make the 
new theory accessible to English speaking scholars, NLH has published 
articles by many of the leading figures in postmodern criticism. NLH 
also remains the only major American critical journal dedicated to a 
re-evaluation of the history in the light of contemporary communication 
theory.
Chapter I explicates the fundamental epistemological principles of 
the postmodern paradigm. The chapter has been structured to show the 
evolution of postmodern epistemology from its inception in Kant to its
ill
most contemporary representation In post-Gadamerican hermaneutics. The 
fundamental epistemological principles of the major modern and
postmodern critical schools are examined and the Interrelationships 
between these separate critical philosophies are studied. The chapter 
discusses the epistemological contributions made by Kant,- Saussure, 
Hegel, Dilthey, Heidegger, Derrida, and Gadamer. The chapter also 
locates the Identity of NLH in terms of the overall postmodern paradigm.
Chapter II analyzes the nature of audience response as envisioned
in the light of postmodern eplstemology. The principles that structure
this reception are accounted with special attention being given to 
centextual linguistics and the postmodern definition of metaphor.
Chapter IV presents a summary of the basic tenets of the NLH
approach to the history of the arts and proceeds to an evaluation of the 
merits and limitations of the NLH format for future theatre history 
research. The chapter includes an estimation of how the theatre 




In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn develops 
the concept of disciplinary paradigms, epistemological presuppositions 
tacitly accepted among members of a particular community o f .scientific 
researchers. Paradigms, by setting the epistemological boundaries of a 
particular field, restrict the selection of problems to "those that can 
be answered," set down the rules that govern methodical research, and
construct the guidelines for understanding the results of that re­
search.^ As David Bleich asserts, paradigms give consistency to a 
particular field of research be delineating "the cognitive state of mind 
of those systematically observing something in human experience." In 
The Order of Things, structural historian Michel Foucault develops a 
concept similar to Kuhn's idea of paradigms. Foucault devotes his 
discussion to "epistemes," the â priori conditions under which "ideas
could appear, sciences could be established, experience could be re-
fleeted in philosophies." Foucault extends the province of the 
episteme beyond the realm of scientific discourse, that region of 
knowledge upon which Kuhn had limited his focus. Foucault asserts that 
the same epistemes or paradigms govern all forms of discourse within a 
particular period. And structural historian Hayden White echoes
^Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1970), pp. 37-40.
2David Bleich, "The Subjective Paradigm in Science, Psychology, and 
Criticism," New Literary History, 7 (Winter 1976), 313.
3Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. xxi-ii.
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Foucault's extension of paradigmatic po^^r to all forms of scholarly 
discourse: "a discipline, as against whatever findings or knowledge it
may provide, is nothing if not a product of the conventions, generally 
social in nature, which make collective work possible."^ All disci­
plines insofar as they assume a common standard by which to judge truth 
and sense must also assume a central paradigmatic basis.
Paradigms, as long as they are stable and in wide acceptance, 
assure the smooth operation of disciplinary research and discussion. 
However, epistemological realities change during periods of crisis, 
points in time which Kuhn characterizes as marked by the "blurring of a 
paradigm and the consequent loosening of the rules for normal re­
search."^ Such a paradigmatic crisis evidenced itself in the western 
world in the years immediately following World War II. For example, 
late eighteenth century paradigmatic standards such as objectivism, 
positivism, and linguistic atomism prevailed in the study of the arts 
and humanities until the 1950's. However, due to the influence of 
eastern culture and existential philosophy, the post-war years saw the 
emergence of new paradigmatic standards such as relativism, historicism, 
and linguistic contextualistn. In the study of the arts, attention 
shifted away from the analysis of a work's meaning to the study of a 
work's potential for meaning making. A new form of criticism which 
posed new questions arose. Jonathan Culler defines this new criticism: 
"a poetics which strives to define the conditions of meaning. Granting
^Hayden White, "Conventional Conflicts," New Literary History, 13 
(Autumn 1981), 152.
"’Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1970), p. 84.
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new attention to the activity of reading, it would attempt to specify
how we go about making sense of texts, what are the interpretive op­
erations on which literature itself, as an institution, is based. 
The paradigmatic revolution evidenced in the post-war period deeply
altered the western world's sense of reality; Ihab Hassan accordingly 
defines the revolution as "a radical reorganization of knowledge, in the 
discourse by which we apprehend our b e i n g . A n d  in the early 1980's, 
the success of the revolution could be easily perceived. Kuhn cites 
three types of evidence that testifies to the success of a paradigmatic 
revolution: the formation of specialized journals, the foundation of
specialized societies, and the accepted claim of the new paradigm for a
g
special place in the university curriculum. In the realm of American 
letters alone, the increasing number of journals devoted to the new 
theoretical stance bears witness to the wide spread acceptance of the 
new paradigm. Since the late 1960's, scholarly publications such as New 
Literary History, Dia-Critics, Yale French Studies, Glyph, and Poetics 
Today which take their stance in favor of the new criticism have entered 
the ranks of respected literary journals. Symposia devoted to new 
theoretical discussions such as the 1966 Johns Hopkins conference on 
structuralism, the 1974 First Conference of the International 
Association for Semiotic Studies, the 1973 Bellagio conference on
^Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structure, Linguistics and
the Study of Literature (Ithaca: Cornell, 1975), p. viii.
^Ihab Hassan, "A re-Vision of Literature," New Literary History, 8 
(Autumn 1976), 134.
QThomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1970), pp. 19-20.
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literary history, and the 1980 University of Chicago symposium on 
narrative have drawn international participation and large audiences, 
the semiotic association conference attracting a membership attendance 
of 650. And courses in semiotics, hermeneutics, the new historiography, 
and structuralism have increasingly been added to the curriculum offered 
by American universities during the last decade.
For two reasons an understanding of the new paradigmatic 
revolution and of its central epistemological and methodological princi­
ples has become essential to any scholar working in the arts and human­
ities. First, paradigms insofar as they define what will count as man's 
reality also determine the identity of human culture. What will be 
considered by an eighteenth century man as part of his cultural totality 
may not be considered so by a twentieth century man. Any scholar 
working in the arts must first ascertain the identify of his subject and 
this can be perceived only through a knowledge of the particular 
paradigm dominating a period. Also, insofar as paradigms determine the 
boundaries of a certain discipline, paradigmatic revolutions mark the 
evolution of one stage of disciplinary study into another. Kuhn accord­
ingly asserts that when a new paradigm has formed, "the older schools 
gradually disappear. In part their disappearance is caused by their 
members' conversion to a new paradigm. But there are always some men
who cling to one or another of the older views, and they are simply read
9
out of their profession, which thereafter ignores their work."
^Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1970), p. 18.
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Self-preservation as a scholar then demands a constant keeping oneself 
in touch with universal paradigms and with their revolutionary changes.
American scholarship in letters and in the fine arts has done much 
within the past ten years to keep up with the foundations of the new 
paradigm; however, theatre scholarship has done little to digest or
assimilate the implications of the new epistemology. The aim of the
present study is to identify the central theoretical perspective offered
by the new paradigm, to examine and define the central
crltico-historical principles stemming from such a perspective, and to 
relate these principles to the work of the theatre historian. Such an 
aim Immediately encounters a difficulty in the immense amount of new 
critical and historical work produced by major critics on two continents 
and in the wide variety of disparate visions, each stemming from a 
single paradigmatic base. In order to counteract this difficulty, the 
present study has limited its focus to a single significant and rep­
resentative body of work, the first thirteen volumes of the journal, New 
Literary History (NLH).
The significance of NLH in the realm of American aesthetic theory
and history rests on several foundations. Founded in 1969 as part of
the University of Virginia's Sesquicentennial Celebration, NLH became
the first of several major critical journals to devote its pages to the
new criticism. Ralph Cohen, the founder and editor of NLH since its
inception, explains in the periodical's anniversary issue:
Ten years have passed since New Literary History first 
appeared in the autumn of 1969. There was, then, no 
Critical Inquiry, no Diacritics, no new-policy PMLA; 
there was then no English literary journal devoted to 
critical theory or to a reconsideration of literary 
history, its nature and possibilities. New Literary
ix
History was conceived as a move against the critical 
current; its aim was to inquire into the theoretical
bases of practical criticism and, in doing so, to 
re-examine the relation between past works and present 
critical and theoretical needs. . . .  It called into
question the limitations of subject matter in literary
journals, the nature of critical actiyity, and the 
meaning of history as commonly understood.
NLH has borne a worthy testimony to the new critical movement; In 
its pages have appeared articles by many of the leading figures in 
postmodern criticism: Yuri Lotman, Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman,
Hayden White, Jonathan Culler, Tzvetan Todorov, Stanley Fish, Paul 
Ricoeur, Hans Robert Jauss, Bernard Beckermann, Herbert Blau, Harold 
Bloom, Wolfgang Iser, and Charles Altieri. Its editorial board has
included such notable scholars as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Thomas S. Kuhn, E. 
D. Hirsch, Fredric Jameson, Hayden White, Wolfgang Iser, and Hans Robert 
Jauss. NLH has published for the first time many articles that have 
since received wide attention and have been included in important 
critical anthologies. Among these, several stand out: George Poulet's
"Phenomenology of Reading," Jacques Derrida's "White Mythology— Metaphor 
in the Text of Philosophy," and Hans Robert Jauss' "The Alterity and 
Modernity of Medieval Literature."
Another factor underlying the significance of NLH is its position 
as the only major American critical journal dedicated to an ongoing 
re-evaluation of the history of the arts and to an attempt to recon­
struct such a history in the light of contemporary communication theory. 
In order to fulfill this goal, the journal has enlisted the assistance
^Ralph Cohen, "The First Decade: Some Editorial Remarks," New
Literary History, 10 (Spring 1979), 418.
of some of the finest scholars in a wide variety of fields, spanning the 
disciplines of English, theatre, music, art, anthropology, philosophy, 
science, history, cinema, linguistics, sociology, and rhetoric. The 
journal has won acclaim from historians in several fields. 
For example, Michael Baxandall, a historian of the fine arts,'writes, "A 
weird thing about the last ten years has been quite how many art histo­
rians have been beating their breasts about the 'theoretical inad­
equacies' of the activity, and NLH has admirably registered that 
thudding, with a more representative spread of opinions than any of the 
art historians' own journals."^ And James Ackerman calls the "Lite­
rary and Art History" issue of NLH (Spring 1972), "the only theoretical
symposium that 1 can recall involving American art historians on any
12general problem of method."
Furthermore, the format of NLH, a carefully monitored and con­
trolled system of symposia, has done much to further the journal's 
significance. Each issue centers around a specific topic central to the 
ongoing historical study of the arts (e.g. "New and Old History," Autumn 
1969; "Form and Its Alternatives," Winter 1971; "Modernism and 
Postmodernism," Autumn 1971; "Ideology and Literature," Spring 1973); 
each issue has then concluded with an attempt to synthesize the contri­
butions made therein. Cohen attests to the success of this format: "in
issues such as 'Is Literary History Obsolete?' and 'What is
^Michael Baxandall, "The Language of Art History," New Literary 
History, 10 (Spring 1979), 453.
12James Ackerman, "Toward a New Social Theory of Art," New Literary
History, 4 (Winter 1973), 315.
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Literature.'1., the journal initiated discussions that have led to
extensive reconsiderations of the subject matter of literary study and
13literary history." Cohen and Iser further prove the success of the
NLH format when they state in NLH's anniversary issue that certain
solutions to the problems initially posed by NLH had been agreed upon by
14the consensus of its contributors. The first thirteen volumes of 
NLH might then be considered to contain a wealth of critical and theo­
retical ideas bearing upon the present state of the history of the arts 
as seen from the perspective of the contemporary postmodern paradigm.
This study will be arranged in the following fashion. Chapter I 
explicates the fundamental epistemological principles of the postmodern 
paradigm as evidenced in the pages of NLH. Such an attempt at
paradigmatic formation encounters two problems. First, the contribu­
tions to NLH do not all represent a single philosophical or critical 
outlook. Rather the contributions to NLH fall largely into four main 
streams of contemporay criticism. Two represent the polar positions of
the modern paradigm: formalist schools such as structuralism and
semiotics and Dilthey's and Hirsch's intentional hermeneutics. Two 
others represent the polar positions of the postmodern paradigm: the
philosophy of Derrida, deconstruction, and phenomenological 
hermeneutics. Furthermore, no significant critic would claim that any 
foundational principles of postmodern scholarship have stabilized
13Cohen, 417; Wolfgang Iser, "The Current Situation of Literary 




themselves; rather the postmodern period characterizes itself through a 
continuous rebellion against fixed precepts, static definitions, and set 
perspectives. The postmodern paradigm continually evolves as each of 
the four major contributing schools counteracts with each other. 
Accordingly Chapter I has been structured to .show the 
evolution of postmodern epistetnology from its inception in Kant to its 
most contemporary representation in post-Gadamerian hermeneutics. The 
fundamental epistemological principles of the major modern and 
postmodern critical schools will be examined and the interrelationships 
between these separate critical philosophies will be studied. Through 
NHL commentaries and through remarks made by NLH editor Cohen, the 
identity of NLH will be located in terms of the overall postmodern 
paradigm. Also, it will be argued that the postmodern critic has 
posited a similar basis for the history of all arts and of all human 
endeavors. It will be shown that from the postmodern standpoint the 
task of the literary historian and of the theatre historian share many 
other similarities, since both involve primarily the interpretation of 
nonmaterial "texts," that is of linguistic systems that transcend the 
particular medium in which they are manifested. Accordingly many 
aesthetic and historical principles formulated in NLH in terms of 
literary study will be taken in the following chapters as equally 
relevant to theatre studies.
NLH espouses a history of art based predominantly on audience 
reception rather than on the work of art itself. In order to understand 
the nature of the temporal progression charted in postmodern aesthetic 
history, it is necessary first to understand the nature of artistic
xiii
reception. Chapter II thus analyzes the nature of aesthetic reception 
as envisioned in the light of postmodern epistemology. The principles 
that structure this reception are accounted with special attention being 
given to contextual linguistics and the postmodern definition of meta­
phor.
Chapter III examines the values and methods of the practicing NLH 
historian. Since postmodernism attains its identity partially through a 
strong opposition to traditional forms of scholarship, this chapter 
first details the NLH attack on positivist history. The principles and 
procedures of the NLH historian are then examined.
Chapter IV presents a summary of the basic tenets of the NLH 
approach to the history of the arts and will proceed to an evaluation of 
the merits and limitations of the NLH format for future theatre history 
research. This chapter concludes with an estimation of how the theatre 




New Literary History and the Postmodern Paradigm 
Many suggestions for a postmodern paradigm have appeared in the 
pages of NLH. For example, in the spring issue of 1974, Martin 
Steinmann titled the new paradigm "Speech Act Theory."* Steinmann's 
article was followed by a debate between David Bleich and Norman Holland
over whether the new paradigm should be named "Subjective" or "Transa-
2ctive." And Herbert Lindenberger counted no less than seven paradigm
3suggestions in the spring, 1982 issue of NLH. Thus any episteme that 
would offer itself as a blanket paradigm for NLH must meet a basic 
requirement: that it respect the integrity of each distinct vision
represented in the journal. But since, as James Collins remarks, the 
theoretical stances taken in the journal "are not neatly rounded off to 
a systematic completion, but instead remain deliberately open to each 
other's type of work and to still other possibilities from further
4quarters," an overall paradigm must also be able to explain the 
manner in which the different visions can merge into a single progres­
sive line of historical inquiry.
Martin Steinmann, Jr. "Cumulation, Revolution and Progress," New 
Literary History, 5 (Spring 1974), 477-90.
2David Bleich, "The Subjective Paradigm in Science, Psychology, and 
Criticism," New Literary History, 7 (Winter 1976), 313-34; Norman N. 
Holland, "The New Paradigm: Subjective or Transactive?", New Literary
History, 7 (Winter 1976), 335-46.
3Herbert Lindenberger, "Postlogue, Postlude, Postscript," New Literary 
History, 13 (Spring 1982), 533.
4
James Collins, "Interpretation: the Interweave of Problems," New
Literary History, 4 (Winter 1973), 392.
1
Such a paradigm must also be able to explain the peculiar dominance 
of critical as opposed to historical essays in a journal which editor 
Cohen describes as "addressed to all engaged or Interested in the 
reconsideration of literary history."'* It must also make sense of 
editor Cohen's rejection of the principle that "history is a study of a 
series of works arranged in a chronological order as integrated parts of 
the historical process, and it differs from literary criticism which is 
the study of literature as a simultaneous o r d e r . C o h e n  views the 
rejection of the traditional disciplinary boundaries separating criti­
cism and history as the basic foundation for the NLH format. Finally, 
an NLH paradigm must also be able to define a distinct identity for the 
journal, an identity which should link the journal to those trends of 
thought with which Jerome Beaty finds it most frequently associated, 
"reader-response, receptlonalism, , . . literary history" and the
phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophy of the Constance School, a 
German school of criticism headed by Wolfgang Iser and Hans Robert 
Jauss.^
Kuhn explains that new paradigms are adopted because they are seen 
as capable of answering crucial problems which could not be resolved in
g
the terms of preceding paradigms. A study which seeks to establish
^Ralph Cohen, "A Note on New Literary History," New Literary History, 
1 (October 1969), 3.
^Ralph Cohen, "The First Decade: Some Editorial Remarks," New Liter­
ary History, 10 (Spring 1979), 418.
^Jerome Beaty, "Commentary: On Narrature and Narratives," New Liter­
ary History, 11 (Spring 1980), 559.
g
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1970), pp. 37-40.
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the identity of a new paradigm might best begin with an examination of
the moment when its predecessor was seen to fail. The noted structural
historian, Michel Foucault, cites the moment of failure for the
premodern paradigm as that inhabited by Kant and the Romantics, "the
qthreshold between our prehistory and what is still contemporary." 
Paul Ricoeur, a prominent contemporary hermeneutic philosopher, likewise 
writes, "The struggle between Romanticism and the Enlightenment is the 
source of our own problem and the milieu in which the opposition between 
two fundamental philosophical attitudes took shape: on the one side,
the Aufklarung [the Enlightenment] and its struggle against prejudice; 
on the other, Romanticism and its nostalgia for the past."^
This chapter begins with an account of how Kant's "Copernican 
revolution" plunged the nineteenth-century into an extreme 
epistemological dilemma. In answer to the Kantian dilemma, two poles of 
modern thought emerged: One emphasizing man as the dweller of univer­
sal, timeless structures; the other picturing man as an "absolutely 
restless being, pure activity, the negativity or ideality of every fixed 
category of abstractive intellect."^ These two philosophical trends 
then merged into the seminal work of the postmodern period, Martin 
Heidegger's Being and Time (1927). And again the two trends of thought 
split after Heidegger, each now borrowing essential elements from the 
other, in order to form the two polar stances of the postmodern period:
9Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. xxi-ii,
^Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. and ed. 
John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), p. 66.
^ G .  W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 73.
4
Derrida's poststructuralism and Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. 
Finally, it will be argued that a slightly modified and expanded version 
of Gadamer's hermeneutic may serve as the NLH paradigm. To present the 
philosophies or visions discussed in terms of their full richness and 
complexity is not intended; to identify the essential and minimal 
conditions under which meaning is made in the world of NLH is the goal. 
Kant and the Prelude to Modernity
The Critiques of Immanuel Kant were written in opposition to two 
eighteenth-century excesses of Cartesian dualism, rationalist metaphys­
ics and empiricist epistemology. Rationalism, as a science of formal 
logic, had not been able to prove its validity by formulating a consis­
tent, universally accepted metaphysical system. And Kant feared that 
this failure would be taken as confirmation of the empiricist's claim 
for material reality as the basis for all important knowledge. In order 
to alleviate the rationalist's embarrassment, Kant attempted to prove 
the inherent incapacity of rational thought for metaphysical 
speculation; and in order to oppose the empiricist epistemological base, 
Kant formulated his system of pure logic based on priori categories of 
judgment.
In order to defend his system of â  priori ideas, Kant opposed the 
empiricist model of man as a passive perceiver with his own belief in an 
imaginative intuition which actively intersects with the sensuous 
manifold (the external world) and shapes the manifold with the prior 
knowledge that a particular type of meaning may be made. The imagina­
tive intuition works in terms of time, the formal cause of understand­
ing, and space, its material cause. Time, the understanding of the
5
interconnection of parts, the medium of the active inner consciousness,
conditions space: "since all representations, whether they have for
their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves,
as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner
state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so
belongs to time, time is an â  priori condition of all appearances 
12whatsoever." Time allows understanding to occur and thus controls 
Kant's model of apperception. In Kant, the universe begins a slow 
transition from a spatial to a temporal order, a transition to be fully 
consummated only in the postmodern period.
However, in Kant the nature of new born time already raises prob­
lems. For example, since Kant argues that all knowledge comes from the 
union of the rational and the sensible, the essence of time can never be 
comprehended, for time which "has to do neither with shape nor position,
but with the relations of representation in our inner state" cannot "be
13a determination of outer appearances." But time as the formal cause 
of understanding allows itself to be reflected in the act of understand­
ing. Kant explains that because time "yields no shape, we endeavour to 
make up for this want by analogies. We represent the time-sequence by a 
line progressing to infinity in which the manifold constitutes a series 
of one dimension only; and we reason from the properties of this line to 
all the properties of time, with this one exception, that while the 
parts of the line are simultaneous the parts of time are always
12Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: Modern Library, 1958), p. 50.
^Ibid., p. 50.
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14successive." Time allows itself to be comprehended in a
self-reflective manner.
How then does Kant rescue the self-reflective mind from subjective 
relativism? The answer to this question can be found in Kant's 
discussion of the moral imperative in the Critique of Practical Reason.
Kant argues that insofar as all men feel a moral duty, such a duty 
must be a universal practical law: "Assuming that pure reason can
contain a practical ground sufficient to determine the will, then there 
are practical laws. Otherwise all practical principles are mere max­
ims."^ And insofar as the practical law is universally felt, there 
must be a single, universal rational nature: "for reason to be legisla­
tive, it is required that reason need presuppose only itself, because 
the rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without
contingent subjective conditions which differentiate one rational being 
16from another." Kant proceeds to assert that if practical reason 
assumes a reward for appropriate behavior, that reward cannot be one 
belonging to a material world where poetic injustice abounds. Kant 
concludes that practical reason necessarily implies a higher realm of 
justice than that associated with the material world, i. e. that realm 
originating in God. Thus Kant stabilizes the self-reflective world of 
human understanding through the divinely ordained laws of reason. And 
time, the understanding of relationships, manifests divine order through
14Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith 
(New York: Modern Library, 1958), p. 50.
^Immanual Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 17.
16Ibid., p. 19.
7
the universally valid principles of positive reasoning. However, Kant's 
discussion of lines of reasoning will precipitate the classical, objec­
tive paradigm.
These lines of reasoning, their ontology, their validity, and their 
limitations, comprise the central focus of Kant's Critiques. The 
divinely ordained unity of the Kantial universe validates two types of 
reasoning, each with its own particular method and domain of certitude. 
Kant distinguishes practical reason, the act of willing reasonably in 
accordance with the moral law, from rational reason; he further sepa­
rates rational reason into general and transcendental logic. General 
logic, that type usually associated with science, takes its base in the 
sensible world of intuition; transcendental logic, that type usually 
associated with mathematics and abstract reasoning, takes its base in 
the internal world where concepts are formed. General logic depends 
upon the abstraction from an image of the concepts applied to it; 
transcendental logic depends upon a further stage of abstraction as the 
mind reflects on its own powers to form concepts. Kant explains the 
self-reflective method by which transcendental logic proceeds: "we can
reduce all acts of understanding to judgments, and the understanding may 
therefore be represented as a faculty of judgment. The functions of the 
understanding can, therefore, be discovered if we can give an exhaustive 
statement of the functions of unity in judgment."^ Transcendental 
logic thus requires an abstractive distancing from direct observation 
and its proper domain is an intermediate world between the sensible and 
the divine.
^Immanual Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 68.
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Kant’s major contribution to the history of epistemology depended
upon the interposing of the transcendental mediating world between the
sensible and the divine. But the temporality of this intermediate world
undermined the epistemological certainty of many nineteenth century men.
For time places a restriction on man's potential for knowledge. Time as
the condition of man's apprehensive judgment upon the manifold prevents
man from apprehending all types of noumena (things-in-themselves), i.e.
the manifold, the self, and God. Concerning the
manifold, Kant writes, "Even if we could bring our intuition to the
highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby come any nearer to
the constitution of objects in themselves. We should still know only
our mode of intuition, that is, our sensibility. We should, indeed,
know it completely, but always under the conditions of space and time —
18conditions which are originally inherent in the subject." Concern­
ing the self, Kant writes, "We can thus say of the thinking 'I' (the 
soul) which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically 
identical at all times, and as the correlate of all existence, from 
which all other existence must be inferred, that it does not know Itself 
through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all 
objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself.
Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that
19which I must presuppose in order to know any object." And since all 
important knowledge stems from an exercise of â  priori ideas upon the 
manifold, Kant writes, concerning the divine: "Now no one, I trust,
18Immanual Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 55.
19Ibid., p. 201.
9
will be so bold as to profess that he comprehends the relation of the 
magnitude of the world as he has observed it (alike as regards both 
extent and content) to omnipotence, of the world order to supreme 
wisdom, of the world unity to the absolute unity of its Author, etc. 
Physico-theology is therefore unable to give any determinate.concept of 
the supreme cause of the world, and cannot therefore serve as the 
foundation of a theology which is itself in turn to form the basis of 
religion.
Kant's prohibition of rational logic from a comprehension of the 
divine, while intended as a preservation of the spiritual domain against 
the trauma of rationalist metaphysical failure, produced the opposite 
effect for many nineteenth-century men. Michael Timko observes that the 
arrival of Kant's work in England in the 1830's caused an abrupt break 
between the Romantic and the Victorian periods: "To Tennyson and the
other Victorians much of Wordsworth's metaphysical searching to find or 
apprehend relationships among certainties, or what seem to be cer­
tainties to him —  that is, God, nature, and man —  are overshadowed by
what appear to be the larger epistemological issues, the chief one being
21. . the ability of man to know or apprehend at all." Foucault
describes the resultant epoch as the historical moment when Representa­
tion disappeared and Man was born in its place; by this he means that 
truth ceased to be given objectively by the external world and became 
instead the subjective product of the human mind. But, owing to Kant's
20Immanual Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1936), p. 296.
21 Michael Timko, "The Victorianism of Victorian Literature," New
Literary History, 6 (Spring 1975), 612.
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sealing men off from full knowledge of himself, the making of meaning 
became part of the unconscious and could no longer be rationally con­
trolled by the being caught within it. Foucault explains, "it is 
possible to have access to him only through his words, his organism, the 
objects he makes —  as though it is they who possess the truth in the 
first place (and they alone perhaps); and he, as soon as he thinks, 
merely unveils himself to his own eyes in the form of a being who is 
already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible
anteriority, a living being, and instrument of production, a vehicle for
22words that exist before him." Foucault explains that this
uncontrollable and incomprehensible manufacturing of meaning, this
anonymity of man's other self, that part of man which Kant attributed to
23the divine, then became transformed into the ■’.ollective unconscious.
In the late nineteenth century attempts were made to master the
newly found personal and political unconscious. And in their quest for
certitude, certain thinkers turned to the only empirical remainder of
the Kantian universe, the intermediate imaginative faculty. Thus in the
process by which time reflected upon itself, the two schools that
forerun postmodern thought were established. Lawrence Manly depicts
these two philosophical movements as descendents from the empiricist and
2 Arationalist dispositions. The empiricist search for "social,
historical, and psychological genesis" grounded its study in the active
22Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (New Tork: Random House, 1973), p. 313.
23Ibid., pp. 238-39.
Lawrence Manly, "Concepts of Convention and Models of Critical 
Discourse," New Literary History, 13 (Autumn 1981), 38.
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intuition. On the other hand, the rationalist "insistence on the
noumenal grounds of fitness, certainty, and rectitude" manifested itself
in "an explicit search for the permanent structures of the mind itself,
the organizational categories and forms through which the mind is able
to experience the world, or to organize a meaning in what is essentially
25in itself meaningless." Both movements, by extending the intermedi­
ate domain to the proportions of a universal landscape, necessarily 
found transcendental logic the sole valid form of reasoning. The new 
empiricists, who included Hegel, Marx, and Dilthey, would supply the 
writers of NLH with their ideals and aspirations; the new Cartesians who 
included Saussure, Peirce, the early Husserl, and the early Freud, 
would supply the writers of NLH with targets for their animadversions. 
Both together would form the fundamental cognitive basis for the 
critico-historical principles of NLH.
Saussure and Structuralism
Of all the work to have come from the neo-Cartesian movement, 
perhaps only Edmund Husserl's Cartesian Meditations rivals Ferdinand de 
Saussure's Course in General Linguistics in terms of its impact upon 
postmodern thought. Saussure, the father of structuralism, constructed 
his system of linguistics on a fundamental distinction between langue, 
the "storehouse filled by members of a given community through their 
active use of speaking. a grammatical system that has a potential 
existence in each brain, or, more specifically in the brains of a group
25Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account
of Structuralism and Russian) Formalism (Princeton: Princeton
University, 1972), p. 109.
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26of individuals,*' and parole, its individual manifestation. Langue,
2 7"a Kantian . . . categorical, combinative unconscious," shares with
its Kantian counterpart an intersubjective nature: "It is the social
side of speech, outside the individual who can never create nor modify
it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by
28members of a community." Langue stands to parole as the individu­
al's social, linguistic competence to his Individual performance.
Langue also shares with its Kantian counterpart a self-enclosed 
nature, noumenal knowledge being replaced by the conventional, arbitrary
nature of words: "The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name,
29but a concept and a sound-image." Langue, the social lexicon of a
language, permits meaning to be made by distinguishing certain logically
similar words from each other. Saussure writes, "Instead of
pre-existing ideas then, we find . . . values emanating from the system.
When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is understood that the
concepts are differential and defined not by their positive content but
by their relations with other terms of the system. Their most precise
30characteristic is in being what the others are not." For example,
26Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed, Charles 
Bally and Albert Sechehaye; trans. Wade Basking (New York: Philosoph­
ical Library, 1959), pp. 13-14.
27Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Idhe (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1974),
p. 33.
28Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles 
Bally and Albert Sechehaye; trans. Wade Basking (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 14.
29Ibid.. p. 66.
30 Ibid., p. 117.
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the word "green" is partially defined in relationship to the word "red,"
"horse" to "cow," and in certain cultures, "being" to "nothingness."
"Horse" is defined by its relationship to synonyms such as "pony," to
other mammals, to other animals, to other nouns, and so on. Langue as a
syntactical lexicon controls semantics. And since Saussure argues that
meaning can be determined only from an immense series of differences,
langue must be viewed as a unified totality. A change in one definition
within the langue will result in at least a minor change in all other
definitions. Thus, in a passage central to an understanding of
poststructuralist thought, Saussure explains, "The idea that a sign
contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it.
Proof of this is that the value of a term may be modified without its
meaning or its sound being affected, solely because a neighboring term
31has been modified." Saussure concludes that in language all meaning 
is created through contrasts, through relative differences: "in lan­
guage there are only differences. Even more important: a difference
generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up;
32but in language there are only differences without positive terms."
In this play of differences "without positive terms," Saussure allows 
for the temporal evolution of a language and thus imitates his Kantian 
counterpart in the entrapment of time within the object observed, in 
this case within language.
31Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles 
Bally and Albert Sechehaye; trans. Wade Basking (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 120.
32Ibid., p. 120.
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This unified totality of language as a single metaphorical system 
constitutes one of Saussure's two most significant contributions to the 
foundations of postmodern criticism. The other stems from his defini­
tion of langue and results in his evaluative distinction between 
synchronic and diachronic studies. Since Saussure asserts that language 
remains an entire whole at each moment of its use and since meaning 
always depends upon an immense series of differences, he finds it
"absolutely impossible to study simultaneously relations in time and
33relations within the system." He thus separates synchronic linguis­
tics which pertains to "everything that relates to the static side of
our science" from diachronic which pertains to "everything that has to
3 Ado with evolution," But, since any single language event can be
understood only in terms of its relationship to its context, Saussure
explains: "the linguist who wishes to understand a state must discard
all knowledge of everything that produced it and ignore diachrony. He
can enter the mind of speakers only by completely suppressing the past.
35The intervention of history can only falsify his judgment." 
Saussure's positing of this priority of synchronic context over 
diachronic history, itself only a comparison of different synchronic 
states, presents the other structuralist foundational principle for 
postmodern history.
33Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles 
Bally and Albert Sechehaye; trans. Wade Basking (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 81.
35Ibid., p. 81.
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The application of Saussurian structuralism to the study of cul­
tural life and artifacts attained a brief period of prominence in Europe
during the 1950’s and early 1960's. However, as Hans Robert Jauss
36reports, structuralism had become almost extinct by the mid-1960's. 
The inherent incapacity of structuralism to form a lasting poetic 
stemmed from its global focus on the nature of meaning making rather 
than on the nature of meaning itself. While Saussure stressed the 
absolute reliance of the speech act upon context, he formulated no 
answers to the central problem that was to preoccupy postmodern histori­
ans: the nature of those factors which delineate context and conse­
quently determine the relationship between parole and langue. 
Accordingly the most ardent followers of Saussure inevitably evolved 
during the 1960's into champions of Peirce, the father of semiotics, a 
structuralist based approach to the solution of that problem. However, 
semiotics presented only one of the several routes open to structural 
thought in the wake of structuralism proper. Nor was semiotics neces­
sarily the most popular route taken, since its repetition of 
structuralist epistemology left it open to the same philosophical 
attacks as those to be levelled against Saussure.
Structuralism owed its demise to inherent problems more metaphys­
ical than technical, the chief problem being its implicit deterministic 
nature. Paul Ricoeur, despite his debt to structural thought, weighs 
against structuralism because "The act of speaking is excluded not only 
as exterior execution, as individual performance, but as free
36 Hans Robert Jauss, quoted in Rien T. Segers, "An Interview with
Hans Robert Jauss," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 86.
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37combination, as producing new utterance." He adds that for the
structural anthropologist "history is excluded, and not simply the
change from one state of system to another but the production of culture
38and of man in the production of his language." Jacques Derrida, 
another writer heavily influenced by structural thought, writes in a 
similar vein: "the respect for structurality, for the internal
originality of the structure, compels a neutralization of time and
39history." Derrida explains that since a structure remains a 
motionless and hence timeless concept, "one can describe what is 
peculiar to the structural organization only by not taking into account, 
in the very moment of its description, its past conditions; be omitting 
to posit the problem of the transition from one structure to another, by 
putting history between b r a c k e t s . T h e  discovery of langue as 
deterministic relativism inevitably led to the identification of 
language as social ideology. Fredric Jameson, a structural 
hermeneuticist, writes "The Structuralists . . . dissolving the
individual unit back into the langue of which it is a partial articu­
lation, set themselves the task of describing the organization of the 
total sign-system itself . . .  We may therefore understand the
3 7 Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics,
p. 83.
38Ibld., p. 84 
39Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1978), p. 291.
4°Ibid., p. 291.
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Structuralist enterprise as a study of superstructures, or, in a more 
limited way, of ideology.
The linking of the ideological to the unconscious syntactical 
begins the transitional period between modernism and postmodernism. 
From the coupling of the syntactical with the ideological spring two 
predominant characteristics of postmodern criticism. Meaning comes to 
originate not in the words themselves but in the order of words, an 
order Michel Foucault describes thus: "Order is, at one and the same 
time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden 
network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that 
which has no existence except in the grid created by a frame, an ex­
amination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid
that order manifests itself in depth as through already there, waiting
42in silence for the moment of its expression." As a result, the 
structural critics demand an immeasurably closer reading than that 
called for by the New Criticism. NLH editor Cohen explains that the 
leading new critics "have set themselves the task of ordering through 
the unsaid what is found to be obscure, disjunctive, or asymmetrical in 
what is said. . . What is considered, therefore, as a process of
demystification, becomes a process of remystification, of reconstruction 
—  of finding theoretical statements in ruptures of the text, in obscure 
hiding places, in absences of all kinds, in the writing of
41Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account
of Structuralism and Russiam Formalism (Princeton: Princeton
University, 1972), p. 101.
42Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (New York: Random House, 1973), p. xx.
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A 3subtexts." The espying of implicit ideological statements in all
uses of language also results in a focus on the ideological base of all
scholarly disciplines. In the postmodern period, the study of the arts
breaks from its traditional disinterestedness. Turning self-reflective,
criticism now attempts to awaken from its insensitivity to its own
ideological underpinnings. Wolfgang Iser writes that the new "literary
theory sprang not from any intensified study of literature so much as
from the parlous state of literary criticism at the universities —  a
state which it was meant to remedy. Literature has, to a great extent,
lost its social validity in contemporary society, and it was the attempt
,44to counteract this erosion that led to the breakthrough of theory.1 
As criticism turned to a social critique of critical method, as history 
turned to a moral critique of historical method, postmodern criticism 
intertwined the cognitive with the explicitly ethical and the political. 
Evan Watkins writes in the Winter 1971 issue of NLH, "in one grand shock 
wave spread over the last fifteen years . . . criticism could recover
for itself a sense of participation in a much wider enterprise and a 
sense of a vital role in what was increasingly known as the crisis of 
Western c u l t u r e . H o w e v e r ,  it should not be assumed that these 
critics and historians possessed a sutstitute ideology to propagate; 
rather the postmoderns refused to credit any vision as "innocent" or 
unsuspect.
A 3Ralph Cohen, "Statements Literary Texts Do Not Make," New Literary 
History, 13 (Spring 1982), 382; 382a,
44Wolfgang Iser, The Current Situation of Literary Theory: Key
Concepts and the Imaginary," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 1.
A 5Evan Watkins, "Conflict and Consensus in the History of Recent
Criticism," New Literary History, 11 (Winter 1981), 354.
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The transition from structuralism to deconstruction, a term often
associated with the predominant sector of poststructuralist activity,
can be chronicled in the work of Roland Barthes, the single predominant
figure who includes all important stages of structural thought in his
criticism. Barthes voices the sentiments of the transitional period in
Critical Essays (1964):
ideas and themes Interest me less than the way society 
takes possession of them in order to make them the 
substance of a certain number of signifying systems.
This does not mean that this substance is indifferent; it 
means that we cannot apprehend it, manipulate it, judge 
it, make it the basis of philosophical, sociological, or 
political explanations without first having described and 
understood the system of signification of which it is 
merely a term; and since this system is a formal one, I 
have myself engaged in a series of structural
analysis.
In these words Barthes describes the process of "demystification," the
breaking down of a concept or image through structural analysis in order
to reveal its latent ideological message. In the poststructuralist
period, Barthes' critical aim changes radically. For example, in his
most famous deconstructive work, S/Z (1970), Barthes spends 271 pages
interpreting Balzac's short story, "Sarrasine," in order to reveal all
47interpretive analyses, including his own, as fallacious.
This marked change from critical structuralism to deconstruction 
resulted from further reflection upon the deterministic nature of the 
structuralist system. Barthes and his fellow poststructuralists came to 
realize that their metalinguistic tools, having been derived from within 
the linguistic system, already bore the impress of a deterministic
46Roland Barthes, Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard (Evanston: 
Northwestern University, 1972), p. 151.
^Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (London: Cape, 1975).
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ideology. Jacques Lacan, the psychologist most frequently associated
with the poststructuralists, writes, "Language is language and there is
only one sort of language: concrete language —  English or French for
instance —  that people talk. The first thing to state in this context
is that there is no meta-language. For it is necessary that all so
called meta-language be presented to you with language."4® And
Derrida writes in a similar vein, "There is no sense in doing without
the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no
language —  no syntax and no lexicon —  which is foreign to this
history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has
not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit
49postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest." The need arose 
to find one's existential freedom beyond the pall of language, to master 
ideology by refusing to be taken in. The close reading of the critical 
structuralist then turned microscopic as interpretation focused on "the 
irreadable that catches on, the burning text produced outside of all 
probability, and whose function . . . would be to contest the
merchandizing constraints of the w r i t t e n . I n  order to ground this 
process of "misreading," a new Heideggerian interpretive process, an 
anti-methodological methodology, became imperative. If Martin Heidegger 
had not existed, Derrida would have had to create him.
48Jacques Derrida, "Of Structure as an Intermixing of an Otherness 
Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever," in The Structuralist Controversy: 
The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, ed. Richard Macksey 
and Eugenie Donate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1972), p. 188.
49Ibid., p. 280.
"^Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes/by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard 
Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), p. 118.
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Saussurian structuralism and its aftermath then bequeathd to the 
postmodern critical milieu of NLH a strong metaphysical, 
epistemological, political, and moral commitment. Structuralism 
transformed all human perspectives into metaphorical statements; 
grounded the belief in culture as an invisible, holistic linguistic 
system identified with social ideology; presented the critique of 
ideological consciousness as the central impulse behind history and 
criticism; declared invalid any statement suggesting an unclouded vision 
of a work's objective meaning; and turned critical attention to the 
pragmatics of aesthetic perception. Structuralist writers appearing in 
NLH who figure in the present study include Alastair Fowler and Jonathan 
Culler.
Hegel, Dilthey and Phenomonological Hormeneutics
Kant's theory of the active imagination initiated a transition from 
a noumenalogical to a teleological order, from a spatial to a temporal 
universe. The resultant demise of the classical, objective paradigm 
severed meaning from its spiritual, social, and historical context. In 
order to construct a new cognitive framework, the leading figures of the 
modern period seized on the Kantian transcendental method of 
self-reflection. The Neo-Cartesians, threatened by the disparate lives 
of a thousand isolated forms, erected their systems on the Kantian 
categorical consciousness. Their descendents could only reach the 
teleological postmodern period through a direct revolt against the fixed 
geometric systems of their progenitors. On the other hand, Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel founded a school of thought that would develop 
directly into a major sector of postmodern criticism.
22
Hegel was threatened not so much by the loss of a social context
for meaning as by the loss of an established process for the
disciplinary study of the human sciences. He feared that a reign of
total subjectivity would result from the isolated individual's frenzied
attempts to gain integral union with the cultural unconscious. In order
to found a science of the learning process, a Phenomenology of Mind
(1807), Hegel attempted to codify the rules of the Kantian intermediate
agency. However, Hegel argued against the limited nature of his Kantian
prototype. Hegel writes that the ego does not make use of something
(i.e. £  priori categories) in making judgment; rather the ego is
judgment, the willing of meaning."** Hegel's remark Is necessarily
entailed by this moment when the intermediate agency becomes the creator
of the universe. Foucault explains that in Hegel, "the totality of the
empirical domain was taken back into the interior of a consciousness
revealing itself to itself as spirit, in other words, as an empirical
52and transcendental field simultaneously." At this moment, no
intermediate spatial or categorical system remains possible. Meaning
has become fully temporal. By thus adopting the temporal agency as the
conerstone for his philosophical reflections, Hegel became the father of
53"a direct, unbroken lineage" to postmodern hermeneutics.
Before examining the fundamental principles of hermeneutic 
reasoning as displayed In Hegel's phenomenology, a clarification of the
51G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomonology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 82.
52Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 248.
53E. D, Hirsch, Jr. The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: University
of Chicago, 1976), p. 17.
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term hermeneutics may be in order. The term hermeneutics as used in the 
pages of NLH and in this study refers to that branch of philosophical 
inquiry informed by the ideas of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer.
Hegel's phenomenology embodies the essential foundations of 
contemporary hermeneutic reasoning. Charles Taylor provides a synopsis 
of these fundamental principles: "The object of a science of
interpretation must thus have: sense, distinguishable from its
expression, which is for and by a subject.""^ However, Taylor 
underplays one essential element of the hermeneutic process, the role of 
the interpreter as the creator of all meaning, as "the content of the 
relation and itself the process of relating,"’’"* a role similar to that 
of the divine in the Kantian universe and to the unconscious in the 
nineteenth-century.
The hermeneutic process of interpretation begins with the subject's 
projection of significance upon the world. However, in order for 
learning to occur, a "surplus of signification," as overload of meaning 
beyond the phenomenon's signifying power must exist. Meaning must 
overextend structure; understanding must call for greater skills than a 
mere explanation. In other words, there must be more in the object than 
can meet the eye. There must be a vague but significant area that 
demands interpretation. Otherwise a progression beyond the soul's 
static self-reflection would be impossible. Hegel writes,
^Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," The Review 
of Metaphysics, 37 (September 1980), 26.
55G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomonology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 82.
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"Consciousness, we find, distinguishes from itself something, to which
at the same time, it relates itself; . . . and the determinate form of
this process of relating, or of there being something for consciousness,
is k n o w l e d g e , " S u r p l u s  of signification" results in the process by
which "consciousness tests and examines itself" and, since all meaning
is self-generated, self-examination initiates the process of learning.
Hermeneutic knowledge can result only from a process of
self-transcendence, from the passage from a limited to a more
encompassing self, from an earthly self to a more spiritual self.
Consequently, any hermeneutic interpreter must take a stance upon a
triad of essential and intertwined metaphysical questions: the nature
of the all-emcompassing self, the obstacles restricting man from entry
into that absolute self, and the means of interpretation by which the
obstacles may be overcome.
For Hegel as well as for the postmodern hermeneuticists, the chief
obstacle to interpretation lies in man's tendency to settle for factual,
positivist observation. Hegel writes, "man's mind and interest are so
deeply rooted in the earthly that we require a like power to raise us
57above that level." And for Hegel as well as for the postmodern
hermeneuticists, the power to raise man above "facticity" comes from
dialectical reasoning. Dialectical reasoning operates first by 
comparing two entities and then by negating their uncommon elements in 
order to produce the concept of a purer third. Unlike noumenalogical 
reasoning, dialectical reasoning does not operate on an additive but on
"^G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomonology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 139.
57lbid., p. 73.
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a subtractive basis; inessential, earthly elements are removed in the 
process of reducing mental perception to its essential, informing idea. 
For example, the comparison of many trees produces the idea of 
tree-ness; also many visions of this tree produces the idea of 
this-tree-ness.
Hegel and the postmodern hermeneuticists separate dialectical
reasoning into the same three general stages of comparison (Gestalten),
"each of which in realizing itself at the same time resolves Itself, has
for its result its own negation —  and so passes into a higher 
58form." The first Gestalt results from the gap between the object
and its "surplus of signification" which corresponds to a contrast
between one's interior notion of a thing and the thing-in-itself,
between the "1" and the "not-l", between "what is to be tested" and its
"criterion". This contrast tests the truth of perception and thus the
concept of truth becomes realized. The concept of truth then resolves
the first and forms the second Gestalt. Here the contrast for the
dialectical mind is that between "consciousness of what to it is true,
59and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth." And this
contrast leads ultimately to the final stage of dislectical awareness, 
the contrast between one's relative grasp of truth in the here and now 
and the eternal essence and form of that truth. Hegel describes the 
resolution to this final stage as the sundering of one's individuality 
into the universal Absolute Spirit, a grand historical Geist of which
58G. W, F. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (New 
York: Humanities, 1968), p. 54.
59G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 141.
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the Individual is but the momentary manifestation. At this moment Hegel 
subsumes the world back into the temporal agency of the self-enclosed 
Kantian intermediate domain and sends it on its way "along the stream of
j n60progress over onward.
Hermeneutic reasoning as displayed in Hegel depends upon an ever 
actively creative mind in the interpreter, a gap between structural form 
and a surplus of signification, a process of self-transcendence through 
dialectical reasoning, and an active concern with one's own historicity, 
with one's being in the unrepeatable here and now. However, although 
Hegel supplied the base for postmodern hermeneutics, he also manifested 
the central problem that would impel its evolution: the problem of
finding a transcendental source equiprimordial with the constantly 
progressing perceiver. Hegel doomed his phenomenology by attempting to 
define methodically the rules of the constantly progressing, meaning 
making spirit. As Foucault explains, one can define the rules of the 
primordial source of thought and creativity only in static and 
codifiable t e r m s . A n d  just as the birth of teleological time had 
collapsed the Kantian model of apperception, Hegel's positive system of 
thw world spirit collapsed his attempt to found a science of the 
temporal man. The Hegelian system was quickly perceived as spatially 
determined and thus deterministic and the emminent period of cultural
^®G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 75.
^Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 332.
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study was characterized by a total rejection of Hegelianism and "an
62apology for experimental knowledge."
Hermeneutic reasoning then lay dormant until the end of the
nineteenth century when Wilheim Dilthey, protesting against the "growing
separation between life and scientific knowledge," attempted to form a
more "realistic" hermeneutic of free historical man. Rejecting Hegelian
idealism, Dilthey called for a hermeneutic which would start from the
"reality of life" and perception. And in order to base his
interpretation on the reality of perception, Dilthey grafted onto his
hermeneutic the phenomenological theory of intentionality, a concept
that remains the cornerstone of hermeneutic interpretation. Concerning
the theory of intentionality, a theory of active perception introduced
into modern psychology by Franz Brentano and developed by Edmund
Husserl, the father of the phenomenological method, Hans-Georg Gadamer
states: it "is the antithesis of all objectivism. It is an essentially
historical concept, which does not refer to a universe of being, to an
63’existent world.'" The theory of intentiality asserts that the mind 
encounters an amorphous real world with full expectation that that world 
will confirm to one's past experience of it, that it will continue to 
fulfill the same structural expectations. It also asserts that the 
intentional consciousness does not demand a complete inventory of an 
object's characteristics before it composes a mental image of that 
object as an entirety. For example, by perceiving a few general 
characteristics of a house, one constitutes the idea of that house as a
62Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. and ed. 
John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), p. 49.
63Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury 1975), 218.
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completely enclosed entity, an idea which further exploration may
confirm or negate. Intentionality then implies a thoroughly
teleological ontology of perception. Herbert Spiegelberg explains,
"This consciousness shows rougly the following structure: A primal
impression (Urimpression) of a streaming present surrounded by a horizon
of immediate 'retention' of the past (to be distinguished from active
recollection) and of immediate 'protention' of the future (to be
distinguished from active expectation). In . . . retention . . . the
present sinks off steadily below the surface and becomes sedimented in
64such a way that it is accessible only to acts of recollection." 
Dilthey transforms intentional consciousness into his concept of "life" 
which he calls "a flame, not a being; energy, not entity." Dilthey 
writes, "The living coherence of mind is life, which is prior to all 
knowing . . . Vitality, historicity, freedom, and development are its
characteristics. Our consciousness of the world as well as our
consciousness of ourselves has arisen out of our own vitality".
Intentional consciousness then constitues the nature of the self in 
Dilthey's hermeneutic system; however, it also constitutes the obstacles 
which the hermeneutic historian must rise above. Two facets of the 
theory of intentionality comprise special difficulties for the art of 
interpretation. First, in positing man as a thoroughly active
64Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical
Introduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 131.
^Wilhelm Dilthey, Berlin Nachlass (Literatur-Archiv der dautschen 
Akademie der Wissenschafton, Berlin), 209/80, quoted and trans. in 
Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 115; Wilhelm Dilthey,
Gesammelte Schiften (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1914-77), v, 196, quoted
and trans. in Ermarth, p. 178.
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perceiver, Dilthey's theory of intentionality inexorably intertwines
cognition with emotion and desire. Dilthey asserts, "Daily experience
shows that the perception of objects is attended by feeling and
willing." "The 'I* is not an onlooker who sits before the stage of the
world, but is itself action and r e a c t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y  the idea of
a presuppositionless understanding no longer holds credance in Dilthey's
universe. Dilthey states, "There is no man and no thing which would
only be an object for me and not a hindrance or help, a goal for
striving or an instance of will, importance, demand for attention,
closeness of opposition, distance or strangeness. The vital relation,
whether momentary or lasting, makes men and objects into bearers of
happiness, expansion of my existence, extension of my power —  or they
restrict the horizon of my existence, exert a restriction upon me, and
6 7lessen my potentiality," Accordingly Dilthey asserts that every 
perception entails a conditioning by one's needs and desires in the here 
and now and that no process of self-transcendence can ever remove man 
beyond the desirous origins of his intentional understanding. Second, 
the theory of intentionality casts doubt on every effort to study man 
and his culture in a methodical, positivist, quantitative way. Every 
factual statement about man arrests and distorts the ever ongoing 
process of the life force, Dilthey concludes, "Life is the fundamental 
fact which must form the starting point for philosophy. It is that 
which is known from within, that behind which we cannot go. Life cannot
Dilthey, Berlin Nachlass, 243/77, Ermarth, 119; Wilhelm Dilthey, 
Gottingen Nachlass (Niedersachsische Staats-und Universistatsbibliothek, 
Gottingen), 2/188, quoted and trans. Ermarth, p. 119.
^Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, VII, 131, Ermarth, p. 119.
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68be brought before the judgment seat of reason." Consequently 
Dilthey postulates what James Collins calls "the essential modernity of 
his notion of interpretation", the belief that the human sciences must 
find an approach based on an "irreducible kind of explaining. 
Dilthey depicts the historian as confronted with two seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles: the inability of attaining a neutrally
objective perception of the past and the inability of methodically 
articulating any authentic exploration into the realm of human culture.
Dilthey does not deem the historian's task impossible. If Dilthey 
sees human intentionality as a hindrance to one type of historical 
understanding, he also views it as the passageway to another. The 
intentional consciousness arranges itself in a series of discernible 
structures. Dilthey explains: "The state of consciousness which
perceives reality, evaluates, and posits goals contains in itself an 
order of levels . . .  in which every mental relation provides a 
foundation for one built upon it in a particular manner. Here we do not 
have elements but structure —  and the progression through the levels 
within each mode of relating manifests its own structure. 
Moreover, man's structural perspective acquires social dimensions 
through its interaction with its particular historical environment: "By
experience of life I mean those propositions which constitute themselves 
in a collective circle of persons. They are statements about the nature
f. Q
Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on
History and Society, trans. B. G. Teubner, ed. H. P. Rickman (New York: 
Harper, 1961), p. 73.
^James Collings, "Interpretation: the Interweave of Problems," New
Literary History, 4 (Winter 1973), 491.
^Dilthey, Berlin Nachlass, 196/7-9, Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: 
The Critique of Historical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago,
1978, pp. 217-18.
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and course of life, judgments about what has proved to be of value, 
rules of living, and determinations of goals and goods. Their hallmark 
is that they are creations of a community . . .  As morality, tradition, 
and public opinion they exercise a decisive power over the individual 
v i e w - p o l n t . A n d  Dilthey asserts that these socially determined 
structures of the individual consciousness then express themselves as 
the formal causality of all great historical events and works. 
Consequently, these structures are capable of forming a basis for 
historical research.
But, unlike the structuralists, Dilthey regards the study of social 
structures as only the preliminary stage towards the real goal of the 
historian, the study of life. Dilthey's position on this point stems 
naturally from his reversal of the Saussurian relationship between 
langue and parole. For Dilthey asserts that life, human desire, parole, 
stands not in front of language as individual manifestation but behind 
it as the impulse to social communication. While Dilthey does not deny 
the structuralist historians' belief in the priority of synchronic 
states, he does interweave the diachronic with the synchronic as the 
relationship between individual desire and social consummation. And 
this contrast between social structuration and the individual life force 
provides the gap upon which Dilthey builds his hermeneutic dialectic.
Dilthey's dialectical system parallels Hegel's and refines it 
through an exploration of the concept of hermeneutic circularity. 
Hermeneutic circularity refers essentially to the bond of similarity 
linking any two diverse entities at any stage of the dialectical
^Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, VII, 132-34, Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm 
Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason. Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1978, p. 227.
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process. The first level of circularity in Dilthey's interpretation of
a work corresponds to the Hegelian contrast between an object and its
surplus of meaning. Dilthey explains, "The whole of a work is to be
understood from the individual words and their connections with each
other, and yet the full comprehension of the individual part already
72presupposes comprehension of the whole." Dilthey relegates these
two different aspects of a work, the relationship among its parts and
its total meaning, to two separate tasks of the historian, structural
explanation and empathic understanding (Verstehen) respectively.
Dilthey defines Verstehen as "that process by which we intuit, behind
the signs given to our senses, that psychic reality of which it is the 
73expression." Dilthey bases his process of Verstehen on the belief
that one can assume into one's own mind the structural expectations and
perspectives of another. Dilthey writes, "inasmuch as the exegete
tentatively projects his own sense of life into another historical
milieu, he is able within that perspective, to strenghthen and emphasize
certain spiritual processes in himself and to minimize others, thus
making possible within himself a re-experiencing of an alien form of 
74life." But Verstehen must not be understood as a cutting off of 
one's present prejudices in order to enter another person's time; rather 
Verstehen occurs in the here and now. Explains Ricoeur, "By 
'hermeneutical circle' Romanticist thinkers meant that the understanding
72Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Rise of Hermeneutics," trans. Fredric Jameson, 
New Literary History, 3 (Winter 1972), 242.
73Ibid., 232.
74Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Rise of Hermeneutics," trans. Fredric Jameson,
New Literary History, 3 (Winter 1972), 243.
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of a text cannot be an objective procedure in the sense of scientific
objectivity, but necessarily involves a precomprehension which expresses
the way in which the reader has already understood himself and the
world. Therefore, a kind of circularity occurs between understanding a
text and understanding o n e s e l f . D i l t h e y  writes that Verstehen
implies an immanent self-discovery and self-transcendance effected
through the experienced auto-critique of one's own prejudices:
"Understanding is the rediscovery of the 1 in the Thou; the mind
rediscovers itself at ever higher levels of connectedness; this sameness
of the mind in the I and the Thou and in every subject of a community,
in every system of culture and, finally, in the totality of mind and
universal history, makes the working together of the different processes
7 6in the human studies possible." The resultant circularity between 
the comprehension of one's self and of another's, between the 
understanding of one's relative grasp on truth and another's equally 
relative perspective, provides a glimpse of the universal bond that 
unites all men: "In Understanding, the individuality of the exegete and
that of the author are not opposed to each other like two incomparable 
facts. Rather, both have been formed upon the substratum of a general 
human nature, and it is this which makes possible the communion of 
people with each other in s p e e c h . T h i s  for Dilthey becomes the aim 
of historical exploration, not the resurrection of the past but the
^Paul Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics," New 
Literary History, 6 (Autumn 1974), 106.
^Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on
History and Society, Trans. B. G. Taubner. Ed. H. P. Rickman. New 
York: Harper, 1961, pp. 67-68.
^  Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Rise of Hermeneutics," trans. Fredric 
Jameson, New Literary History, 3 (Winter 1972), 242-43.
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freeing of man from his present prejudices in order that a more humane
future may be appropriated. Dilthey asserts, "The understanding of the
past must become an energy to shape the future . . . The historical
consciousness must contain the rule and energy which will allow us, in
contradistinction to all past happenings, to turn freely and sovereignly
78toward a unitary goal of human culture."
Although his writings to a great extent remain unavailable except
79in his native German language, Dilthey, the "overture" to NLH, has 
contributed much to postmodern hermeneutics and history. Dilthey's
hermeneutic system, the obstacles to interpretation from which it 
springs and the goals towards which it is directed, constitute the 
foundation for Gadamer's hermeneutic. Because of Dilthey, the chief 
object of study in the postmodern period has become the various
historical transformations of intentionality. And Dilthey's rooting of 
all human studies under the determinations of the here and now provides 
the ground on which all postmodern historians meet. Indeed Ralph Cohen 
partially explains the foundation of NLH and its uniting of critical and 
historical perspectives in terms of such a concept: "literary
criticism, literary history, and even literary theory are all literary 
genres, and as such they are historical; that is, they arise, as
journals do, at particular moments in time, and they have particular 
ends that time erodes. Of course, all these genres have their modes of 
proceeding, but all are historically determined . . . Literary history,
78Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, VIII, 204, Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm 
Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason. Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1978, p. 321.
79James Collins, "Interpretation: The Interweave of Problems," New
Literary History, 4 (Winter 1973), 392.
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therefore, is not the historical genre but merely another historical 
..80genre.
Despite its contribution to postmodern historical inquiry,
Dilthey's hermeneutic opened itself to charges similar to those levelled
against Hegel's. James Collins expresses the postmodern sentiments
toward Dilthey: "Dilthey opens up horizons on interpretation, without
81fully explaining and understanding them himself." On the one hand,
Dilthey stressed the inescapability of the historian's own historicity,
his situatedness in the here and now; after Dilthey no progression in
hermeneutics was to be made without taking into account relativism and
historicism. On the other hand, Dilthey's system still addressed the
problems of the post-Kantian aporia. Inevitably Dilthey followed the
other leading figures of the modern period in founding his system on the
Kantian intermediate consciousness. Paul Ricoeur explains, "it is not
without interest to recall why Dilthey proceeded as he did. He posed
the problematic of the human science on the basis of a Kantian argument.
The knowledge of things runs up against an unknown, the thing itself,
whereas in the case of the mind there is no thing- in-itself; we
8 2ourselves are what the other is." Dilthey, in erecting his system 
out of that moment when time reflects upon itself as structure, assumed 
that he had identified two separate entities, the self and the other.
80Ralph Cohen, "The First Decade: Some Editorial Remarks," New
Literary History, 10 (Spring 1979), 419.
81 James Collins, "Interpretation: the Interweave of Problems," New
Literary History, 4 (Winter 1973), 392.
82Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. and ed. 
John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), p. 55.
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Derrida points out that at this moment phenomenology deconstructs
itself through an ontology contradictorily divided between a "naive"
teleological ontology of a reality constituting self and a "classical"
83ontology which still allows the existence of the other. Murray 
Krieger explains how this contradictory ontology ultimately led to the 
"celebration of subjective" criticism. Krieger concludes, "Because such 
critics saw language as an unavoidable mediating element which, based on 
its principle of differentiation, kept selves and their objects 
separate, the self-conscious subject had to achieve a breakthrough 
beyond such separateness, as the literary work faded into the blend of 
reader and author, reader —  as a u t h o r . K r i e g e r  proceeds to detail 
how the unresolved subjectivism of Dilthey's position led many critics 
again to seek more scientific and positivist methods of historical 
inquiry, this time in the shape of Formalism and Structuralism.
The work of Wilhelm Dilthey, the fullest development of Hegelian 
hermeneutics prior to Heidegger, represents the richest embodiment of 
one polar attitude during the modern period. The transitional and 
eclectic nature of Dilthey's interpretive system prohibits the neat 
ordering of his descendents into a single critical movement. But one 
may place them along a continuum ranging from Dilthey's hermeneutic to 
those schools with which it bears the closest resemblance: 
phenomenology, structuralism, and Gadamerian hermeneutics.
83Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's 
Theory of Signs, trans, D. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University,
1973), p. 25.
84Murray Krieger, "Poetics Reconsidered: The Presence vs. the Absence
of the Word," New Literary History, 7 (Winter 1976), 356.
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Dilthey links himself closely with phenomenology through his 
championing of the central phenomenological tenet, the theory of 
intentionality. Indeed, the term "phenomenology" when used in NLH to 
designate a particular school of criticism usually refers to Dilthey’s 
most ardent followers, the Geneva School of Consciousness Criticism and 
its near neighbors. The term "phenomenology" will be used in a similar 
way throughout the present study. However, phenomenology in its 
broadest sense divides itself into three critical schools: those
stemming from Husserl, from Dilthey, and from Heidegger. Husserl’s 
descendants distinguish themselves from Dilthey's in calling for a 
disinterested description of an aesthetic work as an objective entity. 
Consequently, Husserlian phenomenological criticism has exerted a major 
influence on Rene’ Wellek and other New Critics but has received scant 
attention in the pages of NLH. On the other hand, Heidegger's 
hermeneutic phenomenology distinguishes itself through its belief in the 
idea of indeterminacy, the theory that the structure and content of a 
particular aesthetic work are in a process of continual change and thus 
undescribable in universal terms. Along a continuum from Dilthey to 
Heidegger one may then range Jean Starobinski, a leading figure of the 
Geneva School; E. D. Hirsch, a self-proclaimed champion of Dilthey; and 
Wolfgang Iser, a leading figure of the Constance School of Phenomenology 
and Hermeneutics.
Dilthey’s theory of structural explanation also aligns his work 
with recent structuralist developments that regard rules of structure as 
cybernetically and historically determined. On a continuum from 
Saussure's belief in universal structural principles to Dilthey's faith 
in historically determined structures one may range Morton Bloomfield's
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stylistics; and Boris Uspensky and Yuri Lotman's cybernetic semiotics.
All of the above mentioned critics have made frequent contributions to
NLH and their work will bear significance in the present study.
Martin Heidegger and the Postmodern Paradigm
The seminal work of the postmodern period, Martin Heidegger's Being
and Time (1927), reflects both a nec-Cartisian and a Hegelian influence.
At the same time, it marks an evolution beyond modernist thought. For
example, Heidegger, the pupil of Husserl and Dilthey, accepts the
phenomenological tenet of intentionality but proceeds beyond his mentors
to articulate fully the relativism and subjectivism such a concept
implies. In describing what he terms "pre-understanding," Heidegger
explains that the unconscious intentional aspect of man projects meaning
onto the world: "Interpretation is grounded in something we have in
advance —  in a fore-having . . .  In every case interpretation is
grounded in something we see in advance —  in a fore-sight. It is
85grounded in something we grasp in advance —  in a fore-conception."
Heidegger concludes, "An interpretation is never a presuppositionless
86apprehending of something presented to us." But intentionality also 
stands as desire behind every human action including that of cognitive 
reasoning. Understanding merely apprehends the meaning which one has 
already projected: "In interpretation, understanding does not become
something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is 
grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans, John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 191.
86Ibid., p. 192.
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87the former." At this point, Dilthey’s identification with another
becomes impossible; the other has lost its existence. Heidegger founds
what NLH editor Ralph Cohen calls the central norm of contemporary
criticism, the rebellion against Husserlian reduction, that is, against
any attempt to bracket off all presuppositions in order to discern the
eternal essence of a work. The work no longer remains the creation of
another but of one's intentional self. Such a concept produces many
ramifications upon the history of the arts. David Couzens Hoy explains
that through Heidegger the postmoderns have acquired "a
metaphilosophical belief in the historical character of all discourse,
including philosophy itself, and thus in the unnaturalness of 
88epistemology." D. W. Robertson expresses the resultant dilemma for
the historian: "Actually, we know very little about the past beyond the
dubious evidence of our memories which are always colored by the
present. What we as students have before us instead of the past itself
is a series of monuments, artifacts, and documents existing in the
present, which are just as much part of the present as are automobiles,
neutrons, or cola beverages. The historian . . . concerns himself with
the order and significance of the detritus of the past in the present,
89not with the past itself, which is unapproachable." Robert Weimann 
expresses the same dilemma in terms of the theatre historian: "The most
learned and historically-minded scholar cannot physically become an
87Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 188.
88David Couzens Hoy, "Hermeneutic Circularity, Indeterminacy, and 
Incommensurability," New Literary History, 10 (Autumn 1978), 164.
89D. W. Robertson, Jr. "Some Observations on Method in Literary 
Studies," New Literary History, 1 (October 1969), 29-30.
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Elizabethan; he cannot recreate the Globe or visualize the original
production. Even if he conceived of Shakespeare's drama as being
enacted in the theatre, he would still be influenced by his own
experience of the modern stage, its twentieth-century audience and
actors and their social relationships, that are quite different from
those which, in Shakespeare's Globe, then constituted part of the play's 
..90meaning.
Furthermore, the lack of an objective hinge for critical estimation
calls a halt to critical debate over a work's meaning. Radical
intentionality implies radical pluralism; radical relativism silences
critical discussion. George Steiner explains: "The critic is an
activist of apprehension. His demarcation, his 'pacing' of the
elucidative distance between himself and the *text-object' is operative,
instrumental, functional. Operation, instrumentality, or function are
91not, cannot be indifferent. Indifference does not act." Steiner
concludes that since every act of perception stems from an intentional
and relativistlc cut into the stream of existence, "No critical ruling
can be refuted. Action knows only reaction and counteraction, not 
92refutation."
Heidegger also assimilates thoughts akin to those of the 
structuralists. Heidegger's concept of language as socially 
predetermined and unconscious parallels Saussure's concept of langue.
90Robert Weimann, "Past Siognificance and Present Meaning," New
Literary History, 1 (October 1969), 106.




In Being and Time, Heidegger writes, "Discourse is existentially
equiprlmordial with state-of-mind and understanding. The
intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before
93there is any appropriate interpretation of it." In the Introduction
to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes, "words and language are not wrappings
in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and
speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being 
94and are." Heidegger concludes that the unconscious, socially
determinate, and all-pervasive character of language prevents individual
innovative perceptions from occurring. Heidegger writes: "everyday
Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection . . .  to Others. It itself
95is not; its Being has been taken away By the Others." Heidegger 
reaches the same conclusion as the critical structuralists, that insofar 
as socially adopted methods of inquiry prevent innovative insight, they 
must be overcome. Ricoeur notes that Heidegger's "explication will add 
nothing to the methodology of the human sciences; rather it will dig 
beneath this methodology in order to lay bare its foundations."^
Heidegger extends the postulates of modern thought to their 
inevitable and ineluctable impasse. In Heidegger, man becomes at once a 
slave to social determinism and the victim of radical subjectivity.
93Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 203.
94Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Mannheim 
(New Haven: Yale University, 1959), p. 13.
95Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 164.
Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. and ed. 
John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), p. 55.
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Howeverf while Heidegger accepts the modern exploration of the
intermediate domain, he also provides a bridge beyond the modern impasse
to the other two domains of the Kantian universe. Heidegger accepts
Dilthey's explanation of the individual impulse to language, of the free
drive to structural understanding, of the primordial priority of parole
to langue. Upon this "rift" in man, upon the hermeneutic circularity
between man's ontological freedom and the socially determined
pre-understanding of the structural universe, Heidegger proceeds to
erect his hermeneutic system. And in the passage from Being and Time
which gives birth to the postmodern technique of interpretation,
Heidegger insists that the free suspension of categorical judgments may
resurrect the noumenal domain:
In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the 
most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we 
genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our 
interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, 
and constant task Is never to allow our fore-having, 
fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by
fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the
scientific theme secure by working ^ t  these 
fore-structures in terms of things themselves.
In Heidegger's hermeneutics, truth results from the frustration of 
man's desire to use the world as a depository (the "ready-to-hand") for 
predetermined ideas fo order. Heidegger writes, "when something 
ready-to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence . . . has
been so obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, this makes a 
break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our 
circumspection discovers emptiness, and now sees for the first time what 
the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was
9 7 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 194.
98ready-to-hand f or." For Heidegger and for the postmoderns, truth
refers to a suspension of judgment, to a rupture in one's projection of
meaning. Truth results from the disappointment of expectations and
creates an openness which may then be filled with the wonder of new
meaning. Heidegger asserts what he deems the moral imperative of the
ontologically free rational man, the doing of "violence to lanuage".
Heidegger explains, "Being thus demands that any ontological
Interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in
their primordiality, should capture the Being of this entity, in spite
of this entity's own tendency to cover things up. Existential analysis,
therefore, constantly has the character of doing violence . . . whether
to the claims of everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its
99tranquillized obviousness." This principle becomes the root of 
postmodern "methodology." Cohen explains the importance of "violence" 
in postmodern criticism and history: "As a hypothesis underlying every
textual analysis, including its own, it provides a baiss for finding a 
different example of contradiction-making in every text."*^
Truth as a moment of violence against critical presuppositions 
feeds on a plurality of critical methods. And truth as the active 
rupture of social language continually changes its nature along with the 
constant evolution of language. Truth in its constant opposition to the
98Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 105.
99Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 359.
^^Ralph Cohen, "Statements Literary Texts Do Not Make," New Literary
History, 13 (Spring 1982), p. 386.
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presuppositions of the here and now assumes a strictly temporal 
dimension. And since truth is the function of art, the work of art can 
never by empirically or methodically examined and explained. The work 
of art, its reception and its truth, remain in a constant flux of 
change.
Postmodernism may be characterized by an overall belief in radical
relativism and radical historicism; by a concept of truth as
auto-critique; by a plurality of critical methods, each sacrificed to
the sundering power of truth; and by the search for each work's
"negativity," for the work of art as "other," for those factors which
negate one's initial approach and reception of a work. Postmodernism as
a "critique of false consciousness" operates within a strongly ethical
dimension. The postmoderns identify reality with interpretive method
and stress the moral demand to build a more humane interpretive reality
for the future, to erect a future world which respects the "fullness of
language." Hayden White notes:
Modern interpretation thrives as much on the question,
'Who shall have the authority to determine what is a
proper question to put to a text?' as it does on the 
question, 'What does this text mean?' In the 
deliberative disciplines especially, every claim to 
knowledge is also a claim to power. And interpretation 
has as much to do with establishing the legitimacy of a 
particular exercise of interpretive power as it does with 
the establishment of validity of a given
interpretation of a text.
And the differing postmodern stances on the ethics of interpretation
divide the period into its two polar stances, the French
poststructuralism and the German hermeneutics.




By itself the work of Martin Heidegger could not have grounded 
postmodern ethical criticism. While Heidegger's teleological vision 
transformed criticism from applied methodology to free moral action, 
Heidegger concerned himself primarily with the ontological base of 
knowledge rather than with interpretation's socio-ethical ramifications. 
While Heidegger supplied postmodern criticism with its concept of 
interpretation through methodological rupture, he provided few 
suggestions on how to handle rupture's aftermath.
Rather the ethical impulse toward postmodernism evolved from the 
failure of modern criticism. And the two prototypical stances of 
postmodern aesthetics responded directly to the problems plaguing their 
respective ancestors. On the one hand, the critical structuralists' 
inability to derive an Ideologically uncontaminated methodology resulted 
in their recognition of the mutual exclusiveness between individual 
freedom and social langue. Consequently, poststructuralist critics 
placed their highest moral value on the freedom to be found outside the 
confines of language. On the other hand, the ultimately self-enclosed 
subjective position of Dilthey fostered in the hermeneuticist a renewed 
desire for individual consummation in the communal unconscious. 
Consequently, contemporary hermeneuticists placed their highest moral 
value on tradition and the linguistic community. The distinction 
between the two polar postmodern positions may be perceived clearly in 
the different degrees of worth accorded by each to human freedom, to 
social heritage, and to historical study.
The poststructuralist drive for linguistically unfettered freedom
manifests itself in the central philosophical belief, "the metaphysics
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of absence." In opposition to epistemologically based "metaphysics of 
presence," the metaphysics of absence stems from a belief that the
ineffable spirit of man defies confinement in any linguistic assertion, 
that truth emerges from the violent silencing of language.
And in order to silence language, the poststructuralists attempt to 
"deconstruct" the text, to expose language in itself as incapable of 
communication. Derrida's chief strategy for deconstruction results from 
a blend of Saussurian langue and phenomenological intentionality. 
Derrida points out that any statement as a new utterance, as a new
projection of meaning, "effaces" its origins in langue; else it could 
not come into existence as something new. At the same time, it points 
toward its future fulfillment as another's interpreted material. For 
example, Derrida coins the word, "differance." "Differance" seems to be 
comprehensible because of one's familiarity with its contrasting term, 
"difference;" parole promises to make sense because of one's familiarity 
with langue; the present promises to fulfill past expectations. 
However, "differance" defers interpretation until further grounds for 
understanding have been laid. Derrida never lays these grounds. Rather 
by leaving "differance" uninterpretable, Derrida suggests that once an 
utterance as something new has servered itself from langue no 
restrictions remain on its potential for meaning. A word can mean 
anything one wishes it to mean; meaning is a question not of language 
but of desire. Language then contains no meaning giving "center" and
can be reduced to its pure state of nonsignificance. Jacques Ehrmann,
another poststructuralist, writes, "Meaning is organized within 
non-meaning; it does not take its place. It neither covers over nor 
obliterates it . . . Therefore, since non-meaning does not efface itself
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as loss, as flight; to attempt to arrest it is to allow it to escape;
102but neither does releasing it allow us to grasp it."
Derrida and the poststructuralists belabor this seemingly obvious
point because they view the myth of a linguistic center as the great
debilitating alibi of Western man. Derrida implies that the concept of
a linguistic center results from man's attempts to anaesthetize himself
against the trauma of an ever fluctuating reality: "The concept of a
centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a
fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental
immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach
of play. And on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered,
for anxiety is invariably the result of a certain mode of being
implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were
103at stake in the game from the outset." But this anaesthetization,
this "reification," denies man the wonder of an amorphous, undefinable
universe. Consequently, through a totalization of the Heideggerian
suspension of judgment, poststructuralism has set itself the task of
deconstructing, of "decentering," of reducing the power of language to
convey meaning and it attempts to do so through spotting
self-contradictory elements in the text.
As Ihab Hassan notes, poststructuralism dominated the American new
104theoretical scene during the late 1970's and early 1980's,
102Jacques Ehrmann, "The Death of Literature," New Literary History, 3 
(Autumn 1971), 44.
103Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1978), p. 279.
^^ I h a b  Hassan, "A re-Vision of Literature," New Literary History, 9
(Autumn 1976), 130.
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providing the context for NLH. However, NLH cannot be classified along
with Glyph, Yale French Studies, and Dia-Critics as a predominantly
poststructuralist journal. For the poststructuralists view the
historical study of art as merely another manifestation of ordering
through metaphysical presence and thus as suitable fodder for
deconstruction. Ehrmann writes: "The 'meaning of history' . . .  is
therefore only a myth to which we have clung —  perhaps out of our
weakness and cowardice or of some visceral desire to believe that life
has a foundation that could justify it, out of some obscure need to
orient ourselves and thereby attempt to protect ourselves from what our
105society calls madness." However deconstruction as the non-science
of the Heideggerian moment of rupture plays a minor but essential part 
in the new history of the arts. And NLH has published articles by such 
poststructuralists as Jacques Derrida, Jacques Ehrmann, Paul de Mann, 
Harold Bloom, and J. Hillis Miller. The present study will make 
occasional allusions to them.
Gadamer and Contemporary Hermeneutics
Derrida's postmodern de-centering of language bears only minor 
relevance to contemporary hermeneuticists. As early as the turn of the 
twentieth century Dilthey had already de-centered language for 
hermeneuticists. He did so by negating what remains a central tenet of 
the poststructuralists, that parole stands in front of langue as 
individual manifestation. Instead Dilthey had asserted a central 
principle of hermeneutics, that human desire stands behind language and 
utilizes it to make sense of the world. Despite a common ancestry in
^^Jacques Ehrmann, "The Death of Literature," New Literary History, 3 
(Autumn 1971), 47.
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the work of Martin Heidegger, hermeneuticists find poststructuralism and
its metaphysics of absence philosophically untenable. Deconstruction
operates from a stance outside the deterministic confines of language, a
stance that hermeneuticists cannot envision. In the seminal work of
contemporary hermeneutics, Truth and Method (1960), Hans-Georg Gadamer
writes, "we cannot see a linguistic world from above . . . There is no
point of view outside the experience of the world in language from
which it could itself become an o b j e c t . G a d a m e r  concludes, "Being
that can be understood is l a n g u a g e . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the
poststructuralist position entails a deliberate relishing of the present
moment. Herbert Blau explains: "So much of modern thought —  disturbed
by a world impeded (if not made) by words —  wants to free language for
use now, as if names were (or should be) only referrable to present
things. That is why there has been so much experimenting with the
denial of names and the refusal of words, as if now is (or should be)
108all the reality there is.*" However, Gadamer accepting the
phenomenological concept of intentionality, cannot conceive of a 
presuppositionless present, that is, a present which does not entail the 
past. Gadamer views the inescapable existence of language as the voice 
of tradition, of the historical community, of the projection of past 
prejudices into the present: "If every language represents a view of
the world, it is this primarily not as a particular type of language (in
^^Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975), p.
410.
107Ibid., 432.
108Herbert Blau, "Precipitations of Theatre: Words, Presence, Time
Out of Mind," New Literary History, 12 (Spring 1981), 140.
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the way philologists see it), but because of what is said or handed down
109in this language." Moreover, since one's intentional expectations, 
one's "horizon of understanding," exist in a perpetual state of flux, 
language and tradition move with one into the future: "The horizon is,
rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons 
change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past . . . 
which exists in the form of tradition, is always in m o t i o n . T h i s  
is not to say that Gadamer denies the Heideggerian interpretive process 
whereby the obstruction of the present moment ruptures methodical 
consciousness; but Gadamer does not believe that the present moment can 
be prolonged beyond the Imperceptible moment of rupture.
Gadamer consequently disagrees with Derrida over the derivation of 
rupture. For Derrida rupture occurs through a willful existential 
wresting of freedom from social langue; for Gadamer, it occurs naturally 
through what he terms "the fusion of horizons." Gadamer writes, 
"Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an action of one's 
subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within a process of 
tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused.11 
Gadamer's fusion of horizons resembles Dilthey's understanding of the 
"I" through the "Thou": "It not only lets those prejudices that are of
a particular and limited nature die away, but causes those that bring 
about genuine understanding to emerge as such. It is only this temporal
109Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975), p.
399-400.
110Ibid., p. 271 
U 1 Ibid., p. 258,
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distance that can solve the really critical question of hermeneutics,
namely of distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand,
112from the false ones by which we misunderstand." However, the
influence of Heidegger's radical relativism produces a subtle but
profound difference between Dilthey's hermeneutic and Gadamer’s. On the
one hand, Dilthey's historicism separates the past from the present life
world. On the other hand, contemporary hermeneuticists wonder if a
totally separable past would be understandable at all. And Gadamer
explains that, since the past is not totally unintelligible, much of the
past must be retained in the evolution of tradition, Gadamer concludes:
"Time is not a yawning abyss, but is filled with the continuity of
customs and tradition, in the light of which all that is handed down
113presents itself to us."
For Gadamer what can be understood of past tradition remains still 
alive within us and the goal of historical research is not so much to 
reveal what we already share with and thus understand about the past but 
to confront us with what we do not understand, what remains 
unintelligible. History, in uncovering the pastness of the past, in 
uncovering its "otherness," its "alterity," produces a rupture in our 
present horizon, a disappointment of expectations, and thus "brings 
something new into the language." Gadamer writes: "a person trying to
understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something. That is why 
a hermeneutically trained mind must be, from the start, sensitive to a 
text's newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither




'neutrality' in the matter of the object nor the extinction of one's
self, but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and 
114prejudices." However, the "alterity" of the past, its newness, its 
unintelligibility, does not openly present itself. Hermeneuticist 
Frederic Will explains: "How could we determine when the past has
become unintelligible? At what point would we know that 
unintelligibility had set in? At no point. When we reached such a 
point we would already be unable to recognize it as the beginning of 
unintelligibility. Unintelligibility is by definition
unrecognizable."^^ One can never surprise the past into revealing 
its otherness. As Gadamer asserts, "Restoration, if made central in 
hermeneutics, is no less absurd than all effort to restore and revive 
life gone forever. Rather the hermeneutic historian seeks not the
reconstruction of past realities, at least he does not hope to establish 
them as facts, but instead seeks to work out his present prejudices. 
Gunther Buck, a disciple of Gadamer, explains that in interpretive 
history, "I not only discover something about an object, but primarily 
something about myself . . . To go back 'behind" an experience-horizon
and push through it, as it were, is therefore, more accurately speaking, 
to unfold its implications, which previously, so long as it was still
^^Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975), p.
238.
115Frederic Will, "Shamans in Turtlenecks," New Literary History, 13 
(Spring 1982), 413.
^^Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975),
p. 159.
53
naively in force, had remained unnoticed. Gadamer comments that
118in interpretive history, "we do not remain what we were,"
Jerome McGann summarizes the effect of hermeneutics upon historical 
criticism: "in attempting to specify historical distinctions, we set a
gulf between our past and our present. It is this gulf which enables us 
to judge and criticize the past, but it is equally this gulf which 
enables the past —  so rich in its achievements —  to judge and
^  . "119criticize us.
In his exposition of the critlco-historical principles behind the
foundation of NLH, Ralph Cohen summarizes the effect of hermeneutics
upon recent literary scholarship:
In taking account of the responses of different readers, 
the critics inevitably find themselves writing literary 
history. They inherit the tripartite division of 
literary study —  literary theory, literary criticism, 
literary history —  in which theory is 'the study of
principles of literature, its categories, criteria and 
the like, while studies of concrete works of art are 
either literary criticism (primarily static in approach) 
or literary history . . . Literary criticism, according
to this view, is the study of literature as a 
simultaneous order, whereas literary history is a study 
of a series of works arranged in chronological order as
integral parts of the literary process.
But most critics . . . resist the idea of literature 
as a 'simultaneous order' because it overlooks the 
complex relation between a present reader and past works, 
especially the pastness of the past. 'Simultaneity' 
draws attention to those aspects of a work that exist for 
us, not those which had existence for other, earlier 
readers, and to this extent the 'work1 is not properly 
distinguished from a particular historical interpretation 
of it. The critics also resist the vagueness of a
^^Gunther Buck, "The Structure of the Hermeneutic Experience and the 
Problem of Tradition," New Literary History, 10 (Autumn 1978), 38-39.
118Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975),
p. 341.
119Jerome J. McGann, "The Text, the Poem, and the Problem of
Historical Method," New Literary History, 12 (Winter 1981), 285.
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concept such as 'historical process'; they argue that the 
historical ordering of works involves a conceptual 
hypothesis, and it is to the unft^jLng of these 
hypotheses that they address themselves.
NLH may then be regarded as fundamentally a hermeneutically based 
journal. And the NLH writers who figure predominantly in this present 
study all swear allegiance to the hermeneutic grounds laid by Gadamer. 
These writers include Hans Robert Jauss, Fredric Jameson, Wolfgang Iser, 
Hayden White, Rainer Warning, and Paul Ricoeur.
New Literary History and the Postmodern Paradigm
New Literary History takes as its central tenet Gadamer's 
teleological pragmatization of Dilthey's interpretive system. However, 
Gadamer's work cannot suffice by itself as the NLH paradigm. For 
although Gadamer lays the grounds for the continuing of historical 
research in the wake of modernist positivism, he does not concern 
himself with creating a pluralistic model that would co-ordinate the 
diverse forms of contemporary criticism and history manifested in the 
pages of NLH. On the other hand, Paul Ricoeur and Fredric Jameson have
shown that Gadamer's work implies the possibility of such a pluralistic
.. 121 paradigm.
The differences between hermeneutic and objectivist pluralism stem 
from Gadamer's redefinition of time. The neo-Kantian aesthetic holds a 
Platonic belief in the fixed idea of a work which allows a series of 
sectional individual interpretations, each valid in its own right. And
120Ralph Cohen, "New Directions in Literary History," in New
Directions in Literary History, ed. Ralph Cohen, (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins, 1974), p. 7.
121 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences- pp. 63-100; Fredric 
Jameson, "Marx and Historicism," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 
41-75.
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in neo-Aristetelian aesthetics, theory exists as the universal truth
informing the individual practice of criticism and literary history. On
the other hand, hermeneutics stresses the temporality of all visions and
collapses theory and practice into the same category as intentional
praxis. The postmodern writers for NLH exist in a relativistic world
without timeless works of art, without universal critical or historical
principles, and without a "naive" acceptance of their own methodology as
eternally valid. In NLH, historical praxis exists as an individualistic
122process of seeing; criticism as "a love letter to oneself." In the
postmodern period, radical relativism implies radical pluralism.
Gadamer and his disciples believe in a communal ethic and posit a 
commonly agreed upon heuristic model of the interpretive process. 
Again, however the tripartite model of the hermeneuticists differs 
widely from the essentially dualistic model of the neo-Kantians. The 
neo-Kantian tradition continues the neo-classic dichotomy which divides 
the world into subject and object, perceiver and perceived, phenomenon 
and noumenon, time and space. Gadamer's hermeneutic reasserts the 
three-tiered Kantian system as a fully temporal universe. In Gadamer, 
the domains of phenomenal consciousness, noumenal reality, and divine 
interdict become transformed respectively into the moments of the 
intentional projection of past expectations, the ruptured present, and 
the spiritually refined future. And Gadamer asserts the fully 
realizable nature of thi6 teleological universe.
A particular aspect of criticism then dominates each of these three 
domains. The initial domain, that of the intentional projection of the
122 Gregory L. Ulmer, "Of a Parodic Tone Recently Adopted in
Criticism," New Literary History, 13 (Spring 1982), 557,
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past, manifests itself in the application of acquired methodology.
Ricoeur explains that at this initial stage of approaching a text,
phenomenology and structuralism, the "hermeneutics of belief" and the
"counterhermeneutics of suspicion," hold sway not as irreconcilable
forms of interpretation but as Dilthey's dialectically contrasting
poles, understanding and explanation. Ricoeur writes, "The first time,
understanding will be a naive grasping of the meaning of the text as a
whole. The second time, comprehension will be a sophisticated mode of
123understanding, supported by explanatory proceedures." However, in
Gadamer's hermeneutics the initial level of interpretation, that of 
structural projection, will always keep itself open to the second level 
of understanding, that of ruptural truth; one will always remain aware 
of the relativity of one's own position. On this second interpretive 
level, Heidegger's work and its amplifications in Derrida constitute the 
metatheoretical level of the NLH paradigm. Here certain principles 
arise to control all practical applications of historical method: All
applications of methodology possess an immanent bias and the goal of any 
study in the humanities is to manifest those erroneous and harmful 
prejudices that help to ground such a bias. Truth is to be regarded as 
temporally determined and manifests itself as the negation of one's 
expectations. Truth lies not in the readily understood but in the 
unintelligible. Historical reality, always a matter of linguistics and 
interpretive processes, cannot be reconstructed. History aims at 
revealing the present to itself and thereby at clearing an opening for
123Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Idhe (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1974),
p. 75.
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the refinement of the future. Error in historical research results not 
from a failure to recognize and methodically interpret all the facts but 
from the unrelenting desire to do so.
Finally, the third interpretive level concerns the problem of 
ethical criticism. At this point, the writers for NLH sever themselves 
completely from structuralism and its descendents. NLH supports the 
concept of an international, interdisciplinary language community. The 
major writers for NLH view their vocation as part of a communal process 
of replenishing the human spirit.
CHAPTER II 
The Ontology of Audience Response 
In a period which identifies history with the reconstruction of 
past interpretive processes, the work of the historian of the arts 
naturally commences with the construction of a heuristic model of 
audience perception. For the postmodern historian, this model consists 
of three distinct but integral interpretive moments: the initial
projection of past expectations, the ruptural present, and the handling 
of ruptural aftermath. The discussion of these three moments has given 
rise to three central issues in postmodern criticism: respectively, the
nature of artistic language, the nature of metaphor, and the nature of 
artistic closure and determinacy. This chapter will examine the central 
stances taken on these issues by the hermeneutic writers for NLH. In 
doing so, this chapter defines the ontological nature of the aesthetic 
response detailed in the pages of NLH.
Speech Act Theory and the Initial Aesthetic Response
The majority of the writers for NLH regard reality as a matter of 
interpretation and interpretation as a matter of linguistics. 
Consequently their definition of art and of the aesthetic response 
begins with an investigation into the nature of artistic language. The 
investigation divides Itself into two polar positions, that of the 
structuralists and that of the postmoderns; respectively, that of the 
argument for art as constituted by a special "poetic language" and that 
of the argument for art as merely a deviation from everyday "practical 
language."
The debate between the two positions concerning artistic language 
cannot be resolved on the purely aesthetic level, since the issue at
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stake intertwines itself with the question of the nature of human 
cognitive processes and consequently with the essential paradigmatic 
problem of epistemological certainty. On this level, the distinction 
between the two aesthetic visions results from their differences in 
opinion concerning the relationship of langue and parole.
The structuralist concept of art as a special "poetic language" 
holds that in the work of art the ostensive, referential power of 
language is reduced in order that the work's essential structural 
principles may be more clearly manifested. The concrete elements of a 
work become subservient to the expression of a universal aesthetic idea; 
the structural idea of a work of art becomes more Important than the 
content or material used to express that idea. The concept of the work 
of art as the embodiment of a special "poetic language" consequently 
entails two fundamental postulates alien to the phenomenologist and the 
hermeneuticist. First, the structuralist regards language as a centered 
phenomenon with its own inherent capacity to control the manufacture of 
meaning. Correspondingly, the structuralists adhere to the 
neo-classical subject-object dichotomy whereby any statement, be it 
informative or poetic, is received by an initially passive perceiver. 
For the structuralist, language is an object which directly communicates 
its message. Desire and innovation are held within the confines of 
language; parole stands in front of langue.
The opposing hermeneutic position stems from a contrary placement 
of desire behind structure. The conception of the work of art as merely 
a deviation from "practical language" replaces the primordial priority 
of langue with that of desirous intentionality, the meaning bestowing 
rules of language with the principles of live discourse, and the
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semantic control exerted by structural syntax with that constituted by 
communicative context. This counter-aesthetic then roots itself in a 
vision of language as a desirous action rather than as an atomistic 
assertion and it replaces the dominance of structuralist linguistics 
with a situation-based speech act theory.
Speech act theory, an attempt to de-center linguistics by 
transferring the central focus away from formal linguistic principles to 
"rule-governed forms of behavior,"^ has become a major branch of 
contemporary linguistic study and a crucial adjunct to hermeneutic 
aesthetics. First developed and popularized by John L. Austin in How To 
Do Things with Words (1962), speech act theory was formulated in 
opposition to the positivist "obsession with true and false as 
categories which, along with the category, meaningless, should neatly 
embrace all utterances." Instead Austin contends that the meaning of 
a statement is as much controlled by the psychological-situational 
context in which it is uttered as it is by the formal syntactical, 
semantic and grammatical principles of language. In order to justify 
this assertion, Austin defines two aspects of all utterances, the 
performative and the constative, a division familiar to any student of 
the Stanislavsky method of acting between what a statement does and what 
a statement asserts, between language as action and language as 
declaration.
John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language
(Cambridge: CUP, 1969), p. 12.
2Richard Ohmann, "Speech, Literature and the Space between," New
Literary History, 4 (Autumn 1972), 151.
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Austin's distinction between the active performative aspect of an
utterance and its static constative reflection of langue has become a
central principle for contemporary aesthetics, both the modern and the
postmodern variety. For example, E. D. Hirsch reflects this distinction
in his separation of artistic significance and artistic meaning: "The
important feature of meaning as distinct from significance is that
meaning is the determinate representation of a text for an interpreter.
An interpreted text is always taken to represent something, but that
something can always be related to something else . . . Meaning is what
an interpreter actualizes from a text; significance is that actual
speaking as heard in a chosen and variable context of the interpreter's
3
experiential world." And postmodern hermeneuticist Paul Ricoeur 
parallels this distinction in his separation of discourse and meaning: 
"First, all discourse occurs as an event; it is the opposite of language 
as 'langue,' code, or system and as an event, it has an instantaneous 
existence, it appears and disappears. But at the same time —  here lies 
the paradox —  it can be identified and reidentified as the same; this
4sameness is what we call, in the broad sense, its meaning." Ricoeur 
adds: "the aim of language is double: the aim of an ideal sense or
meaning (that is, not belonging to the physical or psychic world) and 
the aim of reference. If meaning can be called inexistent, insofar as
3
E. D. Hirsch, Jr. "Three Dimensions of Hermeneutics," New Literary 
History, 3 (Winter 1972), 250,
^Paul Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics," New
Literary History, 6 (Autumn 1974), 97.
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it is a pure object of thought, it is the reference . . . which roots
our words and sentences in reality."^
This distinction between the performative and constative 
characteristics of all utterances grounds contemporary speech act 
theory. However, a division has occurred within the theory's advocates. 
The strict followers of Austin and Searle remain adherents to the 
neo-classical subject-object dichotomy, believing that the rules 
governing both the performative and the constative aspects of an
utterance may be perceived, codified, and classified. And Austin and
Searle merely repeat on a social structural level the type of 
transcendental thought practiced by Saussure on the formal linguistic 
level. Jonathan Culler notes, "As the founder of speech act theory, 
Austin is, in fact, repeating at another level (though less explicitly) 
the crucial move made by Saussure: to account for signifying events
(parole) one attempts to describe the system that made them 
possible."^ Indeed, Austin, aware of the infinite regression and 
relativism implicit in any concept of a temporal based communication 
sans rigid codification, attempted to ground his speech act theory 
through the establishment of certain structural "felicity conditions"
necessary for communication to occur.^ These conditions are as 
follows: an accepted conventional procedure must lead to a
"*Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Idhe (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1974),
p. 33.
^Jonathan Culler, "Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin," New
Literary History, 13 (Autumn 1981), 15.
7J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard,
1962), pp. 14-16.
63
conventionally accepted effect; the participants in the speech act must 
be able to fulfill the full requirements of their roles; the full 
conventional procedure must be properly executed. These three 
conditions enable a speech act to take place. Two other conditions 
allow Its abuse to be detected: the participants must possess the
appropriate conventional attitudes and must be sincere about them.
However, in perhaps the most significant debate to occur within 
contemporary criticism, Jacques Derrida, through the aid of the 
phenomenological concept of intentionality, argued forcefully against 
John Searle in order to prove Austin's felicity conditions fallacious. 
Derrida's central argument parallels Dilthey's assertion concerning the 
impossibility of knowing or defining the life force. Derrida explains 
that Austin's felicity conditions demand full coincidence between one's 
intentional attitudes and the conditions that constitute any situation. 
However, to accept such a total coincidence between man's intentional 
self and his present situation means the reduction of man to a totally 
present, nonthinking entity; it would again strip man of his unconscious 
intentional desire and make him a slave to the linguistic system.
Derrida writes, "The conscious presence of speakers or receivers 
participating in the accomplishment of a performative, their conscious 
and intentional presence in the totality of the operation, Implies
teleologically that no residue reste escapes the present
g
totalization." Derrida concludes that Austin and Searle's
formulation of speech act theory cannot attain validity because the 
human intention "animating the utterance will never be through and
O
Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," Glyph, 1 (1977), 187-88.
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9through present to itself and to its content." Paul de Man parallels 
Derrida's argument against Austin's speech act theory, again 
capitalizing upon the unconscious aspect of human intentionality. De 
Man explains that since the mind does not "know whether it is doing or 
not doing something, then there are considerable grounds for suspicion 
that it does not know what it is doing.
The poststructuralist attack against Austin's speech act theory has 
produced wide ramifications upon all schools of modern and postmodern 
thought. Most importantly for the present study, the poststructuralist 
attack upon Austin and Searle freed speech act theory from its 
structuralist deterministic confines and opened it for use as grounds 
for a hermeneutic aesthetic. The kernel of speech act theory, the 
influence of context upon the perception of meaning, a concept similar 
to the hermeneutic concept of tradition, remained intact despite 
Derrida's onslaught. As Culler notes, what the poststructuralist attack 
on speech act theory put in question was not the contextual 
determination of performative effectiveness "but the possibility of 
mastering the domain of speech acts by exhaustively specifying the 
contextual determinants."^
Paul Ricoeur explains how the hermeneutic aesthetic borrowed 
significant facets of speech act theory without subscribing to Austin's 
structuralist amplifications. Ricoeur notes the first facet:
9
Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," Glyph, 1 (1977), 192.
^Paul de Man, "Action and Identity in Nietzche," Yale French Studies, 
52 (Fall 1975), 29.
^Jonathan Culler, "Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin," New
Literary History, 13 (Autumn 1981) 24.
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"Discourse is always realized temporally and in a present, whereas the
12language system is virtual and outside of time." This trait, the
fundamental principle of speech act theory, allows for the free movement
in time of constitutive linguistic rules and has enabled speech act
theory to secure a firm place in the hermeneutic aesthetic.
Ricoeur notes the second trait: "Whereas language lacks a subject
—  in the sense that the question 'Who is speaking?' does not apply at
its level —  discourse refers to its speaker by means of a complex set 
13of indicators." The principle of self-referentiality corresponds to
Austin's definition of the "illocutionary force" of language: the
"performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of
14an act o£ saying something."
The third trait Ricoeur notes corresponds to his and Hirsch's 
definition of communicative meaning: "Whereas the signs in language
refer only to other signs within the same system, and whereas language 
therefore lacks a world just as it lacks temporality and subjectivity, 
discourse is always about something. It is in discourse that the
symbolic function of language is actualized."^ The propositional 
power of language corresponds to Austin's definition of "locutionary
force," "the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words
12Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered
as a Text," New Literary History, 5 (Autumn 1973), 92.
13Ibid.
14J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard,
1962), p. 99.
*3Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Actio Considered
as a Text," New Literary History, 5 (Autumn 1973), 92.
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in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain
'meaning' in the favorite philosophical sense of that word, i. e. with a
16certain sense and with a certain reference."
Finally, Ricoeur notes that discourse is always addressed to a
particular audience: "Whereas language is only the condition for
communication, for which it provides the codes, it is in discourse that
all messages are exchanged. In this sense, discourse alone has not only
a world, but an other —  another person, an interlocutor to whom it is
addressed."^ This extensive aspect of communicative language
corresponds to Austin's definition of "perlocutionary force:" "the
18achieving of certain effects by saying something."
Together the regulative rules governing the illocutlonary,
locutionary, and perlocutionary forces of a language comprise the
hermeneutic model of practical everyday communication. And the
hermeneutic aesthetician then seeks to define the peculiar communicative
power of art. by noting its deviations from this communicative mode.
Wolfgang Iser explains, "experience of the text is aesthetic insofar as
the recipient produces the object under conditions that do not or need
19not correspond to his habitual disposition." The hermeneuticists 
note the primary aesthetic deviation as distanciation, the temporal
L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard,
1962), p. 94.
^Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered
as a Text," New Literary History, 5 (Autumn 1973), 92.
18J, L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard,
1962), p. 120.
19Wolfgang Iser, "The Current Situation of Literary Theory: Key
Concepts and the Imaginary," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 19.
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fixation of discourse. This fixation results in a lowering of
contextual restraints as the work's locutionary meaning transcends the
restrictions of the here and now. Richard Ohmann explains, "Literary
works are discourses with the usual illocutionary rules suspended. If
you like, they are acts without consequences of the usual sort, sayings
20liberated from the usual burden of social bond and responsibility."
Barbara Hernstein Smith defines the fictive nature of art in a similar
fashion: "when we interpret a natural utterance, we seek to ascertain
its real historical determinants, the context that did in fact occasion
the occurrence and form. However complex and elusive that context, it
is nevertheless historically determinate and particular. The context of
21a fictive utterance, however, is historically indeterminate." And
Herbert Blau uses similar words to describe the nature of theatre art:
"We may think of lago as an avatar of difference, an undoubted presence
leaving origins behind. The scene is now familiar, slipped, and loosed;
yet is there not something within us, as if another Troilus, that
doesn't want to believe it? What will hold still, for all the seeming?
22That's the problem to which we keep returning to in the theatre."
At this point it should be stressed that speech act theory and the
hermeneutic aesthetic based upon it do not restrict themselves to verbal 
communication but include all other forms of language as well. For 
example, Paul Ricoeur states that action may be regarded as a text
20Richard Ohmann, "Speech, Literature and the Space between," New
Literary History, 4 (Autumn 1972), 151.
21 Barbara Hernstein Smith, "Poetry as Fiction," New Literary History, 
2 (Winter 1971), 275.
22Herbert Blau, "Precipitations of Theatre: Words, Presence, Time Out
of Mind," New Literary History, 12 (Spring 1981), 140.
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insofar as it can be seen as a variation upon a prototypical model, that
is, insofar as one can project the illocutlonary intention behind it and
the perlocutionary effect at which it is aimed. Ricoeur writes, "A
typology of action, following the model of illocutionary acts, is
therefore possible. Not only a typology, but a criteriology, inasmuch
as each type implies rules, more precisely 'constitutive rules' which
23according to Searle . . . allow the consturction of 'ideal models'."
And in the first NLH article to explore an aesthetic based upon speech
act theory Barbara Hernstein Smith uses Hamlet's abuse of Opelia as one
of her primary examples. Writes Hernstein Smith, "To understand why
Hamlet abuses Ophelia, the reader must infer from, on the one hand, the
linguistic structure of the play and, on the other hand, everything he
knows about the world of man and the relation of their acts to their
situations and motives, a plausible set of motives and situations for 
2 4that act." Here the linguistic structure of the play, its intent, 
corresponds to the play's perlocutionary force; the motives of the 
characters, its illocutionary force. Illocutionary force may also be 
extended to the motives of the playwright in choosing a particular 
action over another. However, it should be stressed that each 
communicative action or object (such as a costume, an expressive 
lighting effect, or a theatre set) constitutes only a segment of the 
entire locutionary text of a production. Barbara Hernstein Smith 
explains this concept in terms of the novel: "The essential fictiveness
23Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered
as a Text," New Literary History, 5 (Autumn 1973), 100.
01Barbara Hernstein Smith, "Poetry as Fiction," New Literary History,
2 (Winter 1971), 276.
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of novels, however, as of all literary artworks, Is not to be discovered
In the unreality of the characters, objects, and events alluded to, but
In the unreality of the alludings themselves. In other words, in a
novel or tale, it is the act of reporting events, the act of describing
25persons and referring to places, that is fictive." Although the 
individual action remains confined to its position in the entire 
production's locutionary structure, the audience can no longer rely upon 
everyday contextual clues in determining the assertion made by the 
production as a whole. And to the degree to which the author or 
director's illocutionary intentions and perlocutionary aims remain 
undiminished, the theatrical production loses its artistic stature and 
encroaches on the rhetorical and propagandists. The hermeneuticist 
regards the theatrical production as a tabula rasa upon which the 
audience is initially forced to write its own interpretation. A play's 
significance emerges from the audience's projected interpretation. The 
initial assertion of a work of art becomes the product of the mind of 
the beholder.
However, the loss of everyday contextual determinacy need not imply 
a poststructuralist vision of the total indeterminacy of the art work. 
Nor need it imply a perspective of the art work as a totally free 
floating structure upon which the individual audience member is at 
liberty to impose any interpretation he desires. Charles Altieri 
explains that such a subjective stance, placing the interpreter totally 
outside the text's embodiment of language, manifests an 
anti-hermeneutic, positivist slant which robs language of its
25Barbara Hernstein Smith, "Poetry as Fiction," New Literary History,
2 (Winter 1971), 272.
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unconscious deterministic nature and reduces it to an object that can be 
stood outside of, that can be freely and consciously manipulated to 
express different things. Rather Altieri opposes the poststructuralist 
subjectivist concept of aesthetic understanding with the objective 
hermeneutic position. Objective here is to be understood In light of 
its definition by Gadamer and Kuhn: "objectivity is less an abstract
property of certain kinds of things than a property of certain 
procedures within an established model of inquiry. Objectivity is
simply the possibility of reaching agreement among inquiries or
26descriptions of a phenomenon." The hermeneuticists view the
audience's initial response to an art work as essentially objective
through their acceptance of the phenomenological concept of the social
structuration of individual intentionality. One's initial aesthetic
response remains contextually determined by one's being historically
situated in a particular "interpretive community." Stanley Fish, one of
the first to develop the concept of interpretive communities, explains,
"If the speakers of a language share a system of rules that each of them
has somehow internalized, understanding will, In some sense, be uniform;
that is, it will proceed in terms of the system of rules all speakers
share . . . they will be constraints on the range, and even the
direction, of response; they will make response, to some extent,
27predictable and normative." In a similar vein, Fredric Jameson 
writes, "we never really confront a text immediately, In all its
freshness as a thing-in-itself. Rather, texts come before us as the
26Charles Altieri, "The Hermeneutics of Literary Indeterminacy: A
Dissent from the New Orthodoxy," New Literary History, 10 (Autumn 1978), 
77.
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always-already-read; we apprehend them through sedimented layers of
previous Interpretations or —  if the text is brand-new, through the
sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited
28interpretive methods." And Wolfgang Iser argues that "Literary
texts collect and store elements from many other texts, which may
themselves be literary or may —  as 'contexts' —  reflect social norms
and conventions. The selections from texts and contexts lays down the
direction from which the world is to be approached through the literary
29texts in question." Furthermore, the phenoraenologists and the
hermeneuticists agree that the "objectivity" of an audience's
intersubjective aesthetic response extends from the smallest semantic
componant to the full structural design of a work.
In addition to assuring a certain degree of intersubjective
uniformity in an audience's aesthetic response, the concept of an
interpretive community also allows the artist a certain degree of
control over the reception of his artistic statement by those with whom
he shares a common tradition. Hans Robert Jauss writes, "The work does
not exist without its effect; the effect presupposes reception, and in
30turn the audience's judgment conditions the author's production."
27Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge: Harvard, 1980), p. 11.
28Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious; Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell, 1981), p. 9.
29Wolfgang Iser, "The Current Situation of Literary Theory: Key
Concepts and the Imaginary," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 12.
30Hans Robert Jauss, "Theses on the Transition from the Aesthetics of 
Literary Works to a Theory of Aesthetic Experience," in Interpretation 
of Narrative, eds. Marie J. Valdes and Owen J. Miller (Terente: 
University of Terente Press, 1978), p. 138,
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Jauss further points out that the artist can ignore his connections with
tradition only at the risk of becoming incomprehensible, Jauss explains:
A literary work, even if it seems now, does not appear as 
something absolutely new in an informational vacuum, but 
predisposes its readers to a very definite type of 
reception by textual strategies, overt and covert 
signals, familiar characteristics or implicit allusions.
It awakens memories of the familiar, stirs particular 
emotions in the reader and with its 'beginning' arouses 
expectations for the 'middle and end', which can then be 
continued intact, changed, re-oriented, or even 
ironically fulfilled in the course of reding according 
to certain rules of genre or type of text.
Thus the lowering of practical illocutionary and perlocutionary 
restraints on communication cannot be viewed as necessitating a 
poststructuralist conclusion regarding either the total indeterminacy of 
a text or the individual audience menber's right to foster his own 
private, subjective interpretation of a work. For the artist and his 
collective audience as participants in a common interpretive tradition 
may be regarded as co-partners in the creation of an aesthetic 
experience. However in the interaction between the artist and his 
audience, the latter always retains the upper hand. For just as the 
concept of phenomenological intentlonality implies that all perception 
flows from the projection of past expectations, so the hermeneutic 
version of speech act theory asserts that the aesthetic lowering of 
everyday contextual restraints unleashes a more fervently creative 
pre-understanding. Iser explains that "As what is meant can never be 
totally translated into what is said, the utterance is bound to contain 
implications, which in turn necessitate interpretation. Indeed, there 
never would be any dyadic interaction if the speech act did not give
31Hans Robert Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary 
Theory," New Literary History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 12.
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32rise to indeterminancies that needed to be resolved." Consequently,
Iser argues that since every intentional projection "involves certain
heuristic decisions" which "cannot be equated with the literary text,
33but simply opens up a means of access to it," intentional
pre-understanding of a text "always attempts to subjugate fictional
3 Adiscourse to existing theoretical frameworks."
However, the aesthetic lowering of contextual restraints not only
evokes a more forceful intentional projection of significance but causes
an audience to reflect upon their own intentional structures. Wolfgang
Iser explains that when norms are removed from the "practical" world to
become part of a work of art, "They are set in a new context which
changes their function, insofar as they no longer act as social
regulations but as the subject of discussion which, more often than not,
35ends in a questioning rather than a confirmation of their validity." 
The freer the individual audience member becomes in the projection of 
his own individual interpretation, the greater becomes his need to check 
the validity of his Interpretations against the structural base on which 
it depends. Iser explains this relationship between the individual 
interpretation and the intersubjective locutionary structure in terms of 
connotation and denotation. He writes that aesthetic "signs fulfill
32Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 59.
33Wolfgang Iser, "The Reality of Fiction: A Functionalist Approach to
Literature," New Literary History, 7 (Autumn 1975), 7.
34Wolfgang Iser, "The Current Situation of Literary Theory: Key
Concepts and the Imaginary," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 16.
35Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in
Prose Fiction from Banyan to Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 1974), p. xii.
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their function to the degree in which their relatedness to identifiable
objects begins to fade or is even blotted out. For now something has to
be imagined which the signs have not denoted —  though it will be
preconditioned by what they do denote. Thus the reader is compelled to
36transform a denotation into a connotation." Iser concludes, "the
reader’s communication with the text is a dynamic process of
self-correction, as he formulates signifieds which he then must
37continually modify." For example, a more sophisticated member of an 
eighteenth century audience may be taken with a private sense of 
revulsion at the peculiar horrors demonstrated in the denoument of 
Shakespeare's King Lear. Being so moved, he will naturally be prompted 
to reflect upon whether his response manifests his own particular 
idiosyncrases or whether such a response is well warranted by a play or 
production that has exceeded the logical protocol of a particular
conventional aesthetic structure, i. e. that of tragedy. This path of 
reflection then necessarily entails an investigation of the relationship 
between the audience's collective intentional concept of tragedy and its 
embodiment within Shakespeare's play. However, it should be stressed 
that such a cognitive exploration need not have occurred consciously. 
Rather it would have transpired most frequently on the unconscious level 
as one's intentional expectations (e.g. those of King Lear as a tragedy,
of the structure of reality as reflected in tragedy and in King Lear's
embodiment of tragedy, and of oneself as a member of a collective
audience) were either negated or fulfilled. Instantaneously, the
36Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 59.
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aesthetic experience evokes reflection upon the langue of conventional
structural principles and upon the parole of the art work as the
embodiment of those principles.
Such a concept of the aesthetic experience resembles closely the
structuralist idea of overdetermination formulated by Roman' Jakobson,
the Russian formalist. Jakobson's classic statement of this principle
reads: "The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from
38the axis of selection into the axis of combination." Jakobson here
asserts that the art work, existing in a situation where pragmatic
implications have been reduced, shifts its focus from the referential
power of signs to their structural interrelationships. In the work of
art form comes to dominate over referential content and to a great
degree itself constitutes aesthetic content. But the close similarity
between the hermeneutic concept of distanciation and the structuralist
concept of overdetermination need not lead to structuralist Morton
Bloomfield's conclusion: "If by poetic language we mean language used
for poetic purposes or a special dialect used in the writing of poetry
or other literature, it makes no difference in most cases for poetic
analysis. It makes a metaphysical but not much of a literary critical 
39difference," Bloomfield's assertion ignores the postmodern union of 
critical inquiry with metaphysical vision as well as the resultant 
differences in the epistemological status of the work of art in the
structuralist and postmodern world views. Also the epistemological
38Roman Jakobson, "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics," in
Style in Language, ed. Thomas A, Sebeek (Cambridge: MIT, 1960), p. 358.
39Morton Bloomfield, "Stylistics and the Theory of Literature," New
Literary History, 7 (Winter 1976), 278.
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difference between the structuralist and the hermeneutic work of art, 
between art seen as a fixed message and the art event viewed as an 
interpretive process, produces a profound difference in what each 
position views as the content, the reality, and the power of the work of 
art.
As one passes from a concept of artistic significance based on an 
immanent structure to a concept of the artistic experience as projected 
significance, the boundaries defining the content of the work of art 
enlargen and gain flexibility. Commenting upon the articles contained 
in the issue of NLH devoted to "Form and Its Alternatives," Morris Weitz 
opposes Smith's hermeneutic vision of speech act theory with the view 
expressed by Joan Webber and Warner Berthoff: "that certain literary
forms are inextricably tied to their social and political contexts; and 
consequently that they cannot be intelligently understood or 
aesthetically evaluated independently of those c o n t e x t s . H o w e v e r ,  
Weitz's juxtaposition stands in contradiction to the hermeneutic 
assertion that "the reader's response is not to the meaning; it _is the 
m e a n i n g . F o r  in asserting the audience's perceptual framework as 
the dominant determinator of the aesthetic event, the hermeneuticist 
insists upon the eternal elasticity of audience reception. A work's 
historical, social, and aesthetic context do not automatically cease to 
occupy a position in the interpretation of a work's locutionary 
structure. Rather the "factual" context of a work becomes
^Morris Weitz, "The Context of Form: A Commentary," New Literary 
History, 2 (Winter 1971), 353.
41 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge: Harvard, 1980), p. 11.
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"fictionalized" as it becomes transformed into part of the audience's
aesthetic perceptual apparatus. For example, the "factual"
function of myth in classical Greek society exerted a control over the
aesthetic experience of Aeschlyus' audience that has distanced that
experience forever from twentieth century man. Hermeneuticist Frederic
Will explains the resultant unintelligibility of Greek tragedy: "Greek
tragedy puts the question of intelligibility forcefully before us. How
can we teach Greek tragedy in translation to our younger contemporaries?
Key words —  sophrosyne, anangke, philia —  are impenetrable except to
experts, who are usually unable to find their own culture, to pass on 
A 2the news." Consequently Will and other hermeneuticists argue that a 
twentieth century production of a Greek tragedy represents not the 
recreation of a classical work but the presentation of a contemporary 
piece. And Rainer Warning postis the mobility of interpretive horizons 
as the chief difference between an objectivist and a hermeneutic 
aesthetic, the latter operating with full knowledge that the text "is 
only the linguistic manifestation of a speech act which, qua act, stands 
in institutionalized contexts of acting" and that "consequently, a
theoretical grasp necessitates taking those pragmatic contexts into
„  „43 account.
Furthermore, as the significance of the art work becomes the 
product of the audience's intentional pre-understanding, the work 
encroaches more powerfully upon the everyday life of the audience
42Fredric Will, "Shamans in Turtlenecks," New Literary History, 13 
(Spring 1982), 415.
I Q
Rainer Warning, "On the Alterity of Medieval Religious Drama," New
Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 266.
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member. The work of art ceases to be a mimetic structural statement
over which the audience holds the contemplative power to grasp, analyze
and relate to their life. Rather the art work brings to light its
audience's structural understanding of their world, an understanding
which had hitherto remained submerged beneath the utilitarian
trafficking of everyday life. As Michael Holquist and Walter Reed
explain, "texts do not provide photographs of society but X-rays of the
44system out of which they are constituted." These X-rays of social 
perception, those revealed intentional structures, become the 
hermeneutic equivalent of aesthetic verisimilitude, a verisimilitude now 
no longer mimetically embedded in the text but actualized in the 
operations performed by the audience in creating the text's contextual
world. And since a text does not directly give a sense of
verisimilitude but instead allows an audience to create it, the
hermeneuticist argues for a diminished and less stringent aesthetic
distance than traditionally understood. For example, Wolfgang Iser 
asserts, "If the sense of the narrative can only be completed through 
the cooperation of the reader (which is allowed for in the text), then 
the borderline between fiction and reality becomes increasingly hazy, 
for the reader can scarcely regard his own participation as fictional. 
He is bound to look on his reactions as something real, and at no time 
is this conviction d i s p u t e d . A n d  Hans Robert Jauss writes, "When 
the accent of reality is bestowed upon a province of meaning, the other
^Michael Holquist and Walter Reed, "Six Theses on the Novel —  and 
Some Metaphors," New Literary History, 11 (Spring 1980), 418.
45Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 97.
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provinces of meaning appear only as 'quasi-realisties,' including the 
everyday life world.
In identifying aesthetic significance with the intentional
projections of an audience, the hermeneuticist allows the possibility
for ruptural meaning to occur through the aesthetic experience. For the
hermeneuticist argues that the conventional expectations of an audience
will never fully coincide with the locutionary structure of the text.
Wolfgang Iser writes, "An author's perspective of the world, the text
clearly cannot claim to represent the reader's view. The gap cannot be
bridged just by a 'willing suspension of disbelief1 because , . . the
reader's task is not simply to accept, but to assemble for himself that
47which is to be accepted." And in asserting that the audience's 
aesthetic projections of verisimilitude come from the same source as 
everyday practical consciousness, the hermeneuticist allows the 
aesthetic event to infringe unconsciously upon the entire social, 
cognitive life of the audience. Hayden White writes, "The text is not 
to be 'cracked,' like a code, but restored to its original state as a 
mysterious presence in a putatively stable linguistic world, a presence 
which challenges, not only language, but the very modes of perception of 
that world , . . the work of art is comprehensible precisely because it 
figures a way of knowing which conflicts with the ways of knowing of the
46Hans Robert Jauss, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval 
Literature," New Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 213-14.
47Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 97.
80
generation into which it is p r o j e c t e d . H a n s  Robert Jauss
summarizes the hermeneutic concept of aesthetic significance:
"Significance, which is unlocked through aesthetic 
experience, arises from the convergence of effect and 
reception. It is no atemporal, basic element which is 
always already given; rather, it is the never-completed 
result of a process of progressive and enrichening 
interpretation, which concretizes —  in an ever new and 
different manner —  the textually immanent potential for 
meaning in i()the change of horizons of historical 
life-worlds.
The hermeneutic vision of speech act theory then may be summarized: 
art suspends the everyday pragmatic context that controls and 
facilitates the understanding of meaning; in doing so, it evokes a more 
powerful though self-conscious projection of pre-understood 
significance, verisimilitude. And this projection of verisimilitude, 
stemming from the audience's everyday consciousness, allows the art work 
to make a profound disturbance in one's perception of the workaday 
world.
Rupture and Metaphor
NLH has produced many articles describing speech act theory and its 
bearing on an audience's aesthetic response. But the postmodern authors 
of NLH delegate a purely idealistic, heuristic validity to descriptions 
of an audience's intersubjective response. The necessarily limited and 
metaphorical nature of the phenomenological projection insures a lack of 
complementary coincidence between interpretation and the work itself. 
In terms of postmodern aesthetics, any interpretive projection is doomed 
to be reductive; interpretation naturally ignores an artistic text's
^Hayden White, "Literary History: the Point of It All," New Literary
History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 179.
49Hans Robert Jauss, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval
Literature," New Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 183.
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polysemous nature, its multiplicity of avenues for diverse
interpretations, its surplus of signification. Martin Price explains
that the interpretive unity projected upon a work's otherwise
multifacted, insignificant structure leads to an overinterpretation, an
overdetermined form, "fulfilling a number of functions at once and
sacrificing the full realization of each for the sake of the
o t h e r s . F o r  similar reasons, Wolfgang Iser explains that the
aesthetic experience occurs in a total state of tension: "The
polysemantic nature of the text and the illusion-making of the reader
are opposed factors. If the illusion were complete, the polysemantic
nature would vanish; if the polysemantic nature were all-powerful, the
51illusion would be totally destroyed."
Multiple causes for the work of art's polysemous nature have been 
suggested by the writers for NLH. For example, Iser cites not only the 
Imbalance between the author's and the audience's intentional worlds but 
also the demands placed upon the audience to complete the communicative 
message after the restraints of contextual clues have been lowered. The 
lack of clear contextual directions for the construction of an art 
work's significance opens up a wide variety of interpretive 
possibilities, the understanding of any piece depending upon aesthetic 
closure, the selection of any single interpretation at the expense of 
the others. This necesssity for aesthetic closure occurs in any 
narrative medium on three levels: that of plot construction and
"^Martin Price, "Form and Discontent," New Literary History, 4 (Winter 
1973), 384.
^Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 285.
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verisimilitude (the global text); that of the interpretation and
evaluation of any single event, communicative object or sentence (the
subtext); and that of the deciphering of the play's message, theme, or
significance. Wolfgang Iser explains, "Even in the simplest story there
is bound to be some kind of blockage, because no tale can ever be told
in its entirety. Indeed it is only through inevitable omissions that a
story gains its dynamism. Thus whenever the flow is interrupted and we
are led off in unexpected directions, the opportunity is given to us to
bring into play our own faculty for establishing connections —  for
52filling in the gaps left by the text itself." And Iser adds, "A
gestalt that represents plot development is still not completely closed.
The closing can only come about when the significance of the action can
53be best represented by a further gestalt." But, as hermeneuticist 
Robert Weimann explains, the lack of clear contextual directions for the 
construction of an artistic text results in a constant tension in 
interpretation which forces one to check and recheck the validity of 
one's interpretive projections. Weimann writes, "both reference and 
sign —  in their very different ways —  engage in a relationship to an 
object or situation . . . which, being imaginary, enjoys a metaphorical 
rather than actual station. At the same time this relationship is 
subjected to a process of rhetoric and evaluation which tends to stress 
the tension (rather than the congruity) between reference and
52Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 280.
53Ibid., p. 123.
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54object." In this fashion, the polysemous nature of a text assures 
itself of constant recognition. Indeed, the demand to maintain 
aesthetic interest and curiosity may drive the audience to ferret out a 
work's polysemous nature even when it has been most submerged. E. H. 
Gombrich, an art historian who has influenced many NLH writers, states, 
"The more the text fulfills our expectations; the more we want from it 
. . . Illusion wears off once the expectation is stepped up. We take it 
for granted and want more."^ According to the postmodern critics of 
NLH, aesthetic reception exists in a constant state of flux between an 
audience's act of closure and the possibilities for other acts of 
closure opened up by the text. And since no interpretation can be 
stabilized, no foundations are left for the classical concept of 
artistic unity.
In the dissonance between an audience's interpretation and a text's 
polysemous nature, in the rift between the projection of a familiar 
verisimilitude based upon learned expectations and the text's power to 
elude those projected boundaries, the power of the art work comes into 
being. As Iser writes, "Experiences arise only when the familiar is 
transcended or undermined; they grow out of the alteration or 
falsification of that which is already ours."^ For the same reason, 
Needner points to the breaking of expected visual codifications as the
54Robert Weimann, "French Structuralism and Literary History: Some
Critiques and Reconsiderations," New Literary History, 4 (Spring 1973), 
466.
E. H. Gembrich, Art and Illusion; A Study in the Psychology of 
Pictoral Representation (New York: Pantheon, 1965), p. 54.
"^Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 132.
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source of power in the graphic arts: "Without an indication of the
effects of a crossing on two strata of the life of a person, a picture
would not point to what is really spontaneous and unique in subjective
experience: no emotions, nor temporal proclivities, but the boundaries
that someone may have transcended and we have not."^
This rift between an audience’s expectations and the reality of the
text provides the basis for what the postmodern critic deems the single
most essential element of artistic expression, metaphor. Ricoeur's
definition of metaphor, supported by the majority of writers in the
issue of NLH devoted to metaphor, speaks of the metaphorical moment in
terms of the "logical absurdity" resultant from this rift. Ricoeur
explains that the work of art is received with the expectation of a
certain type of unity, verisimilitude, which the individual expressive
element then possesses the power forcefully to contradict. In this
conflict between world vision and the obstinate element which refuses to
make sense in terms of that world, Ricoeur writes, the audience is
presented with "a choice between either preserving the literal sense of
both the subject and the modifier and concluding to the meaninglessness
of the whole . . .  or attributing a new meaning to the modifier such as
58the whole . . . makes sense." Ricoeur defines this obligatory
choice as the metaphorical moment, "a clash between literal meanings 
which excludes a literal use of the word in question and gives clues for 
the finding of a new meaning which is able to fit in the context . . .
"^Angel Medina, "Discussion: On Narrative and Narratives," New
Literary History, 11 (Spring 1980), 573.
58Paul Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics," New
Literary History, 6 (Autumn 1974), 102.
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59and to make sense in this context." The metaphorical moment becomes 
equivalent to the Heideggerian moment of rupture and proceeds from a 
forced suspension of judgment.
Tzvetan Todorov explains that the Heideggerian basis for the
poststructuralist concept of metaphor "requires both as and of
literature that we recognize the Other as other, without identifying it
with ourselves, without identifying ourselves with it —  that we view it
as irreducibly external, neither Inferior nor superior but fundamentally
different. However, it should be stressed that for other NLH
writers including the hermeneuticists, the metaphorical introduction of
the alien, of the other, need not imply a total disruption to an
audience's sense of verisimilitude. Judgment need not remain totally
suspended. As David Edge explains, the metaphor may itself act "to
eliminate confusion, to structure c h a o s . S o l  Worth adds that the
metaphor is "designed as much to prevent putting the wrong things
6 2together as to help us to put the right things together." Wolfgang 
Iser explains metaphorical control in terms of an audience's initially 
projected interpretive scheme: "Each scheme makes the world accessible
in accordance with the conventions the artist has inherited. But when 
something new is perceived which is not covered by these schemata, it
"^Paul Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics," New 
Literary History, 6 (Autumn 1974), 99.
^^Tzvetan Todorov, "Reflections on Literature in Contemporary France," 
New Literary History, 10 (Spring 1979), 522-23.
^David Edge, "Technological Metaphor and Social Control," New 
Literary History, 6 (Autumn 1974), 137.
62Sol Worth, "Seeing Metaphor as Caracature," New Literary History, 6
(Autumn 1974), 205.
63can only be represented by means of a correction to the schemata,"
Iser amplifies this concept of schema and metaphorical correction
through utilizing the cybernetic gestalt concepts of figure and ground,
foreground and background; metaphor, he writes, "inevitably creates a
background-foreground relationship, with the chosen element in the
foreground and its original context in the background. And, indeed,
without such a relationship, the chosen element would appear
meaningless."^ And for similar reasons Yuri Lotman explains that an
aesthetic experience can be achieved only through the metaphorical
process by which a new figure at once stands out from and is compared to
a traditional ground. Lotman writes, "an artistic text is so
constructed that it not only refutes some definite system but constantly
recalls it, keeping it alive in the reader's consciousness."^
And through the metaphorical clash of past expectations and a
ruptural communicative element, a new conception of reality enters into
the audience's language. Wolfgang Iser explains that in metaphor
"Expectations aroused in the reader by allusions to things he knows or
thinks he knows are frustrated; through this negation, we know that the
standards and models alluded to are somehow to be transcended, though no
longer on their own terms. These now appear to be, as it were, things
66of the past; what follows cannot be stated, but has to be realized."
Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 91.
64Ibid., p. 108.
^■*Yuri Lotman, "On Some Principle Difficulties in the Structural 
Description of a Text," Linguistics, 121 (Feb. 1974), 62.
66Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 37.
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In a similar fashion, hermeneuticist Murray Krieger writes that in the
metaphor "the langue has been violated to the point that the parole
appears to have become its own langue, a system of which it is the only
spoken representation . . . Not that it is literally Incompatable with
the existing langue of which it is a parole, but that the langue cannot
67account for what this particular speech act has performed."
Pointing to the power of metaphor to being something completely new into
the language, Jonathan Culler distinguishes between the dead and the
live metaphor: "the 'dead' metaphor . . . functions as nonmetaphorical
expression, though we can perceive its metaphorical origins, and the
truly creative live metaphor . . .  is not simply a substitute for
68another expression." The live metaphor brings more than a new
naming of the world into the language, more than a new comparison of two 
unlike entities. Rather the live metaphor ruptures past world visions 
and thereby creates a new sense of verisimilitude, a new world of
possibilities which had hitherto remained unrecognized. Paul Ricoeur 
writes that according to the extent to which a metaphor negates former 
expectations without straining credibility, it also disrupts the
established order of the probable, the possible, and the necessary and 
causes a new world vision to come into being. Ricoeur writes that the 
understanding of an artistic text coincides with grasping "the meaning 
of the text itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the direction of
thought opened up by the text . . . If we may be said to coincide with
^Murray Krieger, "Poetics Reconsidered: The Presence vs. the Absence
of the Word," New Literary History, 7 (Winter 1976), 358-59.
68Jonathan Culler, "Commentary," New Literary History, 6 (Autumn
1974), 223.
88
anything, it is not the life of another ego, but the disclosure of a 
possible way of looking at things, which is the genuine power of the 
text."^ In this fashion, metaphorical rupture secures the social 
power of art by making the communal langue of intentional expectations, 
that is, the socially sanctioned comcepts of art and of the world, the 
background against which the foregrounded artistic innovation occurs. 
Hermeneuticist Geoffrey Hartman describes the artistic event as a 
"liminal" experience, a ritualistic separation of an audience from its 
socially preconceived world vision in which the individual audience 
member is forced to weld a new interpretive reality. Hartman writes 
that the individual audience member "discovers in this way both his 
individuality and his isolation, both selfhood and the meaning of 
society . . . The ritual process leads, of course, beyond liminality. A 
new identity, or reidentification, should emerge."7^ And Ricoeur 
cites the metaphorical moment as the most important factor in the 
hermeneuticist history of art. Ricoeur asserts that through 
metaphorical rupture language becomes "historied" with usage; new 
possibilities for meaning are created in the language system. Ricoeur 
explains that the ruptural communicative element once understood becomes 
"heavy with new use-value" and "returns to the system. And, in 
returning to the system, it gives it a history.1,7 ̂ Thus, for example,
^ Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of
Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian Univesity, 1976), p. 92.
^Geoffrey Hartman, "History Writing as Answerable Style," New
Literary History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 80-81.
71Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Idhe (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1974),
p. 92-93.
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W. S. Gilbert's introduction of electrical theatre lighting introduced 
into the language of theatre illumination a new metaphorical dimension, 
shattering the past expectations of his audience and creating a richer 
signifying system.
Thus the majority of writers for NLH regard metaphor as not only 
the central moment of artistic truth and power but also as the seat of 
aesthetic innovation. Metaphor has thus become the single most 
essential element in the aesthetic expounded in NLH and the chief 
subject of study for the hermeneuticist historian of the arts.
CHAPTER III 
The Ontology of Historical Inquiry 
Hermeneuticist Geoffrey Hartman capsulizes the central 
historiographic perspective of the NLH writer: "Can history-writing, or
interpretation in touch with it become a new medium —  a supreme fiction
which does not reduce being to meaning, but defines a thing sharply in
terms of the ’difficulty of what It is to be'?"* Hartman's
description of history as "a supreme fiction" stresses the 
self-consciously heuristic and idealistic nature of any humanistic study 
which finds itself confined to the expression of unique experiences and 
events in terms of an inadequate communal language. For the historians 
of NLH all traditional attempts to chart historical progression 
necessarily Imply a reductive, allogorical, paraphrastic, and thus 
fictionalized approach to an irreducible, multifarious reality.
In the pages of NLH, the correspondence between "factual" events 
and their scholarly reconstruction ceases to serve as a primary 
critereon for the evaluation of historical study. According to the 
hermeneuticist, no unbiased summit exists outside the confines of 
language from which such a correspondence may be accurately perceived or 
evaluated. Instead, the postmodern critical evaluation of historical 
texts foregrounds the historian’s own reality, his own interpretive
linguistic perspective. The postmodern historian argues that because of 
the necessarily reductive nature of all linguistic usage, a historian's 
work reveals more about the historian than it does about the historical
^Geoffrey Hartman, "History Writing as Answerable Style," New Literary 
History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 77.
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events of which he writes. For example, Thomas Carlyle's History of the 
2French Revolution reveals more about Carlyle's (and the Romantics')
vision of revolution than it does about the actual storming of the
Bastille; and, in a similar fashion, Oscar Brockett's History of the 
3Theatre reveals more about Brockett's and the mid-twentieth century 
theatre historians' interpretive reality than it does about the actual 
progression of the theatre. Accordingly, in the pages of NLH 
traditional historical issues such as valid documentation, correct and 
efficient collation of historical data, and authentication of primary 
sources receive little attention. On the other hand, questions 
concerning the ethical adequacy of the historian's perceptual framework 
predominate.
This chapter investigates the positions taken by the NLH 
critico-historians regarding the adequacy and inadequacy of various 
historical perceptual frameworks. The stance universally taken by the 
NLH critics against the traditional, positivist, "factual" history of 
the arts will first be examined. Further, how does the postmodern 
critico-historian hope to remedy the deficiencies of positivist history 
through the creation of an alternate perceptual framework? This chapter 
concludes with an overview of the methods of hermeneutic history and of 
the gains the hermeneuticist hopes to achieve through his refurbishing 
of the historical method.
2Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution: A History (New York: C.
Scribner's, 1871),
3 Oscar Brockett, History of the Theatre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1968).
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Positivism and Its Problems
The hermeneutic program for the history of the arts was developed 
as a direct attack upon the procedures of traditional positivist 
history. Hayden White describes the task of the positivist historian: 
he "seeks to explain what happened in the past by providing a precise 
and accurate reconstruction of the events reported in the documents. He 
does this presumably by suppressing as far as possible his impulse to 
interpret the data, or at least by including in his narrative where he 
is merely representing the facts and where he ife interpreting them."^ 
In a similar fashion, James Ackerman writes that positivist history 
depends on the assumption "that fact can be apprehended directly by the 
observer and that the objectivity of statement can be secured by the 
logic of their formulation and by the reliability of the methods of 
investigation on which they are b a s e d . I n  other words, the 
positivist operates from an atomistic perspective of language wherein a 
direct correspondence may exist between the word and what it indicates, 
between signifier and signified. Correspondingly, the foundations of 
positivist history deny the arbitrary and inherently prejudiced 
character of language and imply a belief in the possibility of an 
innocent, uncontaminated vision. Only through such a belief can the 
historian maintain the importance of objective empirical research as a 
means of warding off bias in the interpretation of historical data.
^Hayden White, "interpretation in History," New Literary History, 4 
(Winter 1973), 285.
"\james S. Ackerman, "Toward a New Social Theory of Art," New Literary
History, 4 (Winter 1973), 316.
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Accordingly, the NLH attack upon positivism has been launched in 
the name of the two central hermeneutic principles: the indefinability
of the intentional life force and the inescapably prejudiced nature of 
all human perception. This attack has been levelled against the 
positivist historian both in terms of his analysis and description of 
the single historical event and in terms of his construction of causal 
historical patternlngs.
Repeatedly the NLH historians stress the reductive tendencies of 
the positivist’s conception of linguistic reality. Echoing Dilthey, the 
postmodern historian argues that the positivist's evasion of the gap 
between linguistic convention and "reality" results in the confused 
transformation of purely metaphorical, linguistic concepts into 
empirical realities with their own objectively observable histories. 
The workings of this fallacy (most noticeably evidenced in the reduction 
of temporal progression to such broad spatial concepts as cultural 
periods, aesthetic styles, and predominant temporaments, ideals, and 
world visions, i. e. Zeitgeist) are explicated by Louis Althusser in a 
passage crucial to New Marxist hermeneutics: "it presupposes in
principle that the whole in question be reducible to an inner essence .
. . it presupposed that the whole had a certain nature, precisely the
nature of a 'spiritual' whole in which each element was expressive of 
the entire totality as a ’pars totalis’."^ Hayden White explains that 
the historian's compulsion to create such a centered order stands behind 
even the first perusal of historical documents, indeed that without the 
premonition of such a centered whole any reading of historical documents
^Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading "Capital", trans. Ben 
Brewster (London: NLB, 1979), p. 187.
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would prove Incomprehensible. White explains that "Before the historian
can bring to bear upon the data of the historical field the conceptual
apparatus he will use to represent and explain it, he must first
prefigure the field —  that is to say, constitute it as an object of
mental perception."^ Siegfried Giedion argues that the existence of
such a codifiable, describable centered order must be called into
question. He notes, "History writing is ever tied to the fragment. The
known facts are often scattered broadcast, like stars across the
firmament. It should not be assumed that they form a coherent body in
the historical night." Accordingly, the positivist historian of the
arts has been portrayed in the pages of NLH as one who dresses his own
identity, his own ideas of order, his perceptual framework, in the garb
of another period's predominant Zeitgeist and proceeds to find the works
of that period inevitably created in his own image. George Steiner
asserts that the traditional study of the arts "exhibits a precise drive
towards usurpation; it would work away from its own existential
9derivativeness and take on the ontological primacy of its cause."
If the NLH historian cannot rest confortably with the positivist 
separation of historical description from historical interpretation, he 
is no happier with the professed scientific neutrality of the positivist 
historian. In supporting the Heideggerian concept of intentional 
pre-understanding, the NLH historian argues that every linguistic cut
^Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth
Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1973), p. 20.
g
Siegfried Giedien, Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to
Anonymous History (New York: Oxford University, 1948), p. 3.
9
George Steiner, "'Critic'/'Reader'," New Literary History, 10 (Spring 
1980), 437.
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into the stream of reality has been intentionally predetermined. For 
example, arguing that every perception involves a distinction between 
what remains the same and what has changed, between what fulfills and 
what negates one's intentional expectations, Hayden White explains that 
the mere act of recognizing the past as such involves an ideological 
judgment concerning the present. White writes, "the very claim to have 
distinguished a past from a present world of social thought and praxis, 
and to have determined the formal coherence of that past world, implies 
a conception of the form that knowledge of the present also must take, 
insofar as it is continuous with the past w o r l d , A n d  noting that 
the very selection of historical data for inclusion in an aesthetic 
history automatically entails a judgment of what is to count as 
aesthetic value, Richard Fogle condemns the positivist's dream of 
scholarly neutrality in a fashion similar to White's. "In literary 
history, as in criticism, the problem of value has to be faced. The 
attempt to eradicate it from consideration simply transfers it to 
something outside literature that the historian values more."^
These two central fallacies, the treatment of artificial concepts 
as if they were empirical realities and the camouflage of ideological 
partiality under the disguise of scholarly neutrality, are seen by the 
NLH historian as not only pertaining to the positivist description of 
historical data but also as deeply embedded in positivist 
noumenalogical-deductive reasoning. Noumenalogical reasoning exists in
^Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth
Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1973), p. 21.
^Richard Harter Fogle, "Literary History Romanticized," New Literary
History, 1 (Spring 1970), 242.
the form of a syllogism wherein one set of data, the conditions, are 
related to anther set of data, the results, by means of a causal 
principle or law. Interpretation in positivist history usually consists 
in determining the latter, the connection between one set of data and 
another. Although interpretation often may be more implicit than 
explicit, positivist history depends on such a form of interpretation if 
it is not to degenerate into the chronicle, the mere collection of data 
without any reasoned connection. Indeed without interpretation the 
historian would have no reason for the selection and emphasis of one set 
of data over another.
However, the hermeneuticist finds the positivist laws of
interpretive reasoning just as fallacious as the data on which such
reasoning depends. Leon J. Goldstein argues that history involves
itself not with the actions and reactions of physical properties and
elements but with the ever changing facets of the uncodifiable
intentional unconscious, facets that can move and be moved in a large
number of indefinable and incalculable ways. Goldstein asserts that
historical reasoning "cannot prove that events produce, give birth to
12events; not logically, not empirically." Furthermore,
noumenalogical reasoning when applied to the study of human actions 
stands in direct contradiction to a central phenomenological principle, 
that the processes of the cognitive unconscious often disobey the 
logical rules of reasoning and order. It follows that if historical 
interpretation is to do justice to the often chaotic progression of 
historied time, the historian would have to forsake the basic character
12Leon J. Goldstein, "Literary History as History," Hew Literary
History, 8 (Winter 1977), 320.
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of noumenalogical reasoning, rational order. And once the logical
disorder of the intentional unconscious has been granted, lineal
history, that is, history based on a flow of causal connections, reveals
itself as the chauvinistic suppression of the integrity and existential
identity of other ages. Writes D. W. Robertson, "The common.assumption
that institutions, attitudes and ideals display a 'linear development'
in the course of history has no justification in the evidence of history
itself. And the further assumption that the present represents a kind
of glorious fruition of linear development amounts to nothing more than
what might with some justice be called 'historical anthropomorphism'
13inherited from romantic philosophers like Hegel."
Despite their severe attacks upon the foundations of positivist 
historiography, the writers of NLH exercise caution in their portrayal 
of the practicing positivist historian. They recognize the sensitivity 
shown by predominant positivist scholars to the inherent perils of their 
disciplinary philosophy and suggest that the actual failings of 
positivist history may assume a conscientiously covert nature. The 
writers of NLH portray the practicing positivist as a man riven between 
the ethical responsibility to respect the existential integrity of the 
actual historical document and the opposing impulse to discern 
significant patternings amidst the chaotic welter of historical data. 
Hayden White explicates this dilemma in terms of existential information 
and significant comprehension: "information conveyed in any scientific
explanation must vary in inverse proportion to the degree of 
comprehension claimed for the explanation. The more information given
13D. W. Robertson, Jr. "Some Observations on Method in Literary
Studies," New Literary History, 1 (October 1969), 27.
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about a specific phenomenon, the less comprehension to be expected; the 
more comprehension provided, the less data the generalizaiton 
constituting the explanation can be expected directly to apply to,"^
Correspondingly White divides positivist history into four 
predominant patterns of thought, ranging on a continuum from that which 
attempts a total suppression of the theoretical, the idiographic, to 
that which focuses primarily on the theoretical unveiling of causal 
principles, the mechanistic. White defines the idiographic historian as 
one who "conceives of his work as finished when the phenomena he has 
observed have adequately been represented in precise descriptive 
p r o s e . O n  the other hand, White defines the mechanistic historian 
as one who attempts to predict the future "by virtue of the mechanistic 
reduction of . . . data to the status of functions of general laws of 
cause and effect that are universally operative throughout all of
. * „ ri 16history.
White also divides positivist history into those patterns of 
thought which focus on spatial description and structural explanation, 
the idiographic and the contextual, and those concerned with charting 
the temporal evolution of forms, the organicist and the mechanistic. 
White defines the contextual as that form of thought associated with 
stylistics and periodization. This mode of historical thought attempts 
to assimilate the raw data of the idiographic into broad, spatially
^Hayden White, "The Problem of Change in Literary History," New 
Literary History, 7 (Autumn 1976), 100.




unifying concepts. On the other hand, the organicist stands as an 
informative check on the total theorizing tendencies of the mechanistic. 
White defines the organicist's tracing of historical development as 
resulting in a "synthesis in which each of the parts of the whole must 
be shown either to mirror the structure of the totality or to prefigure 
the form of either the end of the whole process or at least the latest 
phase of that process."^ The organicist insists that the principles 
governing an art form's development not be discovered in nonaesthetic 
influences but instead be located in the inherent life potential of the 
particular art form. While the positivist historian of the arts tends 
to shun the mechanistic due to its overt opposition to prized scholarly 
neutrality, the other three forms of positivist historical narrative 
continue to play a large part in contemporary aesthetic history. 
Consequently, the problems inherent in each have received a great amount 
of attention in the pages of NLH. And an investigation into what the 
NLH writer deems the ethical failings of each may lead to a clearer 
understanding of the vehemence with which the NLH writer has attacked 
the practice of positivist history.
The historian who places his highest value on scholarly neutrality 
will naturally gravitate toward the idiographic. However, the writers 
for NLH argue that the idiographer, in assuming that an alien past can 
be discerned directly through present day vision, evades the central 
judgment that initiates every historical study, the difference between 
the past and the present. Jameson writes, "One is tempted to say that 
this position 'solves' the problem of the relationship between present
^Hayden White, "Interpretation in History," New Literary History, 4
(Winter 1973), 302.
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18and past by the single gesture of abolishing the present as such," 
Furthermore, since the hermeneuticist views art as a ruptural action 
taken against the perceiver's expectations of the world, the 
hermeneuticist also views the idiographer's evasion of the relationship 
between the art work and its interpretive context as coincident with his 
inability to perceive the existential identity, the social impact, the 
aesthetic and historical action of the work of art. As Geoffrey Hartman 
asserts, logical, rational interpretation of the work of art replaces 
appreciation of aesthetic ruptural action.
White identifies the ultimate results of empirical, idiographic
history: a deluge of distancing facticity and man's consequent
Inability to recall lived experience. White writes, "The indiscriminate
use of recollection, the conscious effort to remember everything, is a
threat to memory’s power to restore consciousness1 original relationship 
19wit its world." Yet no matter how exhaustive the historian's 
research, no matter how many documents turned over, no matter how many 
historical data recorded, the reconstruction of past events remains 
forever beyond the idiographer's reach. , Dennis Tedlock forcefully 
stresses this point when he writes in regards to the stenographic 
recording of contemporary oral performance: "How long does a silence
have to be to be profound? How loud is loud? . . . When does an annoyed
tone become an angry one, or irony become sarcasm? Such qualities are
not discrete entities and find no secure place in a mechanical scheme,
18Fredric Jameson, "Marxism and Historicism," New Literary History, 11 
(Autumn 1980), 45.
19Hayden White, "Literary History: The Point of It All," New Literary
History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 82.
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20but they do make changes in the meaning of what is said." 
Accordingly the writers of NLH portray the idiographer as one cut off 
from the living action of the work of art and surrounded by a massive 
accumulation of recorded data, an accumulation continually expanding 
without raison d 'etre and without hope of even accurately reconstructing 
the material thingness of the art of the past. In order to stem and 
shape the flood of historical data, the idiographer inevitably turns to 
the theoretical and the contextual.
The writers for NLH do not deny that the contextual approach to the 
history of art permits a rational ordering and emphasis alien to the 
idiographic. However, the contextual approach to history involves 
itself with two positivist concepts which have received severe criticism 
in the pages of NLH, empirical stylistics and periodization. The 
hermeneutic historian argues that the postivist's concept of distinct 
historical periods, each with its own empirically manifested style, not 
only concerns itself with unreal entitles but also suppresses the life 
impulse and social impact of the work of art.
In the pages of NLH, positivist periodization has come under severe
attack for a large number of reasons. F. E. Sparshott supplies the most
accesible of these arguments when he writes, "a period 'style' Is
nothing but a movement that happens to have become dominant, and nothing
21dictates that an age has to be so dominated by anything." Sparshott 
also links the problem of periodization with the inherent nature of the
20Dennis Tedlock, "Toward an Oral Poetics," New Literary History, 8 
(Spring 1978), 510.
21 F. E. Sparshott, "Notes on the Articulation of Time," New Literary
History, 1 (Winter 1970), 328.
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intentional unconscious where predominant styles, particular states of
langue, originate. The intentional unconscious, though holistically
involved in each act of perception, continually develops in an
irrational and restricted fashion as particular and oftentimes minute
expectations are negated and reconstructed. Sparshott writes that style
"results from the convergence of many changes, proceeding at different 
22rates." Sparshott argues that all attempts to define style in a 
rationally coherent and demonstrative fashion must be considered 
fallacious.
Another argument frequently waged against the positivist's concept
of periodization concerns itself with the difficulty in empirically
locating and describing style. The hermeneuticist argues that style can
be located neither on the level of an empirically manifested Zeitgeist,
on the level of the predominant ideas or ideals of a period, nor even on
the level of the material form of the work of art. The NLH historian
regards the concept of a predominant Zeitgeist governing production in
all the communicative systems of a period as tenuous and as conducive to
23"impressionistic comparisons and easily elastic formations." To 
similar effect, Hans Robert Jauss explains that "simultaneously 
appearing literature . . . breaks down into . . . works formed by the
different moments of the 'shaped time' of their genres (as the 
apparently present starry sky moves apart astonomically at very
22F. E. Sparshott, "Notes on the Articulation of Time," New Literary 
History, 1 (Winter 1970), 326.
23Alastair Fowler, "Periodization and Interart Analogies," New
Literary History, 3 (Spring 1972), 490.
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24different rates)." Nor does the NLH historian believe that style 
can be directly located in the ideals or ideas that predominate during a 
particular period. Style as the manifestation of contoured linguistic 
perception originates in the intentional unconscious. Style exists as a 
form of intentional understanding which proceeds rational, ideational 
segmentation and analysis. Style prohibits or permits certain ideas to 
dominate during a period according to whether those ideas can adapt to 
its structural vision. For example, the disconnected ideas of 
existential philosophy would find no place in the totally unified, 
analogical structure of medieval thought. Consequently, as Hayden Whtie 
argues, the historian who seeks to define a period through a description 
of its predominant ideas mistakes a period's material forms for the true 
reality which binds these forms together, its sense of structural 
verisimilitude.^
Furthermore, since style remains a matter of interpretive reality, 
it must be located in the act of perception rather than in the object 
perceived. The isolated analysis of a work of art in itself can reveal 
little about the predominant style of a particular artist or of a 
particular period. In opposition to the positivist's attempt to locate 
style at the level of a work's material and formal structures, George 
Kubler cites two axioms of icenographic method: "1) that a visible form
often repeated may acquire different meanings with the passage of time, 
and 2) that an enduring meaning may be conveyed by different visual
24Hans Robert Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary 
Theory," New Literary History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 29.
25Hayden White, "The Problem of Change in Literary History," New
Literary History, 7 (Autumn 1976), 108.
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26forms." For similar reasons, Brian Stock asserts, "In any community
or period of time, two sorts of changes are presumably always going on
at once: real change which is happening but not perceived and perceived
27change which may or may not be taking place." For example, Fredric
Jameson writes of "hegemenic forms" wherein a previous aesthetic form
"is appropriated, secretly emptied of its content and subverted to the
28transmission of oppositional . . . messages." Jameson cites the
remaking of folk song and peasant dance into the aesthetic forms of the 
pastoral and the court masque. In summary, the writers for 
NLH undermine the grounds for positivist periodization by stressing the 
impossibility of empirically locating a period's predominant style.
However, the central argument levelled by the hermeneuticist 
against positivist contextualism pertains to another domain, the ethical 
respect for the ruptural power of art. Positivist periodization aligns 
itself with structuralism insofar as it views the individual works 
produced during a period as reflections of that period's langue. 
Inevitably the positivist then defines style in fixed, static, 
structural terms. Douglas Archibald writes, "In most elaborations of an 
'ambience,' a gestalt or a 'world-view,' the past becomes objective and 
static —  and dead . . . Our imaginative past becomes spatial —  an
object, a construction, a closed circuit of sequential events —  rather 
than a set of temporal relationships in which we are invited to
26George Kubler, "Period, Style and Meaning in Ancient American Art," 
New Literary History, 1 (Winter 1970), 143.
27Brian Stock, "Literary Discourse and the Social Historian," New 
Literary History, 8 (Winter 1978), 183.
28Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially
Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell, 1981), p. 86.
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29participate." Such a conception of style denies the dynamic
ruptural power of art. Furthermore, Kubler explains that positivist
stylistics reduces the stature of the art work to a variation upon a
theme: "The historian of an art trains himself to recognize the norms
and commonplaces of an age; he traffics with the mediocre, and
encounters greatness like eccentricity, in the form of significant 
30deviations." In summary, the contextualist though working on a 
broader scale than the idiographer, shares the same tendency to diminish 
the art work into a static object without the power to alter 
meaningfully and recharge a society's communal langue.
Akin to structuralism, contextualism may provide a method for the 
analysis of synchronic cross-sections of historied time, but it cannot 
supply a method for noting the impulse behind significant historical 
change. Having reduced the art work to a reflection of a period's 
stylistic reality, the contextualist loses track of the antagonistic 
force exerted by the individual work upon the communal langue. And 
having lost the means to measure ruptural impact, the historian becomes 
incapable of perceiving the nature of historical evolution. The 
contextualist who seeks to account for the change between one synchronic 
stylistic reality and another inevitably turns to the organicist's 
method of historical narration.
The organicist's vision of an art form as a living and evolving 
medium with its own inherent principles of change and development allows
29Douglas W. Archibald, "Yeats' Encounters: Observations on Literary
Influence and Literary History," New Literary History, 1 (Spring 1970), 
443.
30Lawrence Lipking, "Periods in the Arts: Sketches and Speculations,"
New Literary History, 1 (Winter 1970), 198.
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the positivist historian to account for the contour of historied time
without the apparent sacrifice of scholarly neutrality. However, the
writers for NLH argue that once a historian has begun to separate his
data into the patterning of a chronological narrative, he has at the
same time introduced an entire metaphysical vision into his work, no
matter how surreptitiously. According to White, "the historian
confronts a veritable chaos of events already constituted, out of which
he must choose the elements of the story he would tell. He makes his
story by including some events and excluding others, by stressing some
and subordinating others. This process of exclusion, stress, and
subordination is carried out in the interest of constuting a_ story of a_ 
31particular kind.11
The introduction of a metaphysical vision into a historical
narrative implies an equivalence among all entities comprising the
story. Consequently, the hermeneutic historian argues that the
organicist's perception of history negates the existential integrity of
a work or a period. For example, Rainer Warning complains about the
lack of appreciation given to medieval religious drama by the organicist
historian. Warning argues that the organicist considers medieval church
drama as a transitional form worthy of scant attention since it fails to
fit in with the existential nature of theatre as understood in the
twentieth century, "the separation between the internal situation of the
32performance and the external one of reception." Transitional
31Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth
Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1973), p. 16.
32Rainer Warning, "On the Alterity of Medieval Religious Drama," New
Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 267.
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periods also lose their existential integrity as they become
subordinated to the historical march toward the most contemporary stage
of artistic perfection. Morton Bloomfield summarizes the reductive
tendency of the organicist!s vision: "The notion of progress and
evolution has made natural in modern scholarship an emphasis on
continuities and similarities, even long after those basic notions of
the intellectuals of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth
centuries had begun to fade as dominating ideas or perhaps paradigms of 
33modern thought."
The NLH attack on organicism also concerns itself with the much 
debated topic of aesthetic influence and innovation. In the 
organicist's concept of aesthetic evolution, the successive artists 
working in a particular medium become united through the common goal of 
perfecting that medium, each climbing on the shoulders of his immediate 
predecessor and carrying the medium on from where his predecessor has 
left it. Such a conception of artistic evolution implies that 
innovations may be consciously identified and assimilated by succeeding 
artists but it fails to account for the essentially unconscious 
character of intentional perception and speculation, the sources of all 
aesthetic evolution according to the hermeneuticist. Hayden White 
accordingly calls the organicist's concept of conscious innovation and 
influence, the "unfortunate residue of superannuated intellectual 
loyalties, loyalties that derive from out-moded conceptions of the 
nature of tradition or the one side and from positivist notions of
33Morton Bloomfield, "Continuities and Discontinuities," New Literary
History, 10 (Winter 1979), 267.
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writers as atoms banging into one another, like billiard balls, on the 
*1/
other side."
The writers for NLH argue that the organicist's concept of history
reduces man's aesthetic past to a series of codifiable events stripped
of their deep, unconscious mystery and of their ruptural otherness.
Philip Fisher summarizes the hermeneutic complaint against the
organicist vision by noting how positivist aesthetics originated in "the
idea of systematic ordering . . . and the use of spatial display as a
35form of education" during the "Museum Age," the Enlightenment. 
Fisher adds,
That we walk through a museum, walk past the art, 
recapitulates in our act the notion of art history
itself, its restlessness, its forward motion, its power 
to link. Far from being a fact that shows the public's 
ignorance of what art is about, the rapid stroll through 
a museum is an act in deep harmony with the nature of 
Art, that is, art history and the museum itself (not with 
the individual object, which^the museum Itself has 
profoundly hidden in history)."
The NLH historians argue that the positivists' efforts at impartial 
scholarship have continually limited and diminished the social
importance of art by reducing aesthetic and historical reality to a
single plane, be it that of idiographic thingness, of contextual
stylistic langue, or of organic implicit metaphysics. Consequently,
positivist history lacks the oppositional contrast between reality and 
perception, between parole and langue, between desire and language, that
Hayden White, "Literary History: The Point of It All," New Literary
History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 178.
35Philip Fisher, "The Future's Past," New Literary History, 6 (Winter 
1973), 592.
Philip Fisher, "The Future's Past," New Literary History, 6 (Winter
1973), 592.
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allows both the historical event and the work of art to exert their full 
ruptural power. According to the writers of NLH, positivist history has 
lost its power to interest, to alter one's perceptions or to involve 
either the reader or the historian in the creative understanding of 
another reality.
Hermeneutic History and Its Hopes
Reality rests not in the object perceived but in the act of 
perception, in the temporal, linguistic, holistic act of perception. 
This credo immediately separates the hermeneutic NLH historian from the 
positivist. The relocation of reality into the arbitrary gaze of the 
perceiver and the consequent separation of the historian from any 
authentic, unbiased perception of the totality of factual existence 
produces a profound alteration in the metaphysical assumptions of 
hermeneutic philosophy, For example, the positivist's valued scholarly 
neutrality causes traditional history to gravitate toward the ideal of 
empirically accurate and clear sighted reconstructions of past objects 
and events. On the other hand, the hermeneuticist, arguing that past 
realities cannot be seen through the eyes of the present, regards such
reconstruction as wasteful erudition, as "patient stenographic drudgery
37in the name of science." The hermeneuticist asserts that any 
element of the past not still alive in the tradition of the present has 
forever lost itself in time and can no longer be resurrected, 
reconstructed or re-understood. Consequently, hermeneutic history has 
radically shifted its direction away from that of positivism. Instead 
of attempting to recollect and explain past realities, the
37Dennis Tedlock, "Toward an Oral Poetics," New Literary History, 8 
(Spring 1978), 510.
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hermeneuticist hopes to investigate his own reality through 
confrontation with another. Since reality remains a matter of 
perceptual frameworks and interpretive strategies, the hermeneutic 
historian of the arts looks not to the material thingness of the past 
work of art but to the minds of the past that comprehend it. As Thomas 
Roberts writes, "Any . . . inquiry into the character of literature must
begin not with the books claimed to be literature but with the people
38who claim to perceive literariness in them." In a similar fashion
Manfred Naumann explains, "We start from the view that author, work, and
reader, the literary process of writing, appropriation, and
communication, are mutually interconnected and form a relational 
39structure." The hermeneutic historian of the arts seeks to
reconstruct the past interactions between an aesthetic text and its 
audience not in order to explain the interactions as empirical realities 
but in order to encounter the reconstructions as the heuristic and 
idealistic models of a ruptural reality different from his own.
Another fundamental division between hermeneutic and positivist 
historiography stems from the phenomenological belief in the holistic 
nature of every act of perception. The positivist, operating from a 
base in the rationalist subject-object dichotomy, divides reality into a 
number of discrete entities, each with its own distinct and objective 
history. However, such a precise compartmentalization of historical 
reality becomes impossible once one identifies reality as the product of
38Thomas J. Roberts, "The Network of Literary Identification: A
Sociological Preface," New Literary History, 5 (Autumn 1973), 67.
39Manfred Naumann, "Literary Production and Reception," New Literary
History, 8 (Autumn 1977), 107.
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a structural world vision. Though separate sets of elicited 
expectations, say those elicited from a theatre audience or from a 
reader of popular fiction, may seem to indicate the existence of
separable realities, each system of expectations receives its identity 
only through contrast with its entire contextual environment of other 
systems. For example, theatre will attain its existential identity 
partially through contrast with rival art forms. The value and 
expectations that a society places upon theatrical entertainment will 
vary according to whether the theatre's chief aesthetic competitor is 
the serial novel or the cinema. Jean Starobinski cites the pinpointing 
of this contra-contextual identity as the starting point for all 
histories of art: "Even before bearing upon that sector of society
which may have constituted the 'public' of a given 'author,' the history 
of a work's reception must reflect, be it only summarily, upon the 
choice which promotes to the rank of precious and memorable works those
texts which belong neither to daily verbal exchange nor to the sphere of
AOreligion." New Marxist Manfred Naumann further stresses the
defining link between the individual work and the social perceptual
framework into which it enters. Naumann writes of "social modes of
reception," attitudes toward the work of art that reflect the identity
of a certain social class or community. Social modes of reception,
Naumann writes, include:
ideas . . .  of what literature is, ought to be, can do, 
and must have done; of how works, authors, movements, 
schools, whole literary epochs, and the history of 
literature are to be evaluated, interpreted, and 
understood; of which works and authors the reader ought
^ Jean Starobinski, "On the Fundamental Gestures of Criticism," New 
Literary History, 5 (Spring 197A) , A9A.
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to read, and which not; ideas of norms for realizing the 
possibilities inherent in literary production and 
reception for a specific mode^yf social communication and 
cultivation of consciousness.
Hans Robert Jauss concludes, "the history of an art of literature can no
longer be written as an autonomous history, but only as part of the 
42social process." Hermeneutic historiography differs from positivism
in prohibiting the narrowness of the organicist's focus on a single,
isolated topic of study.
But, perhaps the most essential division between the work of the
positivist historian and that of the hermeneuticist stems from the
latter's belief in the fundamentally indefinable nature of historical
progression. Whereas the positivist labors for historical
reconstruction, the hermeneuticist works to deconstruct his own
reconstructions. Or, as Istvan Soter states, whereas the positivist
envisions similarities and influences, the hermeneuticist encounters 
43confrontations. And these confrontations, between the work of art 
and its linguistic context, between past realities and the historian's 
own present perception, shape and impel the progress of hermeneutic 
history.
The work of the hermeneutic historian can be divided into three 
integral tasks. Initially the hermeneutic historian concerns himself 
with the structural analysis of historical data in the hope of
^Manfred Naumann, "Literary Production and Reception," New Literary 
History, 8 (Autumn 1977), 119-20.
4 2Hans Robert Jauss, quoted in Rien T. Segers, "An Interview with Hans 
Robert Jauss," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 90.
4 3Istvan Soter, "The Dilemma of Literary Science," New Literary
History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 99.
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reconstructing a particular period's "world model," "the whole set, more 
or less closed, of rules which function for us as rules of 
d e c o d i n g . T h i s  structual endeavor co-exists with the attempt to 
experience past realities. The structural and the phenomenological 
sides of the historical discipline then balance and inform each other. 
Above all, the hermeneuticist attempts continually to adopt an 
appropriate ethical perspective toward his work, leaving a clearing for 
ruptural insight to occur.
Although the reconstruction of past world models remains an 
idealistic endeavor, certain principles guiding such work have been 
frequently repeated in the pages of NLH. According to the writers of 
NLH, a world model represents more than the linguistic framework of a 
particular period, more than a period's sense of style or 
verisimilitude, even more than a society's criteria for judging what 
will pass as a real entity. Society's existence as a unified cultural 
network, indeed the very existence of human society, depends on such.a 
model. Yuri Lotman, the Russian semioticist who perhaps has done more 
work than any other contemporary critic in the exploration of the 
cybernetic mechanisms of world models, writes, "at a certain moment, the 
moment, in fact, from which we can begin to speak of culture, man linked 
his existence to a continually expanding nonhereditary memory; he became 
a receiver of information (during the prehistoric period he was merely a 
carrier of constant and genetically given information.)"^"* Lotman
^Paul Zunthor, "Comment on H. R. Jauss' Article," New Literary 
History, 10 (Winter 1980), 368.
^"*Yu. M. Lotman and B. Uspensky, "On the Semiotic Mechanism of 
Culture," New Literary History, 9 (Spring 1978), 226.
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adds that this system of nonheriditary memory "represents a powerful
means of 'self-adjustment' for a culture, since it bestows upon it a
systematic unity, and determines from several aspects the qualities it
46will possess as an information-storage system." Consequently a
world model assures a certain potential for intersubjective communicaton
and perception among the members of a community. It guarantees the
members of a society the right to exist within the same stream of
perceived reality. It also determines what ideas, ideals and types of
communication will predominate during a particular period. And it does
so not in the manner of the positivist Zeitgeist, as the cause of
individual parole's, but as "the conditions of possibility" of their 
A 7existence. Hayden White asserts, "In a given period and place in
history, the system of encodation and decodation permits the
transmission of certain kinds of messages regarding the context and not
o t h e r s . M a r i a  Corti concludes, "The result is inevitable:
anything which does not fall within the bounds of the model cannot exist
49within the culture." A world model sets the boundaries defining the 
cultural and represents the barrier against which the ruptural power of 
art is directed. A world model gives cultural identity to a particular
46Yu. M. Lotman, Tipologia della Cultura (Milan, 1975), p. 73, quoted 
and trans, in Maria Corti, "Models and Antimodels in Medieval 
Literature," New Literary History, 10 (Winter 1980), 340.
^Fredric Jameson, "Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre," New
Literary History, 7 (Autumn 1975), 158.
^Hayden White, "The Problem of Change in Literary History," New 
Literary History, 7 (Autumn 1976), 107.
49Maria Corti, "Models and Antimodels in Medieval Literature," New
Literary History, 10 (Winter 1980), 346.
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society and in doing so forms the oppositional force necessary to give 
identity to cultural artifacts.
Once a society has solidified its world model, it puts into play a 
series of mechanisms designed to stabilize cultural identity and thus to 
prevent ruptural occurrence. The most easily discerned of these defense 
mechanisms, the maintainance of taboos against the anticultural, 
determines what may not be expressed without great risk within a 
particular culture. At the same time it shapes much of what does become 
expressed. For example, Fredric Jameson identifies the social function 
of romance and its descendant, melodrama, as the social assimilation and 
handling of the threat of the anticultural. Jameson asserts that in the 
romance, the Other is feared not "because he is evil; rather he is evil 
because he is Other, alien, different, strange, unclean, and 
unfamiliar. Jameson accordingly identifies the social function of 
the romance as "drawing the boundaries of a given social order and 
providing a powerful deterant against deviancy and subversion.
Lotman identifies another of society's stabilizing mechanisms as
the willed shortening of cultural memory. Lotman writes, "Every culture
creates its own model of the length of its existence, of the continuity 
52of its memory." Lotman asserts that the longevity of a culture's 
memory will be determined "by the permenance of its basic structural 
principles and by its inner dynamism —  its capacity for change while
"^Fredric Jameson, "Magical Narratives: 
Literary History, 7 (Autumn 1975), 158.
51.Ibid.
52,
Romance as Genre," New
Yu. M. Lotman and B. Uspensky, "On the Semiotic Mechanism of 
Culture," New Literary History, 9 (Spring 1978), 226.
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still preserving the memory of preceding states and, consequently, of
53the awareness of its own coherence." And Stephen Nichols proceeds
to demonstrate how society's regulation of its own longevity may
profoundly affect the structural perception of a particular period.
Nichols points to a peculiarity of medieval perception, the
consideration of all realities as co-existent in a perpetual present.
Nichols explains, "What could be thought, and, most importantly, named
in words —  no matter, what its origins —  did not constitute an
abstraction unknowable in reality, but, on the contrary, an important
54and tangible part of the experience of present concrete existence." 
Nichols demonstrates this point by drawing attention to the frequent 
commingling of pagan and Christian icons within medieval painting. And 
Rainer Warning explicates this same perceptual principle of medieval 
disjunction in terms of the frequent pagan imagery and allusions used in 
medieval religious drama. Writes Warning, "This is not a contrast 
pregnant with significance, but rather Christianity is understood here 
in pagan terms and paganism is conceived in Christian ones."^
The writers for NLH cite a third mechanism for the defense of 
cultural identity, the stratification of a single society into a 
hierarchy of social communities, each with its own distinct values and 
perceptual norms. Wolfgang Iser writes, "Every epoch has had its own 
thought system and social system, and each dominant system in turn, has
54Stephen C. Nichols, Jr. "The Sprit of Truth: Epic Models in
Medieval Literature," New Literary History, 1 (Spring 1970), 370.
55Rainer Warning, "On the Alterity of Medieval Religious Drama," New
Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 276.
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other systems as its historical environment, regulating them to
subsystems and so imposing a hierarchical order on what is considered to
56be the reality of the respective period." Yuri Lotman presents an 
overview of the resultant dynamic system that emerges from this social 
stratification: "the entire system for preserving and communicating
human experience is constructed as a concentric system in the center of
which are located the most obvious and logical structures, that is, the
57most structural ones." The nucleus of a particular society's sense 
of reality, its foundational paradigm, conditions the existence of any 
subcommunity. The central world model of a particular period stands in 
the relationship of structural langue to the parole of the subcommunity. 
However, a world model, existing on the nuclear level as a fixed set of 
syntactical rules, takes on the life force of a dynamic system as a 
subcommunity fills it out with the semantics of its own desires, hopes, 
fears, values and aspirations.
The process of social stratification bears heavily upon the task of 
the historian of the arts. For it replaces the concept of a period's 
predominant Zeitgeist or communal language with a large number of 
linguistic perspectives, each attached to a distinctly different
subcommunity. The multiplicity of linguistic perspectives inevitably 
enrichens the individual audience member's perception of a work of art 
not only insofar as the individual may belong to a large number of 
linguistic subcommunities but also insofar as it insures a rich
"^Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 70.
^Yu. M. Lotman and B. Uspensky, "On the Semiotic Mechanism of 
Culture," New Literary History, 9 (Spring 1978), 213.
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cross-fertilization of different linguistic levels in every act of
perception. Hans Robert Jauss identifies the three predominant levels
of linguistic perception involved in aesthetic perception as "the
reflective at the high level of authors, the social at the level of
cultural institutions, and the prereflective at the underground level of
58immediate experience." Every aesthetic experience involves the
individual in perceptions stemming from his own unique personality, from
his membership in an institutionalized subcommunity, and from his
situation within an over expanding cultural society. The writers for
NLH have tended to concentrate upon the level of the institutionalized
subcommunity, the level they identify with generic expectations.
Alastair Fowler asserts the necessity of identifying a particular genre
with a particular subcommunity. Noting that "no genre has ever been
open to all social groups regardless of their level of education,"
Fowler asserts that the basic identity of genres comes from "formal
constituents" which coincide with a subcommunity's particular
59manifestation of a period's world model. Jauss likewise identifies 
genres as the "communicative norms" and "subuniverses" of a particular 
subcommunity.^  And Tzvetan Todorov asserts the close connection
between artistic genres and the institutionalization of the
subcommunity: "a society chooses and codifies the arts that most
58Hans Robert Jauss, "Theses on the Transition from Aesthetics of
Literary Works to a Theory of Aesthetic Experience," in Interpretation 
of Narrative, eds, Marie J. Valdes and Owen J. Miller (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 139.
59Alastair Fowler, "The Life and Death of Literary Forms," New 
Literary History, 2 (Winter 1971), 208; 203.
^ H a n s  Robert Jauss, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval
Literature," New Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 214.
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closely correspond to its ideology; this is why the existence of certain
genres in a society and their absence in another reveal a certain
ideology.
The tracing of generic change has become one of the NLH historians1
chief tools for charting the development of a particular period^ world
model. Furthermore, Jauss explains that since subcommunities do not
exist in mutual exclusion but instead continually interact, the
structural analysis of the changing relationships between genres allows
one to reconstruct the evolution of a particular society^ hierarchical 
6 2structure. Fowler, preceding from a similar argument, lists several
relationships that may be obtained between different genres: inclusion,
63inversion, contrast, combination, and conversion. Fowler explains 
that by noting the dominant member in any generic inter-relationship one 
may pinpoint the more nuclear subcommunities within a society^ 
stratification. However, the mapping of perceptual evolution through 
the inter-relationships of genres attains validity only in the study of 
those types of society which Lotman classifies as paradigmatic. 
Paradigmatic societies secure their identity through a rigid 
stratification of norms and subcommunities, all centered in the fashion 
of concentric circles around the nucleus of a single prized community
^Tzvetan Todorov, "The Origin of Genres," New Literary History, 8 
(Autumn 1976), 164.
6 2Hans Robert Jauss, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval 
Literature," New Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 214.
63Alastair Fowler, "Genre and the Literary Canon," New Literary
History, 11 (Autumn 1980), 100.
and its set of texts. On the other hand, societies may exist 
through what Lotman terms syntagmatic ordering. Here all texts and all 
subcommunities possess equal value and a world model diffuses itself 
through such a society as its noncentered condition of being. 
Neoclassical France may be viewed as a prototypical example of the 
paradigmatic society; contemporary existential Europe, as a prototypical 
example of the syntagmatic society.
Paradigmatic and syntagmatic societies vary not only in regard to 
their means of social ordering but also in their means of evaluation of 
texts. Lotman writes that the paradigmatic society "will tend towards a 
specialization of its texts so that to each cultural function there
corresponds an adequate type of text."^ On the other hand,
syntagmatic societies "will tend to obliterate the boundaries between
texts in order that identical texts should serve the whole set of
cultural f u n c t i o n s . W h i l e  genre holds an important position in 
maintaining and proclaiming the identity of a subcommunity in a 
paradigmatic society, syntagmatic societies tend to relinquish the firm 
codification needed for predominant genres. Instead aesthetic texts 
enter into a broad social marketplace and rival with other types (e. g. 
religious, scientific, philosophical) for the importance and use-value 
to be assigned by a particular culture. Hayden White demonstrates how 
this commodification of the work of art inevitably leads to a reduction 
of art's potential for social impact and to a resultant Isolation of art
64Yuri Lotman and A. M. Piatagorsky, "Text and Function," New Literary 
History, 9 (Winter 1978), 235.
65Ibid., 243.
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as a self-enclosed linguistic system "If we insert 'literature* into 
the list of possible commodities, it then becomes possible to
understand, not only the alienation of the artist which the 
representation of the value of his product in terms of money alone might 
foster, but also the tendency of the artist to fetishize his own produce 
as being itself the universal sign and incarnation of value in a given 
social system.
Many of the writers for NLH have identified this progression from a 
paradigmatic to a syntagmatic social stratification, from the work of 
art as the generic identity of a subcommunity to the work of art as 
fetishized commodity, as the predominant tendency of Western
civilizaton. Consequently, the history of art as presented in the pages 
of NLH gravitates from a portrayal of the work of art as the parole of
an institutionalized social langue during the classical, medieval, and
neoclassical periods to a portrayal of art as an isolated linguistic 
system during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Accordingly, the 
hermeneutic practice of the history of art, while never losing sight of 
the other systems which form the context for aesthetic evolution, alters 
its direction midstream from a medievalist contextualism to a modernist 
organicism.
However, in the postmodern period the coherent nature of art as an 
isolated linguistic system disintegrates. John T. Irwin explains that 
as the syntagmatic stratification of society breaks culture apart into a 
multitude of diverse entities, as art becomes insulated from an often
^Hayden White, "Literature and Social Action: Reflections on the
Reflection Theory of Literary Art," New Literary History, 11 (Winter 
1981), 378.
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indiscernible social langue, as the ruptural power of art becomes 
possible only as an assault upon its own isolated system, the
ZQ
self-evidencing power of the artist becomes severely jeopardized.
Accordingly, Jauss identifies the contemporary period as one of "ironic
identification," "a level of aesthetic reception upon which an
identification that the reader would otherwise have expected is denied
him in order to jolt him out of his undisturbed attentiveness to the
aesthetic object and to direct his awakened reflections toward the
69conditions of illusion and the possibilities of interpretation." 
Irwin asserts that the contemporary artist has most frequently opted to 
achieve this form of anti-aesthetic self-evidencing through a focus on 
the material corporality of his artistic medium.^ The contemporary 
artist has resisted the intentional expectations of his audience by 
emphasizing that element which cannot be made to fit into an abstract 
structural perspective, the material substance of the artistic medium. 
For example, Herbert Blau, citing Grotowski and Brook, points to the 
somatic base of many of the major innovations made in theatre language 
during the 1960’s and 1970's . T h e  hermeneutic historian who seeks
68John T. Irwin, "Self-Evidence and Self-Reference: Nietzche and
Tragedy, Whitman and Opera," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 
180.
^Hans Robert Jauss, "Levels of Identification of Here and Audience," 
New Literary History, 5 (Winter 1974), 313.
^John T. Irwin, "Self-Evidence and Self-Reference: Nietzche and
Tragedy, Whitman and Opera," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 
180.
^Herbert Blau, "Precipitations of Theatre: Words, Presence, Time Out
of Mind," New Literary History, 12 (Spring 1981), 140.
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to study the works of art produced by a loosely organized syntagmatic
society inevitably links his research with the idiographic.
The writers for NLH cite a final means for the social
solidification and protection of cultural identity, the use of a
predominant type of media as the prized carrier for socially significant
information. Lotman argues that the durability of the medium used for
society's central texts exerts a powerful influence upon the longevity
72of a society's cultural memory. For example, a print culture
possesses the capability for a longer termed heritage than an oral
culture. However, more importantly for the historian of the arts, the
capacity of the predominant medium for carrying certain kinds of
information and its incapacity fo others will determine the types of
communication and linguistic perception which prevail within a given
culture. Marshall McLuhan, a pioneer in the study of the cybernetic
effects of media, speaks of "entelechies," patterns of structural
learning and perception re-enforced by the predominant use of a
73particular medium. For example, Robert Kellogg describes the basic
perceptual habits developed within an oral culture as, on the one hand,
sensuous, communal, and poetic, and on the other, as conservative,
74formulaic, and stereotyped. Kellogg explains that the
person-to-person immediacy of communication within an oral culture 
re-enforces the sense of a shared, dynamic communal body of truths. At
72Yu. M. Lotman and B. Uspensky, "On the Semiotic Mechanism of
Culture," New Literary History, 9 (Spring 1978), 215.
73Marshall McLuhan, "Roles, Masks, and Performances," New Literary 
History, 2 (Spring 1971), 523.
^Robert Kellogg, "Literary, Nonliterary, and Oral Tradition," New
Literary History, 8 (Spring 1978), 533.
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the same timet its lack of permanency prevents the explorative and 
technical accumulation of detail. Accordingly Morton Bloomfield argues 
that the invention of the printed text "is a substitute for memory but 
is more accurate than memory. The text makes possible literary accuracy 
and creates a kind of s t a n d a r d . A n d  a large number of postmodern 
historians have blamed print culture for endorsing a positivist 
conception of reality and a correspondant view of language as inherently 
centered. Murray Krieger explains that with the advent of the printing 
press, the act of linguistic expression "became its own synchronic 
metaphor . . .  In the Renaissance it took on the aesthetic dignity of a 
physically present act, and tried to earn its right to such a dignity by 
manipulating its elements into becoming its own emblem, graphic symbol 
of itself."^ Lotman asserts that the fundamental character of French 
Neo-Classicism can be understood only in terms of its bringing to its 
first full flourescence the centered linguistic perspective of print 
culture. Lotman writes, "The relationship between Truth and the world 
being depicted became the point of view. The fixed and unique meaning 
of these relationships, the way they all radiate from a single center, 
corresponded to the idea of Truth as something eternal, uniform, and 
i m m u t a b l e . T h e  material modes of a particular period's sanctioned 
communicative media work to forcefully shape a society's world model. 
As Morton Bloomfield writes, "The graphic level can be central to the
^Morton Bloomfield, "Stylistics and the Theory of Literature," New 
Literary History, 7 (Winter 1976), 285.
^Murray Krieger, "Poetics Reconsidered: The Presence vs. the Absence 
of the Word," New Literary History, 7 (Winter 1976), 347.
77Yuri Lotman, "Point of View in a Text," New Literary History, 6
(Winter 1976), 340,
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social order without paying attention to the significant. Only the
78signifie is relevant."
The writers for NLH depict society as safeguarding its cultural 
identity through four essential cybernetic mechanisms: the erection and
enforcement of cultural taboos, the controlled longevity of cultural 
memory, the stratification of society into a regulated hierarchy of 
subcommunities and norms, and the sanctioning of a particular medium of 
communication. These four cybernetic mechanisms then allow the 
hermeneutic historian to complete his first task: the discovery of the
structural principles, the essential rules of perceptual logic, the 
absolute presuppositions, constituting the world model of a particular 
period. The hermeneutic historian begins this task by noting the 
contrast between the cultural and the anticultural, between the 
sanctioned and the taboo. He notes not only what is included and 
excluded from a particular culture but also the principles of structural 
organization which make the anticultural the. negative exponan of the 
cultural. Futhermore, he notes the diachronic breadth of a particular 
society's self-image, the distance into the past and the projection into 
the future which a society claims for itself. He notes the structural 
differentiations evidenced in the discontinuities between successive 
cultures. He also notes the means by which a society unifies its 
diverse subcommunities into an integrated cultural reality. In a 
paradigmatically ordered society, the hermeneutic historian of the arts 
focuses on the relationships between genres; in a budding synagmatic 
society, on the relationships between communicative systems; in a
78Morton Bloomfield, "Continuities and Discontinuities," New Literary
History, 10 (Winter 1980), 413.
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loosely organized syntagmatic society, on the relationships between
elements belonging to the same aesthetic system. The NLH historian
completes the first stage of his work by noting the cybernetic effects
engendered by the' predominant media utilized during a specific period.
Having thus reconstructed the synchronic world model of a particular
period, the hermeneuticist then calculates the structural nature of a
work of art's ruptural element.
However, the NLH historian cannot rest content with a mere
structural analysis of world models and of opposing works of art.
Rather he seeks also to measure the force of aesthetic conflict, the
difficulty encountered in giving birth to the new. As Hans Robert Jauss
asserts, hermeneutic history inevitably involves itself with the history
of "aesthetic distance," "the distance between the given horizon of
expectations and the appearance of a new world, whose reception results
79in a 'horizon change'." The NLH historian measures this distance by
noting the rigidity with which a society protects its structural
perspective, by pinpointing these elements of its structure most
susceptible to a particular shock of the new, and by analyzing the
interrelatedness of other structural elements contingent to these
segments under attack. Hans Robert Jauss further notes that the success
with which a particular work crosses this distance may by calculated
along " the spectrum of the reaction of the audience and the judgement
of criticism (spontaneous success, rejection or shock, scattered
80approval, gradual or later understanding)."
7 9
Hans Robert Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary
Theory," New Literary History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 14.
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The Initial stage of the NLH historian's task, the reconstruction
of past world models, involves a complex structural analysis of the
entire social reality which may have existed during a particular
synchronic cross-section of historied time. The complexity of such a
system naturally prevents the historian from contemplating its complete
and accurate reconstruction. However, the hermaneutic historian feels
little need to complete this part of his task.
The primary aim of the hermaneuticlst rests not in the
reconstruction of past intentional worlds. Rather by projecting himself
into another perceptual framework, by asking what reality would have
been like had he viewed it through a world model different from his own,
the postmodern historian hopes to encounter the alterity of the past and
thus to transcend his own perceptual framework. Accordingly Stanley
Fish writes that the critico-historian "has the responibility of
becoming not one but a number of informed readers, each of whom will be
identified by a matrix of political, cultural, and literary 
81detriments." And Hans Robert Jauss identifies the value of
82history as the training to see reality from different perspectives. 
According to the hermeneutic vision, historical inquiry exists primarily 
for the benefit of the historian and the historian alone can truly 
evaluate the quality of his own work.
However, the writers for NLH do not endorse an existantially 
unrestrained impressionism of the part of the historian. Rather they
81Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge: Harvard, 1980), p. 11.
82Hans Robert Jauss, "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval
Literature," New Literary History, 10 (Winter 1979), 185.
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stress the necessity to restrain "intuitions" through "the accessible
8 3facts," to temper "historical and cultural aestheticism" through
84structural analysis. World models serve as a restraint upon the
historical experiential endeavor. And positivist philology may serve a 
similar purpose. Positivist philology accordingly has not been banished 
totally from the world of NLH; rather the NLH vision exists as a 
metatheoretlcal stance governing and controlling the pursuit of
philology. Morton Bloomfield writes,"Positivism insofar as it stresses 
respect for fact and text, for accuracy and care, must always have a
place in our studies. But we can move beyond such an attitude if we so
85desire." The NLH historian does insists that primary value in 
historical research be transferred from objective accuracy to perceptual 
enrichment.
In order for this enrichment to take place, the historian's 
"familiar" perceptions must be "defamiliarized"; the historian's
expectations for rational order must be restrained in order that the 
alterity of the past may show itself more effectively. Many of the NLH 
writers seek to achive this "defamiliarization" through the process of 
"problematizing," a method of inquiry that finds its roots in R.G. 
Collingwood's "logic of question and answer." Collingwood, a seminal 
influence upon the historical thought of Hans-Georg Gadamer and a 
forefather of the postmodern revolution against positivist history,
83Lee Marx, "American Studies —  A Defense of Unscientific Method," 
New Literary History, 1 (Autumn 1969), 88.
^^Fredric Jameson, "Marxism and Historicism," New Literary History, 11 
(Autumn 1980), 45.
85Morton Bloomfield, "Continuities and Discontinuities," New Literary
History, 10 (Winter 1980), 413.
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developed Independently of the phenemenologists his theory of "absolute
presuppositions," a concept similar to that of intentionality. Absolute
presuppositions like intentional expectations form a holistic perceptual
system which continually seek its stabilization, Collingwood asserts
that any new piece of knowledge arises in answer to a question put forth
by this system, in response to a structural gap that demands
reconnection through a new piece of information. Accordingly
Collingwood explains the central principle of his logic of question and
answer: "A body of knowledge consists not of 'propositions,'
'statements,' 'judgements* . . . but of these together with the
questions they are meant to answer; and . . .  a logic in which the
answers are attended to and the questions neglected is a false 
86logic." According to Collingwood and to the postmodern
hermeneuticist, the task of the historian lies then in the empathic 
reconstruction of not only a particular period's answers, its 
predominant structural perceptions, but also of its questions, the 
structural tensions that gave rise to these answers. Due to the immense 
and complex nature of a system of absolute presuppositions, the 
historian's quest for questions can never be completed. Collingwood 
asserts that the answers of a historian should not be evaluated in terms 
of correctness or incorrectness, of truth or falsity, but rather in
terms of "right" or "wrong," a "right" answer being one "which enables
8 7us to get ahead with the process of questioning and answering."




In £he pages of NLH the historian appears as one who
"problematizes," as one who does not disseminate answers so much as one 
who asks questions. And the postmodern historian asks questions of past 
realities, of his own present reality, and in the most complex form of 
hermaneutlc historical scholarship, the study of "effect history" 
(Wirkungsgeschichte), of his entire scholarly and cultural tradition. 
For example, in "The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature" 
(Winter 1979), Hans Robert Jauss begins his study not with the
reconstruction of a medieval world model but with an examination of the 
contemperary world vision of the medieval. Jauss traces the present 
concept of medieval culture back through the Romantic period, noting the 
major scholars who have contributed to his present perceptual framework 
and linking the work of these scholars to the predominant world models 
of their respective preiods. In this fashion Jauss develops a
diachronic structure of the evolution of medievalist thought which 
eventually merges into a rich synchronic description of the present day 
medievalist's world vision. This reconstruction then allows the
alterity of Jauss' own medieval world model to extend its ruptural 
Impact beyond the barrier of his own idiosyncratic vision and to 
directly and overtly affect a large segment of his scholarly and 
cultural tradition.
The hermeneutic historical endeavor thus manifests itself in a 
constant tension between a structural-phenemenological analysis and a de —  
constructive "problematizing." The hermeneuticist remains aware that his 
findings can be expressed only in fictionalized, vauge, opaque, and 
heuristic terms. He also remains aware that, despite the complexity and 
vastness of his historival endeavor, the accessible products of his
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labor recedes forever before him. For the hermeneuticist knowledge
always lies in *the future beyond his grasp. And with every new act of
understanding, the hermeneuticist moves part of the way into that future
and the past retreats before him. As Frederic Will writes,"The past we
are striving to both enlighten and combat is an incomplete horizon which
reforms after every appropriate vision of it, a horizon never adequately
88comprehended because always freshly generated by us."
Such an endeavor may naturally appear convoluted and self-defeating
in the eyes of the positivist. Yet the writers of NLH vehemently
proclaim the dignity, the social responsibility, and the joyful verve
manifested in their efforts. For Geoffrey Hartman the hermeneutic
respect for art as a mysterious ruptural other serves to resurrect
the social importance and living power of the particular work of art.
Hartman writes that a new aesthetic history "is necessary less for the
sake of the intellect than for the sake of literature; it is our
'historical duty' because it alone can provide today a sorely needed
89defense of art." For Fredric Jamerson the central basis of 
hermeneutic history, the isolation of present perception from all other 
reality, allows the historian the power to regain lost Importance in the 
betterment of human society. Jameson writes that in hermeneutic history 
the past "rises up to call our own form of life into question and to 
pass judgement on us, and through us, on the social formation in which
88Fredric Will, "Shamans in T u r t l e n e c k s New Literary History, 13 
(Spring 1982), 416.
89Geoffrey Hartman, "History-Writing as Answerable Style," New
Literary History, 2 (Autumn 1970), 89.
90we exist." And for Hans Robert Jauss the hermeneutic insistence
that the indefinable spirit of man be taken into account by the scholar
in the humanities betokens a reawakening of humanistic brotherhood.
Jauss asserts that in its rebellion against "the technocratic
educational ideal", hermeneutic history brings together "understanding,
interpretation, and application in order to win back for self-experience
the knowledge of that which has become alien, the past as well as 
91interhuman life.
90Fredric Jameson, "Marxism and Historicism," New Literary History, 11 
(Autumn 1980), 70.
91Hans Robert Jauss, quoted in Rien T, Segers, "An Interview with Hans
Robert Jauss," New Literary History, 11 (Autumn 1979), 93,
CHAPTER IV 
A New Theatre History: Losses and Gains
The editors of NLH continually stress the identity of the journal 
as that of a symposium. And a symposium cannot exist without a contrast 
of voices. Nevertheless, from the pages of NLH a single central vision 
emerges concerning the eplstemological and ethical dimensions of 
historical study. And this vision manifests itself on three complexly 
developed, profoundly argued and inter-related levels: the
eplstemological, the aesthetic, and the historiographic.
The eplstemological dimension of the NLH vision entered into its 
two hundred year evolution through Kant's and Hegel's rebellion against 
Cartesian dualism, through their reshaping the universe from a 
noumenalogical to a teleological order. At the cornerstone of the NLH 
world vision stands the resultant phenomenological concept of 
intentional understanding. The beliefs, values, and methods of study 
explicated in the pages of NLH may be seen as attempts to work out the 
implications of this central concept. One may also discern, grafted on 
this phenomenological root of the NLH perspective, certain central 
tenets of the structuralists: namely the holistic, linguistic,
conventionally biased character of all perception. However, by 
themselves Husserlian or Diltheyean phenomenology and Saussurian 
structuralism remain spatially confined visions, mutations of a 
positivist perspective. A reshaping of their core tenets was necessary 
before the full teleological vision of NLH could come into existence. 
Consequently, the man most influential in the temporal revisioning of 
intentionality, Martin Heidagger, stands as the seminal figure in the
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recreation of a new aesthetic history. Heidagger's central concepts of 
lntenional pre-understanding and ruptural truth provide the basis for 
the critical and historical methodology expounded in NLH. With Martin 
Heidegger, reality becomes transferred from its empiricist base in the 
perceived object to its hermeneutic base in the act of perception. 
After Heidegger, criticism divides into those who would totally silence 
language and pre-understanding, the poststructuralists, and those who 
believe that man can only exist in the stream of pre-understood
linguistic reality and tradition, the hermeneuticists. NLH takes its
vision from the latter.
Through the evolution of contextual linguistics, particularly
through the development of speech act theory by Austin and Searle and 
its consequent partial deconstruction by Derrida, hermeneutic philosophy 
gained firm access to an appropriate aesthetic vision and formed the 
second level of the NLH paradigm. In NLH aeathetics, artistic
significance results from an interaction between an aesthetic text and 
its audience, the Jatter initially assuming the upper hand. The work of 
art, by forcing the audience to supply the contextual determinants 
necessary for communicative significance, foregrounds an audience's 
perceptual linguistic framework and exposes it at its most vulnerable 
position for attack. This aesthetic attack upon linguistic 
pre-understanding, this erectien of aesthetic metaphor, constututes the 
most important and powerful moment of the aesthetic experience in the 
world of NLH.
Due to his coupling of the aesthetic experience with a temporalized 
linguistic tradition, the NLH critic inevitably finds himself involved 
with the third level of the NLH paradigm, the methodology for charting
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the history of a work's reception. And the writers for NLH insist that 
every act of praxis in the history of the arts implies a set of 
epistemologicial and aesthetic judgements. Consequently, mobilized by 
the ethlclal impulse behind postmodern criticism, NLH has launched a 
severe attack upon postitivist history in terms of its implicit 
aesthetic. The NLH historian argues that the positivist endeavor to 
reduce all history to a single linguistic perspective has abolished the 
multi-levelled texture of reality necessary for ruptural occurrence. 
The positivist endeavor, the NLH writers assert, has reduced the 
temporal action of the work of art to the stature of a material 
commodity. In opposition to the positivist endeavor the NLH historians 
have constructed their own model of historical research. This model 
breaks down into three stages of inquiry: the structural analysis of
past intentional world models; the empathic projection of the historian 
into the structural perceptions of these world models; and a constant 
process of problematizing, of putting questions until the past opens up 
its alterity.
As the postmoderns have transformed all perception into a matter of 
linguistics and all understood reality into the stature of a text, the 
NLH program for aesthetic history can be extended without modification 
to the study of theatre or of any other art form. However, it should be 
stressed that hermeneutic history remains still in its infancy. 
Historical work of considerable soope and value has been published by 
such scholars as Rainer Warning, Wolfgang Iser, Fredric Jameson, and 
Hans Robert Jauss. Of particular interest to the theatre scholar is 
Jauss' historical survey of aesthetic empathy and catharsis as evidenced 
predominantly in the theatrical experience. ("Levels of Identification
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of Hero and Audience," New Literary History, 5 Winter 197A) Yet much
work needs to be done in order to lay the grounds for the
hermeneutic historian. Martin Price stresses the need for a more
"subtle social psychology than we so far have."^ Bernard Beckermann
stresses greater study in the cybernetic mechanisms of learning and
2perception along the lines laid out by Piaget and Polanyi. Alastair
3Fowler calls for greater study into inter-art relationships, a need
felt acutely by the hermeneutic scholar who wishes to study art forms
such as the theatre which unite a large number of diverse communication
systems. And, as Leroy Searle asserts, the study of expansive world
models demands a more strenuous effort at interdepartmentalization than
4is so far evidenced at American universities.
In this interdisciplinary effort to create a new social history of 
the arts, the theatre historian may find himself in the priveleged 
position traditionally accorded to the literary historian or to the 
historian of the fine arts. From the positivist perspective, the 
theatre historian labors against a debilitating obstacle, the 
itnpermanency of the central object of his study, the theatrical 
performance. Unlike works of literature, paintings or films, the 
theatrical performance vanishes in the act of creation. The
Martin Price, "Literary History at Yale," New Literary History, 1 
(Winter 1970), 337-38.
2Bernard Beckermann, "Dramatic Analogies and Literary Interpretation: 
The Cherry Orchard as Exemplum," New Literary History, 2 (Spring 1972), 
403.
O
Alastair Fowler, "Periodization and Interart Analogies," New Literary 
History, 3 (Spring 1972), 506.
^Leroy Searle, "Tradition and Intelligibility: A Model for Critical
Theory," New Literary History, 7 (Winter 1977), 409.
137
hermeneutic approach to aesthetic history does not offer a way around 
this problem. However, in positing reality as a matter of perception, 
hermeneutics strips the literary historian and the historian of the fine 
arts of their priveleged position. Poems and paintings no longer exist 
as first-hand historical documents but instead become purely present 
realities. While historical inquiry may cause the work of art to show 
forth its pastness, this historicity cannot be discerned written on the 
surface. Nor does the hermeneutic historian seek to recapture the 
material form of a work of art as it may have existed in the past. 
Rather he seeks to understand the mentality of the past that first 
observed it. In this endeavor, the traditional values assigned to 
primary and secondary resources become reversed. Secondary resources 
become primary documents in the study of past intentional states. And 
the most revealing secondary resources for the literary historian and 
for the historian of the fine arts, pieces of practical criticism, 
remain largely undeveloped until the modern period. On the other hand, 
the theatre historian has uncovered a rich cornucopia of secondary 
resources which may prove invaluable to a new aesthetic history.
The unique character of the theatrical form of metaphorical 
expression also enables the theatre historian to probe key issues more 
readily than the historians of the other arts. Wolfgang Iser details 
four types of metaphorical structures, each applicable to a discussion 
of the nature of theatrical entertainment. The first type of metaphor, 
the counterbalanced, concerns itself with aesthetic surprise and 
suspense. The counterbalanced metaphor involves a contrast which only 
seems to be improbable but which when fully understood makes sense 
without disrupting the initially projected verisimilitude of a piece.
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For example, the death of Cordelia, occurring at the moment when King 
Lear's tragic catastrophe seems most likely to have been averted, may 
disrupt an audience's expectations for a peaceful denoument but it 
confirms the original tragic cast projected over the play. Iser 
explains that this type of metaphor results in aesthetic suspense 
through the creation of blanks that must be filled in by an audience 
from what it has already learned about the world of the work or from 
what it still has to learn. Consequently the metaphor of counterbalance 
"achieves its control mainly by restricting its blank references to a 
simple yes or no decision."'* The counterbalanced metaphor raises 
questions that may be answered through literal analysis such as what 
caused a particular event to happen and what will happen next. In order 
for this metaphor's control to exist, in order that aesthetic suspense 
may be prevented from expanding into a total suspension of judgement, a 
firmly established world vision must be created and fully accepted by an 
audience. Thus Iser asserts that metaphorical counterbalance relies on 
"a very definite hierarchy of perspectives; not only are the qualities 
and defects of the perspective clearly graded, but the communication 
function of the text is also specifically indicated."^ Thus the 
metaphor of counterbalance relies on a largely unchecked support of the 
perceptual norms of its social environment. Theatre, depending upon a 
popular audience for its very existence, may be seen as heavily reliant 
upon the counterbalanced metaphor. This close connection between 
theatre as popular entertainment and the rhetorical bolstering of the
^Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 190.
^Ibid . , p. 181.
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social norm makes theatre, perhaps more than any other art form, a 
reliable reflector of the intentional perceptual structures of its 
social environment.
The second type of metaphor cited by Iser, the oppositional, 
occurs when the ruptural element becomes improbable enough to call into 
question the initially accepted verisimilitude of a piece. The 
oppositional with its conflict of two mutually exclusive world visions 
locates methaphorical rupture on the level of language itself and 
foregrounds the socially accepted norms that constitue a particular 
language system. Despite the many attempts to incorporate the 
oppositional metaphor into the theatre production, especially noticeable 
for example in forms of alternate and environmental theatre which 
attempt to disrupt the basis of theatrical language by blurring the 
distinction between theatre and reality, such attempts can attain little 
aesthetic validity according to the majority of the writers for NLH, for 
the theatrical medium unlike the literary prohibits the abstraction 
necessary for the oppositional to take place.
The dynamics of metaphor are to a large extent determined by the 
concrete nature of an aethetic medium and by the resultant steadfastness 
of verisimilitude peculiar to that medium. The concrete element of 
theatre limits and localizes a work's verisimilar base in a fashion 
contrary to that of the purely verbal literary work. Oleg Grabar argues 
that since the graphic arts possess a much lower degree of discursive 
power than the literary arts, more background information becomes 
necessary before one comes to them. For example, the title of painting 
becomes more essential to one's aesthetic appreciation than the title of 
a novel. Consequently Grabar defines the nature of the power of the
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fine arts not as discursive but as model: localizing, shaping, and
emotionally grounding one's pre-existent ideas. Grabar writes,"the 
visual world, because it is genuinely interpreted in another medium than 
itself, possesses intrinsically a semantic field which is almost as 
large as the intellect of its observer. In other words, the.'receiver' 
may be considered as more important than the 'sender', perhaps even more 
than the 'message'.^ Adapted to the theatrical medium, Garber*s 
assertions imply that the world view of a play originates not from the 
production elements, not from the spectacle, but from the clues set up 
by the play's narrative and verble locutionary structures. Only after 
these structures have created a sense of verisimilitude does this world 
become localized through the production elements. Spectacle emotionally 
grounds plot. As Herbert Blau writes,"In the erotics of theatre, words
are (theoretically) corporal. They are up there for public scrutiny.
8The mind's eye echoes the mind's ear." Consequently, a holistic 
unified response to a theatrical production demands a constant 
localization of verisimilitude in the play's production elements. The 
theatre secures and holds fast in the bonds of unrelieved spectacle a 
constant, unified sense of verisimlitude. At no moment can a theatrical 
production be divided within Itself between two conflicting world 
visions. In the theatre, spectacle prohibits the oppositional metaphor 
and unifies all attempts at such division into a single, dominant, 
graphic theatrical style.
^Oleg Grabar, "History of Art and History of Literature: Some Random 
Thoughts," New Literary History, 3 (Spring 1972), 566.
g
Herbert Blau, "Precipitations of Theatre: Words, Presence, Time Out
of Mind," New Literary History, 12 (Spring 1981), 140.
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The exclusion of the metaphor of opposition from theatrical
presentation produces important ramifications for the critico-historian
of the theatre arts. The dominance of an unswerving verisimilar base,
grounded in the physicality of theatrical production, prevents theatre
from foregrounding and examining the normative ideas that constitute its
world vision. As a result, Jean Hristic describes the theatre as "far
purer" than the novel, which can support a mixture of co-existant genres 
9and world views. Accordingly Hristic contrasts the novel which 
exists primily as a foregrounding of the ideational elements which 
constitute its world view with the theatre which exists primarily as a 
foregrounding of its world view as an unbroken whole. It follows that 
theatrical expression, existing as a microcosmic manifestation of a 
particular society's world vision, will tend toward the conservative. 
Peripheral social change will tend to have little effect upon it. 
Changes within the structure of theatre language may serve as a fairly 
reliable barometer of changes within the structure of a society's 
linguistic perspective. The theatre historian finds himself in a 
position closer to the core of a particular period's paradigmatic vision 
than do historians of other arts.
Iser also speaks of the dialectical metaphor which is structured so 
that it cannot be resolved by a selection of one sense of verisimilitude 
ever a competitor. Rather, as Kazimar Bartoszynskl writes, in the 
dialectical metaphor different senses of veisimilitude are seen not so
q
Jean Hristic, "The Problem of Realism in Modern Drama," New Literary
History, 8 (Winter 1977), 313.
142
much as competing but rather as parallel.^ The dialectical metaphor 
falls into two categories, the echelon and the serial. In the echelon, 
the opposing senses of verisimilitude balance and cancel each other out. 
A balanced, unified theatre production may be regarded as a metaphor of 
the echelon variety. The theatre experience agglomerates a large number 
of diverse aesthetic languages, each with its own potential for 
different types of verisimilitude, into a single aesthetic experience. 
For example, structuralist Keir Elam identifies twenty-nine distinct 
types of theatrical language systems and finds an equivalent for each 
within the diverse aesthetic languages displayed in the writted dramatic 
text.^ These multiple aesthetic languages can be unified only in a 
metaphorical expression which balances each and refuses the domination 
of any.
However, theatre seldom if ever maintains an existence on the level 
of an even, unbroken equivalence of signs. Art demands rupture and the 
theatrical base in the echelon spirls into what Iser terms the metaphor 
of the serial. The serial metaphor occurs when the dialectical contrast 
of the echelon has been so accelerated that resolution into a single 
vision proves impossible or when an obstinate stylistic element so 
disrupts the prevailing aesthetic language that the meaning making power 
of that language is called into question. This is the metaphorical 
moment when past linguistic expectations stand silenced before the 
thrust and wonder of new truth, or as put into theatrical terms by
^Kazimar Bartozynski. "The Borderlands of Literary Criticism," New 
Literary History, 11 (Winter 1980), 224.
^Keir Elam, The Semietics of Theatre and Drama (London: Methuen,
1980), pp. 57-62.
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Stanley Homan, the moment when "theatre turns to itself," calling
attention to new and ineffable innovations in the body of theatre 
12language. The theatre, an art form which exists primarily by means
of a foregrounding of aesthetic language, takes its essential
hermeneutic history from the serial metaphor and the technical
innovations implied therein. Consequently the theatre tends to draw
its inspiration not from the anticultural, the noumenalogical negation
of the cultural, but from the uncultural, from the incomprehensible,
from that realm which Ricoeur identifies as that of the symbolic, the
13ritualistic, and the sacred. Theatrical rupture then tends to occur 
not on the sanctioned structural borders of a society's values but
rather on its cognitive frontier. And the hermeneutic theatre historian 
consequently finds himself in the position to ask questions crucial to 
the hermeneutic endeaver: What factors constitute the borders of
comprehension during a particular period? And what factors constitute 
that which can cross those borders intact as the mysterious, 
incomphehensible, sacred Other? Correspondingly as the hermeneutic 
endeavor gains ascendancy in the academic orthodoxy, the study of 
theatre history stands to grow in its importance in the university
curriculum.
However, great efforts still are needed to establish firmly a 
hermeneutic revision of aesthetic history as the orthodox disciplinary 
method. The eplstemological foundations of hermeneutics prevent the
12Stanley Heman, "When Theatre Turns to Itself," New Literary History, 
2 (Spring 1971), 410.
13Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Idhe (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1974),
p. 33.
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hermeneutic vision from opening itself to rational debate or promotion. 
Catharine Belsey explains, "What divides empiricist criticism from 
formalism and both from poststructuralism is centrally a debate over
meaning; and this debate cannot be resolved because what is at stake is
a contest between the different theoretical frameworks within which each 
group conceptualizes language, subjectivity, and the w o r l d . A n d  
the same applies to hermeneutics. Either one accepts the intentional 
nature of all human cognitive processes, either one accepts the 
linguistic base of all human perception or one does not. As Peter 
Steiner writes, "Epistemological spaces are not subject to the 
ballot."^ However, one can assess the ethical impact of the 
hermeneutic inquiry as a form of scholarly action; that is, one can 
judge whether the NLH format for historical inquiry hinders or
facilitates one's humanistic desires.
And the writers for NLH display a clear sighted awareness of which
values their form of scholarship sacrifices, namely academic
professionalism and specialization. Richard Ohmann notes that "a
profession is in many ways the nearest approximation offered by
bourgeois society to hereditary title and rank," and he cites five
criteria on which the attainment of a professional status depends:
1) that they have something that society vitally needs 2) 
that they offer it in a way that is detached and 
objective . . .  3) that they 'know better than their
clients what ails them or their affairs' . . .  4) that 
this experience cannot be won by apprenticeship alone, 
rather, the skills that characterize a profession flow 
from and are supported by a field of knowledge that has
14Catherine Belsey, "Problems of Literary Theory: The Problem of
Meaning," New Literary History, 14 (Autumn 1982), 175.
^Peter Steiner, "In Defense of Semiotics: The Dual Asymetry of
Cultural Signs," New Literary History, 12 (Spring 1981), 421.
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been organized . body of theory and 5) that
long training in a professional schoo^is necessary to 
master that knowledge and those skills.
Ohmann proceeds to argue the importance of academic departments in
safeguarding the central body of knowledge required for a professional
position and in regulating entry into the sanctioned ranks of the
professional. Ohmann thus defines academic departments as "the center
of our self-image and of the value we set on our professional
17selves." However, the hermeneutic vision undermines the socially
and departmentally sanctioned professional status of the academic 
professor in several ways: by insisting on the reductive, fictionalized
nature of any body of knowledge in the humanities; on the lack of 
correspondence between this body of knowledge and anything beyond the 
professor's own perceptual framework; on the nature of all truth as an 
experience of the isolated individual; and on the inability of the 
individual to truly communicate the product of such an experience. 
Consequently the abolition of academic professionalism has been
vehemently demanded by such NLH writers as Ohmann, Sparshott, and
18Hartman. And it may be argued that if the theatre scholar is
promised a prominent position in the hermeneutic endeavor only at the 
cost of a reduced social status, he may be well wary of its full-scale 
adoption.
^Richard Ohmann, "English Departments and the Professional Ethos," 
New Literary History, 5 (Spring 1974), 583; 582.
17Ibid., 568.
18Richard Ohmann, "English Departments and the Professional Ethes," 
New Literary History, 5 (Spring 1974), 584; F. E. Sparshott, "Notes on 
the Articulation of Time," New Literary History, 1 (Winter 1970), 328; 
Geoffrey Hartman, "A Short History of Practical Criticism," New Literary 
History, 10 (Spring 1979), 502.
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On the other hand, the hermeneutic vision may be judged as offering
a means to heal the division long existent in theatre studies and thus
as serving to revitalize the discipline. The discipline of theatre
studies has been riven since its inception in two essential ways. Keir
Elam expresses the first of these when he writes, "The drama.has become
(and largely remains) an annexe of the property of literary critics,
while the stage spectacle, considered too ephemeral a phenomenon for
systematic study, had been effectively staked off as the happy hunting
ground of reviewers, reminiscing actors, historians and prescriptive 
19theorists." As Elam suggests, traditional theatre scholarship
divided itself into two predominant pursuits: theatre history which
tends to focus on the theatrical production and dramatic criticism which 
tends to focus on the dramatic script. The theatrical production has 
continually been relegated to the stature of a second-order 
aesthetic system, existing as a derivative, interpretive parole of its 
langue, the dramatic text. Consequently the domain of theatre studies 
has always owed a great debt to literary analysis, the application of 
methods of reading to any type of written material. The principles of 
literary analysis consequently have controlled and guided much of the 
work in theatre history. For example, actors are described in terms of 
the characters they have impersonated; and designers and directors, in 
terms of their portrayal of certain themes. On the other hand, the 
principles of theatre history have done little to inform the practice of 
dramatic criticism. Indeed, as pointed out by Oscar Brockett, the 
principles of theatre history have themselves been derived from other
19Keir Elam, The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (London: Methuen,
1980), p. 5.
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20fields, especially from history proper. And so extensive is the 
derivative nature of disciplinary study in the theatre that there has 
yet to be adopted on a full scale a scholarly method which would unite 
the study of all the elements of the theatrical endeavor into a single 
line of inquiry. However, hermeneutics promises, indeed demands, such a 
methodological approach to the 6tudy of the theatrical experience. In 
identifying the aesthetic event as a holistic experience, hermeneutics 
has prevented the theatrical event from dividing itself into a number of 
disconnected elements, each of which the historian must account for. In 
developing a structural method of identifying the work of art through 
its relationship to its linguistic context, hermeneutics has provided a 
means for locating the equibalanced unity of all the aspects comprising 
a single theatrical expression. In replacing the traditional belief in 
a universal aesthetic with an acceptance of a large number of particular 
aesthetics conditioned intentionally and Cybernetically by the medium of 
the work of art and by the scholar's own linguistic environment 
hermeneutics has provided the philosophical grounds for a unique 
aesthetic of the theatre and for a correspondent methodology. In 
merging critical theory with historical praxis, heremaneutics implies a 
single goal unifying all scholarly endeavor in the field of theatre 
studies, namely the training to see through a large number of different 
perceptual frameworks. And, although the full development of a 
particular hermeneutic for the theatre scholar waits upon futher study 
in the phenemenological nature of the theatrical experience, the writers
20Oscar Brockett, History of the Theatre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1977), p. 612.
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for NLH have supplied an expansive methodological structure from which a 
specialized hermeneutic may be adumberated.
In 1966, a second division within the field of theatre studies was
identified by the Princeton Conference on Theatre Research, that between
the training of the theatre artist and the education of the theatre
21scholar. The training of the theatre artist ultimately gears itself 
to the domain of the Imaginatively originative. On the other hand, 
positivist theatre history and objectivist dramatic criticism concern 
themselves primarily with the domains of analysis, synthesis, and 
interpretation, forbidding the domain of the imaginatively originative 
as the source of overinterpretation. Consequently a cognitive and 
imaginative leap has been required before the findings of one field can 
be related to the other. However, hermeneutics promises to bridge this 
gap between the training of the theatre artist and the work of the 
theatre scholar. It has done so not by supplying a method for 
the incorporation of "historical facts" into contemporary production but 
by stressing the subordinate role that "facts" play in the true task of
the scholar. By transforming scholarship in the arts from a process of
interpretive analysis to an experience of creative self-expression, 
hermeneutics unites scholarship and aesthetic practice through the 
commom bond of a particular mode of understanding. Hermeneutics 
promises to unite all educational endeavors in the field of theatre 
studies as similar types of cognitive action.
21 "Conference on Theatre Research" issue of Educational Theatre 
Journal, 19 (June 1967), 240.
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However, the major contribution hermeneutics stands to make to the
field of theatre studies stems from its position in contemporary
aesthetic thought. In 1980, David Lodge accurately summarized the
prevailing conditions in the domain of aesthetic theory; it is marked,
he writes, by the
belated turning of attention, by English and American 
critics, to the European tradition of formalism and 
structuralism, which has without a doubt been the most 
striking development in the humanities in the last 
decade. In Britain, and no doubt in America, there are 
still a few strongholds of dissent, where academics try 
to convince themselves that if they keep their heads down 
long enough the structuralist fuss will simply blow over; 
or, more valiantly, man the periodical ramparts in
defense of empiricism, humanism, New Criticism, or 
whatever. But really the battle has been won (or lost, 
depending on your point of^ylew), and the question is 
what to do in the aftermath.
In the contemporary debate between the scientist and the humanists, 
the predominant voice for the scientists is no longer that of the 
positivist or of the objectivist but of the structuralist and of the 
semloticist. And, at least In America and France, the main opposition, 
the most noted voice for the new humanism, comes from the
poststructuralist. One then has a choice between, on the one hand, the
scientific dissection of the work of art in a fashion that would reduce
all culture to a set of deterministic systems and, on the other, the 
total silencing of scholarly research in the humanities. Given this 
arena, the committed scholar in the field of theatre studies can welcome 
the hermeneutic vision, no matter how underdeveloped its method of study 
still remains. While hermeneutics does not evade recognizing the demise 
of the old scholarly tradition and the arrival of the new, it does
22David Lodge, "Historicism and Literary History: Mapping the Modern
Period," New Literary History, 10 (Spring 1979), 555.
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guarantee the continued study of the work of art without prohibiting its 
participation in the mysterious and in the divine. The writers for NLH 
insofor as they bear witness to the hermeneutic vision may serve the 
theatre scholar as paradigmatic models of how to preserve aesthetic 
education and scholarship in the wake of positivism and objectivism and 
in the name of the indefinable, sacred other-ness of one's fellow man.
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